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Abstract 
This thesis examines the programs introduced by the Australian 
Government between 1989 and 1998 aimed at responding to inadequate 
incomes among farmers. The policies were developed and frequently 
reviewed in the context of the Government's structural adjustment 
objectives for the farm sector and related drought response policies. 
The policy process itself was incremental, suggesting that Charles 
Lindblom's model of "muddling through" might provide a valuable analytical 
tool. In Lindblom's model an important role is allocated to watchdogs who 
protect and promote a diversity of values during the course of policy 
development. In the area of farm poverty, the Commonwealth Department 
of Primary Industries and Energy, the various farming and welfare interest 
groups and the major political parties have not been effective advocates for 
poor farmers. The strong influence of economic liberalism within policy 
circles suggests that the diversity of views that Lindblom called for is absent 
and it has seen farm poverty framed as an industry issue rather than a 
welfare concern. This may not be such a problem if the values of economic 
liberalism were more compatible with the agrarianism which is important to 
many small family farmers. 
The future of Australian agriculture is being shaped by the 
Commonwealth's rural adjustment policies, however there has been little 
public debate about the direction of these policies. The focus has been on 
the means and on instrumental goals such as economic efficiency with little 
consideration given to the environmental and social implications. 
Government policies towards farm poverty provide an interesting insight 
into the dilemmas of policy making when the policy ends are not clear and 
different values are represented unequally in the policy process. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Agriculture has played an important role in Australia's history since 
European settlement. It has been described as providing "the cornerstone 
of Australia's economic prosperity" (Wilson and Johnson 1997, p7) and for 
many years the adage that Australia rode on the sheep's back was 
appropriate (Epps 1993, p116). As the Australian economy has developed 
and matured, agriculture's contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) 
has declined, although its export earnings remain significant. In 1997 -98, 
the gross value of agricultural production was $27.4 billion or 3.4 per cent 
of GDP. The total value of exports was $22.9 billion or 25.9 per cent of total 
goods (merchandise) exports (DPIE 1998b, p8). Although there have been 
moves to diversify over the past decade or so, agricultural production and 
exports remain dominated by grains, meat and wool (ABARE 1999). 
Australian agriculture has experienced an ongoing process of adjustment 
(Ockwell 1990, p46) and this is likely to continue. The outlook has been 
described as "continuing and significant change that will bring both 
opportunities and threats to the farm sector" (McColl et al. 1997, p5). In 
addition to market pressures arising from the globalisation of world 
agriculture, farmers face natural risks, and the challenge of sustainably 
managing their resource base. As Epps notes: 
Australia is not endowed with a wealth of good farming and grazing 
land. Compared with many other countries, our lands are generally 
nutrient poor, fed by erratic rainfall, and subjec to a range of 
hazards. (Epps 1993, p118) 
These hazards include pests, drought, floods, bushfire and, in the tropics, 
cyclones. The ancient soils of the Australian continent are not well suited to 
hoofed animals and the combination of tree clearing and irrigation has 
caused problems with salinity. Large areas of the rangelands have been 
degraded and in places that degradation is irreversibla. It has been 
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estimated that the annual cost of lost production due to land degradation is 
around $1 billion (Wilson and Johnson 1997, p15). 
Australia's farmers and rural life have become part of the national identity. 
Stehlik et al describe this as a notion that Australians are 
essentially rural creatures transplanted against our will in urban 
metropolises around the eastern seaboard of the continent. To many 
of us 'the bush' evokes a natural, pristine essentially good place 
which may be less than the city we live in, but somehow it is still 
morally our national conscience. We respond emotionally to the 
ideology of the pioneering spirit, the challenge against the unknown, 
the concept of 'the rural'... ( Stehlik et al. 1996) 
Soldiers returning from the Second World War were thanked for their 
service by the allocation of farm land through the War Service Land 
Settlement Scheme which provided for the intensification of existing land 
use and development of new lands. With this policy, the rural myth became 
tied up with the "Anzac legend" (Stehlik et al. 1996). Sadly, these soldier 
settlement schemes sowed the seeds for some of the adjustment problems 
which faced the farming sector over half a century later when these 
properties proved too small to be viable in an era of declining farm terms of 
trade. The policy of closer settlement was expanded in the 1950s to include 
new farmers other than those selected as soldier settlers (McEwen 1952). 
Although these schemes had the support of agriculture Ministers around 
Australia, they were not universally applauded. Professor of Agriculture at 
the University of Melbourne SM Wadham wrote in 1947 that 
Of all the foolish policies of land settlement which have been 
advocated for general application in many parts of Australia, the 
endeavour to create systems of small -scale or peasant farming is 
probably the most stupid. (Wadham 1947) 
Other government policies have also impacted significantly on agriculture. 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s farmers were exhorted to 'get big or 
get out'. This resulted in additional land purchases by farmers, including 
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those who were already productive and viable in the long term and for 
whom further land purchases may not necessarily have been sound 
business decisions. These purchases were often debt- financed and, when 
combined with the very high interest rates in the late 1980s, resulted in a 
debt crisis in agriculture (Epps 1993, p121). 
Agriculture in Australia 
Australia is the world's largest exporter of wool, the fourth largest wheat 
exporter (Irving et al. 2000, p29) and a significant producer and exporter of 
beef. Production far outstrips domestic demand, so the sector is 
export- oriented with nearly 80 per cent of primary production being 
exported (Wilson and Johnson 1997, p11). Australian farmers are among 
the most efficient in the world in terms of production costs, having achieved 
ongoing increases in agricultural output in real terms. Over the period 
1960 -61 to 1988 -89 this increase was at a trend rate of 2 per cent 
per annum (Wonder and Fisher 1990, p55). In response to changing 
market conditions, Australian farmers have begun the move from the 
production of undifferentiated bulk commodities to more customer -focused, 
niche marketing. For example, grain growers have shifted their production 
from wheat of "fair average quality" to specialty grains such as noodle 
wheats and high protein durum wheat for pasta manufacture. Similarly, 
beef producers have changed their practices to respond to the Japanese 
demand for marbled beef products, and the wool industry has increased its 
emphasis on the production of very fine wools in order to increase the value 
of the product. Relatively new crops such as cofton, canota and chick peas 
have also expanded and exports of fresh fruit and vegetables have 
increased as farmers have sought new, higher value markets. However, 
Australian farming remains dominated by broadacre farming systems 
(sheep, beef cattle and extensive cropping) (ABARE 1999). 
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In spite of ongoing productivity improvements and moves into higher value 
products, agriculture's importance to the Australian economy has been 
steadily declining. The farm sectors contribution to GDP dropped from 
around 18 per cent in 1952 -53 to around 3 per cent in 1995 -96 (McColl 
et al. 1997, p21) and agriculture's share of exports dropped from 
78 per cent in real value terms to 21 per cent over the same period 
(McColl et al. 1997, p22). Farmers have faced declining terms of trade for 
decades - at an average annual rate of 2 per cent over the past forty 
years (Industry Commission 1996, p4). This long term decline has been 
exacerbated by climatic variability and fluctuations in commodity prices, 
with the latter feit more acutely in recent years as various price support and 
stabilisation schemes have been abolished by successive governments. 
As price- takers in the international market, Australia's commodity producers 
have also been adversely affected by the agricultural trade policies of the 
large international players, such as the US Export Enhancement Program 
and the export subsidies of the European Union's Common Agricultural 
Policy. In 1998, Australian farmers felt the impact of economic upheavals in 
Russia, Latin America and Asia as weaker demand for commodities 
resulted in agricultural commodity prices declining on average 20 to 30 
per cent in US dollar terms (Fisher 1999, p3). 
In 1997, there were 145,086 farm enterprises in Australia and 394,000 
people were employed in agriculture and related industries ( Dorges 
1998a, p10). The proportion of the Australian workforce employed in 
agriculture has declined from around 10.3 per cent In 1962 -63 to 
5 per cent in 1988 -89 and 4.2 per cent in 1998 -99 (ABARE 1999, p2). 
Australian agriculture is dominated numerically by family farms with about 
90 per cent of farms fitting this description (Lawrence et al. 1992, p10). 
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Family farms are either owned by a sole operator or family partnership and 
"operate on the basis of a combination of business and social goals" 
(McColl et al. 1997, p7). Only 0.4 per cent of farm enterprises are 
corporately owned, although these farms contribute 6.5 per cent of the 
gross value of production (Wilson and Johnson 1997, p12). The financial 
performance of farms differs widely, with the top 20 per cent of farms 
producing 80 per cent of farm output (Wilson and Johnson 1997, p15) and 
there are many family farms which are performing well in all agricultural 
districts. The gap between top performing farms and the average 
performers has widened over the course of the 1990s (Beare 1999, p14). 
The overall number of farms has been decreasing, accompanied by an 
increase in the number of large farms. This reflects the fact that farm size 
has a significant bearing on farm financial performance (McColl et al. 1997, 
p27), although the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (ABARE) suggests that this is only one factor, with farm 
management skill levels and the age of the farm operator also being 
significant (Beare 1999, p14). Nevertheless, structural adjustment 
pressures have been felt particularly by the smaller family farms as they are 
less resilient in the face of fluctuating commodity prices and an uncertain 
and variable climate. 
Tied very closely to the issue of farm adjustment is that of farm poverty. 
Over the decade 1989 -1998, a series of programs was implemented by the 
Commonwealth Government to provide support to farmers experiencing 
hardship. These programs were developed against a backdrop of ongoing 




There is frequent reference in the rural adjustment and farm policy literature 
to the "low income problem" in farming and the existence of poverty among 
farm families (Musgrave et al. 1975, p10; Campbell 1980, p83; Lawrence et 
al. 1992, p11; Rolley and Humphreys 1993, p248). However, no large 
scale systematic research has been undertaken to either define or measure 
farm poverty. In 1976, Vincent argued that 
While legitimate doubts may be held concerning the actual number 
of farm families whose welfare is below socially acceptable 
standards, the evidence clearly points to a sizeable group whose 
incomes are chronically low and a larger group whose incomes are 
low in some years. (Vincent 1976, p112) 
Based on 1986 figures, Davidson and Lees concluded that 
After allowing for all adjustments, the levels of poverty range from 
13 per cent for wage and salary farmer households, to 24 per cent 
for employer farmer households, and to 33 per cent for 
self -employed farmer households. (Davidson and Lees 1993, p45) 
The adjustments referred to by the authors include allowance for the 
perquisites of farming, such as rent and motor vehicle use, for wealth 
increases and the opportunities for tax minimisation, as well as for regional 
differences (Davidson and Lees 1993, p45). 
Defining and measuring poverty is a complex issue which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Putting aside the particular difficulties associated with 
assessing poverty among the self -employed (including farmers) there is 
ongoing debate in the social welfare literature about the appropriate means 
of defining and measuring poverty (Nicolaou 1998, p5). Saunders argues 
that "[lit is not easy to produce a precise definition of poverty, even in its 
narrow meaning in relation to material well -being or `primary poverty- 
(Saunders 1998, p12). Debate includes whether poverty should be defined 
to incorporate social exclusion, concepts of relative deprivation, choice and 
social context and whether measurement should focus on income, 
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expenditure, level of choice or the budget- standards approach. The latter 
attempts to determine precisely how much it costs to live at a basic level by 
assembling a basket of goods and services and determining the budget 
necessary for their purchase (Henman 1998, p103). Townsend argues that 
Poverty can be defined objectively and applied consistently only in 
terms of the concept of relative deprivation. ... Individuals, families 
and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty when they 
lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the 
activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are 
customary, or are at least widely encouraged or approved in the 
societies in which they belong. (Townsend 1979, p31) 
Within Australia, the Henderson poverty line has been used since the 
mid -1960s as a threshold for determining the level of poverty within the 
community and also as a factor in the determination of the level of social 
welfare payments. Although there has been criticism of the poverty line in 
terms of its arbitrary nature, the method it employs to adjust for differing 
family composition and the means for updating, it is generally regarded as 
useful (Saunders and Whiteford 1989). It should be noted that the criticisms 
that apply to the Henderson poverty line are also levelled in different 
degrees at other forms of poverty line (Atkinson 1989, p23). In assessing 
the number of farmers in poverty, a 1973 survey of farm households by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics set the poverty line at 80 per cent of 
60 per cent of average earnings. This compared with a poverty line of 60 
per cent of average earnings for the community at large, the difference due 
to the fact that farmers did not generally face the housing costs of non -farm 
low income earners (Vincent et al. 1975, pp81 -82). 
The inclusion of farmers in the 1973 survey was unusual as the 
self -employed are generally excluded from poverty research. This is 
because their true financial situation is difficult to determine due to the 
blurring of business and family expenditure. Johnson explains: 
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There are several problems with analysing poverty among the 
self -employed. First many household expenditures such as housing 
costs, may have been paid wholly or in part by the business so there 
is an unidentified in -kind source of income; second many businesses 
may receive tax discounts on expenditures that apply to their 
households as well as to their business; third businesses may have 
the opportunity to average income over several years so that 
negative income may be recorded, and finally the structure of the 
business may involve more than one income unit making attribution 
of income difficult. (Johnson 1996, p53). 
The situation with respect to farmers is further complicated by the nature of 
farming. As noted in the research report prepared for the Henderson 
Commission, "Financial Aspects of Rural Poverty ", 
Money income in farming is likely to be a misleading and 
inappropriate measure of farm poverty. Even extremely low farm 
incomes need not necessarily indicate a poverty situation. (Vincent 
et al. 1975, p82) 
One of the main factors which hinders the accurate measurement of farm 
poverty is the large amount of capital tied up in the land. This often results 
in a situation where a farm family is asset -rich and income -poor. This arises 
due to both the generally low returns earned by agricultural land and the 
propensity of farmers to accumulate capital (Vincent et al. 1975, p86). 
Vincent et al argue that, for farmers, capital accumulation "has traditionally 
commanded a very high priority, often at the expense of income ". This 
tendency is exacerbated by a focus on tax minimisation among farmers 
rather than on income maximisation. Having converted income into capital 
for various reasons the farmer is unable easily to reconvert the asset for 
consumption purposes. Vincent et al suggest that 
Current income and current wealth together provide a more 
functional measure of welfare, because the possession of assets 
gives access to loanable funds which can be used by an individual to 
increase his command over goods and services. (Vincent et al. 
1975, p83) 
However, this is not a realistic assumption. As Hefford points out: 
most lenders expect loans to be repaid over some specified period: 
in fact, it is inconceivable that private institutional lenders would be 
willing to provide advances for consumption purposes, allowing 
indebtedness to grow, year after year, with no prospect of repayment 
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prior to the death or retirement of clients and ultimate sale of their 
farm assets. (Hefford 1985, p288) 
If farmers are receiving inadequate returns from their investment in land, 
they could perhaps be expected to remove their capital from farming and 
reinvest in an activity which produces higher returns. This response to low 
incomes is rare among family farmers, resulting in delays in the adjustment 
of the sector to declining terms of trade. Then Director of the Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics, Stuart Harris, explained in 1970: 
If farmers transferred quickly to alternative occupations when their 
incomes reached relatively low levels, the supply of agricultural 
products would better adjust itself to commercial demand and, while 
the prices of the non -labour resources in agriculture would also fall, 
average farm incomes would be maintained at levels closer to those 
obtainable elsewhere. For various reasons, farmers tend not to 
leave agriculture until forced out by low levels of income and /or high 
debt. (Harris 1970) 
The continued failure of farmers to respond to adjustment pressures over 
the thirty years since these remarks were made is illustrated by the 
existence of the various forms of the Rural Adjustment Scheme and its 
successor programs analysed in this thesis. 
Government concern with farm poverty is therefore not new; it has been a 
feature of Australian agricultural policy for many years. Mauldon and 
Schapper report that, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, "[ijnadequate 
income for a large and growing number of family farm businesses was a 
major feature of agriculture" (Mauldon and Schapper 1974, p109). 
Campbell wrote in 1980 that the increased profile of farm poverty was a 
result of changed community expectations about the government's role. He 
argued that 
The reason so much is heard about rural poverty and rural 
reconstruction today is not so much that farmers face new problems 
that their forbears did not have to face, but the fact that we now live in 
a welfare state where governments assume responsibilities for 
disadvantaged citizens where they did not in former years. 
(Campbell 1980, p83) 
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This is a little misleading as rural adjustment and rural reconstruction 
policies, which incorporated household support components, have been a 
feature of Australian rural policy for decades. Nevertheless, public 
awareness of farm poverty has increased over the past twenty years or so 
for a variety of reasons, including increased focus on the welfare of farm 
families during the drought of the early 1990s. 
Saunders and Whiteford suggest that poverty alleviation extends beyond 
the provision of income support underlining the `importance of both income 
support and the provision of public services in any effective strategy to 
combat poverty" (Saunders and Whiteford 1989, p12). The issue of 
equitable access to services is of particular relevance to people in rural and 
remote Australia and has received increased attention in recent years from 
both government and the National Farmers' Federation. Concerns about 
access to services apply to otherwise wealthy farmers as well as to those in 
hardship, and although the issue of equitable access to 
telecommunications, health and other services is important, this study 
focuses on the specific issue of income inadequacy and how governments 
have responded to the needs of the income -poor in the farming community. 
Improved access to services will increase the overall well -being of poor 
farmers, however consideration needs also to be given to the issue of low 
incomes which give rise to conditions of poverty. 
This thesis accepts Musgrave's proposition that ' {pjoverty exists when the 
income available to the household is inadequate for essential items" 
(Musgrave et al. 1975, p10). Although lacking in definitional precision, 
given the ongoing debate about poverty mentioned above this is 
considered appropriate for the following consideration of government 
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responses to farm poverty in Australia. Musgrave et al also propose a 
useful typology of farm poverty which helps clarify its various forms: 
Type A poverty which results from inadequate resources (land, 
capital and /or labour) so that income is low even though prices and 
productive conditions may be satisfactory. This problem has plagued 
most closer settlement schemes. 
Type B poverty which is of a temporary nature due to a short term fall 
in prices or adverse seasonal conditions... 
Type C poverty which is widespread within an industry and is of a 
long term or structural nature. (Musgrave et al. 1975, p9) 
McKenzie (McKenzie 1985, p29) and Lawrence (Lawrence 1987, p46) 
identify similar forms of poverty. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, 
Government policies have in various ways attempted to address all three 
types of farm poverty. 
Government Responses to Farm Poverty 
A number of writers have pointed to the lack of coherent rural policy in the 
first half of the twentieth century (Lewis 1967; Throsby 1972b). In the 1930s 
and 1940s Governments were clearly concerned about inadequate farm 
incomes and there were reports of 'outright poverty in many rural areas and 
industries" (McKay 1972, p29) and assistance provided to farmers was 
"essentially a form of income relief" (McKay 1972, p23). The outbreak of the 
Second World War saw the introduction of organised marketing schemes 
and price stabilisation for agricultural products. These schemes had a 
range of objectives including the control of inflation, control of output and 
ensuring a reasonable income for producers (McKay 1972). 
In 1952, State and Commonwealth Ministers with responsibility for 
agriculture shifted the emphasis of agricultural policy from income stability 
to the expansion of exports. Agriculture was seen as having a crucial role 
in generating the export income required to fund the import requirements of 
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a growing economy. In a statement which he later described as "the most 
important declaration of agricultural policy ever made in peace time by the 
Commonwealth Government" (McEwen 1959, p252), Commerce Minister 
John McEwen told the 1952 meeting of the Australian Agricultural Council 
(AAC) that 
The Commonwealth Government has decided to adopt as its policy 
objective a Commonwealth -wide programme of agricultural 
expansion not only to meet direct defence requirements but also to 
provide food for the growing population, to maintain our capacity to 
import and to make our proper contribution to relieving the dollar 
problem. (McEwen 1952) 
The AAC announced a set of production aims with a target date of 1957 -58. 
Due to the good conditions prevailing in agriculture in the early fifties these 
targets were in fact met by 1955 -56 (McEwen 1959). Concern about farm 
income levels continued to be addressed by guaranteed minimum prices to 
producers. 
In light of difficulties in the wool and wheat industries and widespread 
drought in the late 1960s, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics undertook 
an inquiry into The Immediate and Longer Term Needs for debt 
reconstruction and farm adjustment with special reference to the sheep 
industry (BAE 1971). This report provided background for the development 
and implementation of the 1971 Rural Reconstruction Scheme. The 
legislation stated that "the over- riding objective is to help restore to 
economic viability those farms and farmers with the capacity to maintain 
viability once achieved ". In 1972, Throsby reported that "the emphasis of 
policy has shifted more to the traditional welfare considerations of 
maintaining and stabilizing farm incomes" (Throsby 1972a, p13). 
The Henderson inquiry into poverty in the early 1970s concluded that 
"much of the chronic poverty among farmers is due to the inability of farmers 
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to adjust to changing economic circumstances ". While including a caveat 
about the measurement of farm incomes, the Commission concluded that 
between 5.7 and 7.3 per cent of farmers had incomes below 20 per cent 
of the poverty line after housing costs and a further 5.5 to 5.6 per cent 
were living on between 20 and 100 per cent of the poverty line after 
housing costs (Henderson 1975, p179). Accordingly, the Report suggested 
that short term income support measures should be provided for farmers 
undergoing structural adjustment or exiting farming. The Commission 
explained that its "primary concern [was] to advocate a set of policies that 
promote[d] individual welfare, on an equitable basis, and farm efficiency" 
(Henderson 1975, p184). It went on to express its suspicion that "practically 
all farmers with low incomes which cause the family to be in poverty are in 
need of long -term [adjustment] assistance" (Henderson 1975, p185). This 
tendency to address farm poverty in terms of structural adjustment policy 
has been a consistent feature of Government policy towards farm poverty 
for several decades. Even after a shift in the direction of government rural 
adjustment assistance from income support to adjustment support in the 
1970s, the various programs included household support components 
aimed at helping farmers meet the day to day expenses of the family unit. 
The prominence of welfare objectives in these schemes has been a matter 
of debate with some reviews suggesting that rural adjustment type schemes 
were the most appropriate means for delivering such support (Henderson 
1975; DPRTF 1990), while others have urged the separation of adjustment 
and welfare objectives (Synapse Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd 1992; McColl et 
al. 1997). 
The standard social security safety net is not tailored to deal with either the 
self -employed or the asset -rich /income poor. Farm land is generally a 
low- yielding investment and it is not easily liquidated. Selling off part of a 
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property to overcome low income problems is not a realistic option as 
reducing the size of the land holding is likely to reduce further the farm's 
long -term viability. In addition, finding a buyer for very small parcels of land 
is problematic, particularly during a downturn. The assets test which has 
been applied to social security payments since the mid 1980s is therefore 
a major obstacle to farmers' accessing support. During the drought of the 
1990s, many farmers' spouses who were genuinely available and looking 
for employment were unable to gain the unemployment benefit due to the 
value of the farm, even if it was not generating any income. The hardship 
provisions within the social security system required that the farm be placed 
on the market before the assets test could be waived, a course of action 
with little appeal. The uncertainties of farming also create problems. After 
years of treating drought as a natural disaster and compensating farmers 
accordingly under the Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements, 1989 saw a 
shift to an official position that drought is a normal feature of the farmer's 
operating environment and should be managed like any other risk, such as 
fluctuations in commodity prices. 
Responding to farm welfare needs poses particular problems for policy 
makers. The direction of rural policy over the past decade or so has been 
driven by economic liberalism and the pressures of international 
competition, leaving little scope for addressing seriously the welfare impact 
of these policies. The Industry Commission summed up the dilemma of 
addressing farm poverty in this climate in its submission to the 1996 
mid -term review of the Rural Adjustment Scheme: "[t]he obvious danger 
with income support is that it could undermine the incentives of farmers to 
adopt their own risk management strategies" (Industry Commission 1996, 
p57). 
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As there had been in the past (BAE 1971; IAC 1976; IAC 1977; IAC 1978; 
LAC 1984), there were numerous reviews of Government policy towards 
rural adjustment and farm welfare over the decade from 1989 (DPRTF 
1990; Synapse Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd 1992; Senate Rural and Regional 
Affairs and Transport References Committee 1994b; McColl et al. 1997). 
Although these reports are replete with sympathetic references to the 
difficulties experienced by farm families, the underlying message remains 
consistent with an overall policy direction of reduced Government 
intervention and increased self -reliance. None of the inquiries over the 
period questioned the underlying paradigm that farming is a business and 
should be managed as such, with drought treated like any other business 
risk. The key words which sum up this approach are productivity, 
sustainability (both economic and ecological) and self -reliance, with 
government support targeted at farmers with prospects of long term 
profitability - and emergency assistance only available in exceptional 
circumstances. For example, the Senate Inquiry into Rural Adjustment, 
Rural Debt and Rural Reconstruction was "convinced that sound financial 
and management skills are the key to a robust, profitable and flexible farm 
sector". The Committee also expressed the view that "individual 
landholders within rural industries should be responsible for preparing and 
managing for variable climatic, seasonable and industry conditions" 
(Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee 
1994b, p xi). 
This emphasis on farming purely as a business undertaking is not 
consistent with the way farmers have traditionally viewed their roles (Halpin 
and Martin 1996, p12). Farming is seen by many farmers as a way of life 
which encompasses more than the business (Mauldon and Schapper 
1974; Share et al. 1991; Bryant 1992; Lawrence et al. 1992; Gray et al. 
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1993). Departure from farming is somewhat different from job transition in 
other occupations as it frequently involves loss of the family home, and with 
it in many cases several generations of family history. If the farmer cannot 
find employment in the local town, which is likely, farm exit is also often 
accompanied by the loss of social networks as the family is forced to 
relocate. As Gray et al express it 
Leaving farming is not merely a career change. For those who have 
inherited the farm, it involves loss of birthright, loss of social status 
and community contact and loss of access to a satisfying career and 
quality of life. (Gray et aI. 1993, p16) 
Although some of the uncertainties and challenges of farming are shared by 
other occupations, such as artists, miners and other self -employed, the 
combination of factors such as the nature of their asset, attachment to the 
land and variable climate arguably places farmers in a category of their 
own. 
In spite of the non -economic factors influencing farmers' behaviour, policy 
makers have focused consistently on economic objectives in constructing 
responses to farm poverty. Geoffrey Lawrence places this rural policy 
approach in a broader framework in his 1987 book Capitalism and the 
Countryside. This work examines the so- called rural crisis against the 
background of the increasing dominance of economic liberalism in the 
public policy debate. His central thesis is that free market economics is 
incompatible with family farming as it has been practised in Australia to 
date, arguing that the "ideology and economic policies of the New Right 
offer little salvation for the family -farm sector of Australian agriculture" 
(Lawrence 1987, p97). This perspective raises some important questions 
about the direction of Australian rural policy and the representation of the 
interests of the small, family farmers who make up around 80 per cent of the 
farming community. Lawrence's critique of the Rural Adjustment Scheme 
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and its predecessors continues his argument that recent Government 
policies have not supported the family farm, suggesting that there "was 
never much doubt about the overall aim of the schemes: it was to 
redistribute farm resources among fewer farmers as a means of improving 
the economic efficiency of the farm sector" (Lawrence 1987, p193). He 
goes on to argue that "[w]hile the schemes provided a measure of welfare 
assistance, they were primarily used as an economic lever to dislodge the 
low- income producer from agriculture ". 
Other writers take a more sanguine view of the direction of rural policy in 
Australia over the period under review, tending to adopt the language of 
economics in their defence of structural adjustment policies. Stayner 
argues against the provision of income support through farm business 
programs in just these terms. 
It is inappropriate and distorting for governments to attempt to treat 
the welfare problems of farm people by recourse to intervention in 
the markets for farm inputs ... and output, that is, by measures aimed 
at farm businesses. (Stayner 1996, p163). 
In a later study undertaken for the Rural Industries Research and 
Development Corporation on farm welfare service delivery, his perspective 
is even more explicit. 
it is important that one continuing objective of farm policy be to 
improve the efficiency of farm businesses, so that the industry 
continues to be a major contributor to the economic performance of 
the nation. (Stayner 1998, p2) 
Musgrave takes a similar view, suggesting that "the persistence of low farm 
income problems could be an indication that adjustment is not occurring 
fast enough" (Musgrave 1990, p250). Sorenson concurs, suggesting that 
"the only lasting solutions lie with getting stressed farmers to leave the land 
and with raising the profitability of agriculture" (Sorenson 1993, p287). 
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One of the key dilemmas of rural policy in Australia Is how the structural 
adjustment of agriculture sought by industry policy makers can be achieved 
in the face of strong emotional attachments to farming as a lifestyle by many 
of those at whom policy is aimed. The sociological literature contains much 
evidence that farmers will endure extreme financial hardship rather than 
consider the possibility of leaving the farm. As Share et al describe this 
tendency, 
[w]hilst rationalist economics predict that market forces will remove 
the inefficient and leave bigger but leaner farmers, sociological 
evidence suggests that farmers on poverty level incomes do not 
necessarily obey 'rational' economic logic. (Share et al. 1991, p10) 
Other writers agree with this conclusion (Campbell 1980; Stayner 1996; 
Special Rural Task Force 1997). 
Apart from the Henderson Inquiry (1975), the social welfare literature has 
paid scant attention to the plight of farm families in poverty. Saunders notes 
that "the self -employed are often excluded from research on poverty" 
(Saunders 1994, p24). While providing useful insights into Australian 
welfare policy, general works on the Australian welfare system reflect this 
oversight (Graycar 1979; Beilharz et al. 1992; Jones 1996). 
Government Support for Rural Adjustment 
The Commonwealth Government first became involved in developing 
policies in response to rural adjustment pressures with a debt 
reconstruction and farm build up scheme in 1935. Since that time there has 
been a variety of rural reconstruction and rural adjustment schemes, the 
most recent ending in 1997 following a review of the 1992 version of the 
Rural Adjustment Scheme. Early schemes, which were run predominantly 
by Coalition governments, were aimed at supporting farm incomes. From 
about the mid 1970s the focus began to shift from income support and 
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assistance based on financial need to enhancing the economic 
performance of the farm sector by emphasising productivity and 
sustainability and improved farm management. By 1990 this shift was 
being clearly articulated as Government policy for the farm sector. The 
approach was based on the principle of self -reliance, terminology which 
appealed to the self -image of the rugged, individualist farmer. The 
implications of this policy were that 
governments should not interfere to distort market prices or outputs. 
Government policy must work within the confines of the marketplace, 
by removing distortions or disincentives to appropriate activities, and 
by providing positive incentives where markets fail to provide 
sufficient inducements to act in the community interest. (DPRTF 1990, 
p9) 
The Structures and Institutions of Australian Agriculture 
Constitutionally, agriculture comes mainly within the purview of the States, 
with the Commonwealth's involvement being through overseas marketing, 
such as commodity agreements, international trade agreements, and the 
operation of the quarantine service with respect to imports and the provision 
of inspection services with respect to exports. Through grants to the States, 
the Commonwealth has also become involved in natural disaster relief, 
land and water development projects and rural reconstruction /rural 
adjustment schemes (Harris et al. 1974, p36). With respect to the latter, the 
national Government's involvement in agriculture has involved the transfer 
of substantial sums of money to the States for this purpose. For example 
between 1992 -93 and 1995 -96, $604m was spent through the Rural 
Adjustment Scheme alone, of which well over half were Commonwealth 
funds (McColl et al. 1997, p54). 
The Commonwealth -State relationship with respect to agriculture is 
managed through a Ministerial Council set up in 1934 as the Australian 
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Agricultural Council (AAC). The AAC is the oldest of the 
Commonwealth -State Ministerial consultative arrangements and it operated 
under that name until 1992 when the inclusion of the New Zealand Minister 
for Agriculture and Fisheries necessitated a name change to the Agriculture 
Council of Australia and New Zealand (ACANZ). In 1993, following a series 
of amalgamations of Ministerial Councils initiated by the Commonwealth 
Government, ACANZ became the Agriculture and Resource Management 
Council of Australia and New Zealand (ARMCANZ). ARMCANZ meets on a 
regular basis to discuss policy issues of shared interest between the States 
and the Commonwealth. 
Servicing the Ministerial Council is a Standing Committee of officials, 
previously the Standing Committee on Agriculture but known since 1993 as 
the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Resource Management 
(SCARM). SCARM provides a forum for regular contacts between officials 
in the State and Commonwealth agriculture departments and establishes 
Working Groups to address particular policy issues as they arise. For 
example, the bulk of the work on developing the National Drought Policy in 
1991 and 1992 was undertaken by officials from State and Commonwealth 
Departments comprising such a Working Group. 
Within the Commonwealth bureaucracy, agriculture has been covered by a 
number of different institutional arrangements. A separate Primary 
Industries portfolio was first established in 1956, prior to which 
responsibility for agriculture had rested with the Department of Commerce 
and then the Department of Commerce and Agriculture (Grogan 1968). For 
most of the period under review (1989 -1998) the responsible agency was 
the Department of Primary Industries and Energy (DPIE). Following the 
1998 federal election, the responsibility for the resources and energy 
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Industries were removed from the Department and it was renamed as 
Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry - Australia (AFFA). For many years the 
Commonwealth portfolio has included a number of research bureaux which 
have carried out research on policy related issues. The Australian Bureau 
of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE - formerly the Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics), the Bureau of Rural Sciences (previously the 
Bureau of Resource Sciences prior to the 1998 Departmental 
reorganisation) and the Australian Geological Survey Organisation 
(previously the Bureau of Mineral Resources) have all contributed to the 
policy development process at Commonwealth level. 
Also involved with the development of structural adjustment policy for the 
farm sector is the National Rural Advisory Council - known as the Rural 
Adjustment Scheme Advisory Council (RASAC) until 2000. RASAC was set 
up under the Rural Adjustment Act 1992 to advise the Commonwealth 
Minister on the operation of the Rural Adjustment Scheme and on the 
structural adjustment needs of rural Australia. RASAC's membership 
included representatives of the State and Territory Governments, the State 
Rural Adjustment Authorities, the National Farmers' Federation and the 
Australian Bankers' Association, along with other members with relevant 
special expertise. 
The major interest group representing farmers at Commonwealth level is 
the National Farmers' Federation (NFF), formed in 1979. As its name 
suggests, the NFF is a federation of State -based farming organisations, 
such as the New South Wales Farmers' Association, the Victorian Farmers' 
Federation and the South Australian Farmers' Federation. The NFF 
structure includes a number of commodity councils, for example the Grains 
Council of Australia and the Cattle Council of Australia, whose membership 
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is drawn from the commodity groups or committees of the constituent State 
bodies. Some commodity groups, such as the Pork Council of Australia, 
operate outside the NFF structure as affiliates of the Federation. The NFF is 
well resourced and has a high profile on issues of concern to the 
organisation. Apart from the NFF, there is a number of much smaller groups 
representing farmers on various issues such as the Australian Women in 
Agriculture, the Isolated Children's Parents Association and the Country 
Women's Association. None of these groups has the resources or profile of 
the NFF and, as a result, the latter remains the major voice for farmers on 
rural policy. 
Scope and structure of the thesis 
Since the 1930s the Commonwealth Government has been involved, 
through a variety of schemes, in the delivery of support to farmers who are 
responding to adjustment pressures. However, no detailed analysis of 
these policy approaches has been undertaken by political scientists. 
Writing on rural adjustment policy has been either sociological, focusing on 
the impact of the rural crisis on farm families and communities, or the work 
of agricultural economists whose area of interest is the response of the 
sector to the pressures of declining terms of trade and international 
competition. Writers such as Gray and Lawrence (1996), Bryant (1991; 
1992), Gray et al (1993), Lawrence (1987) and, much earlier, Mauldon and 
Schapper (1974), have exe mined how Australian farm families react to the 
pressures on their businesses and their way of life. The alternative 
approach to assessing rural policy is demonstrated by writers who focus on 
the soundness of the policy approaches, in economic terms, and give little 
attention to the impact of these policies on the ground and the possibility 
that they may not be effective when considered in a broader context than 
economic efficiency. This perspective is taken by Burdon (1996a; 1996b), 
23 
Campbell (1980), Musgrave (1990), Sorenson (1993) and by the series of 
Senate Inquiries into rural adjustment policy (Senate Standing Committee 
on Rural and Regional Affairs 1992; Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and 
Transport References Committee 1994b; Senate Rural and Regional Affairs 
and Transport References Committee 1995c; Senate Rural and Regional 
Affairs and Transport References Committee 1995b). 
Among political scientists, work has been done on rural issues in the areas 
of rural politics (eg Warhurst 1990), pressure groups (eg Warhurst 1985; 
Trebeck 1990; Halpin 1997; Halpin and Martin 1999), political parties (eg 
Costar and Woodward 1985) and on rural policies more specifically (eg 
Gerritsen 1991). An area of some neglect, however is the policy 
development process which underpins rural programs. 
This study sets out to undertake two related tasks. It examines the policy 
development process in the area of farm poverty in Australia between 1989 
and 1998. In so doing, it identifies inadequacies in the process which 
appear to have undermined the effectiveness of government programs set 
up to respond to low farm incomes. This thesis will argue that Government 
responses to farm poverty between 1989 and 1998, while well intentioned, 
were muddled. Faced with conflicting objectives, the agriculture portfolio 
constructed a series of complex schemes which attempted to reconcile the 
concern to alleviate poverty Emong farm families with the objective of 
ongoing structural adjustment in the farm sector. It will be argued that the 
policy development process underpinning farm welfare programs has been 
incremental, and that it has been hampered by inappropriate organisational 
arrangements within the Commonwealth bureaucracy and the lack of 
effective interest groups to speak for farm families in poverty. The impact of 
economic liberalism on the policy environment will be examined and the 
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values inherent in this policy paradigm will be compared with the agrarian 
attitudes held by many farmers. In light of the incremental nature of the 
policy process, the thesis utilises Charles Lindblom's model of policy 
development as an explanatory tool. It is not an attempt to canvass the 
wide range of public policy models, although in particular places the work of 
other policy- oriented scholars is drawn on. 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter Two considers how policy is 
made and outlines the general policy climate in Australia in the 1980s and 
1990s. Chapter Three and ChapterFour outline the series of Government 
responses to farm poverty over the period 1989 to 1998. This period was 
chosen as it commences with the removal of drought from the Natural 
Disaster Relief Arrangements, marking a major shift in drought policy, and 
ends a decade later, following a prolonged drought, a change of 
government and the development of numerous programs attempting to 
address farm poverty. Chapter Five looks at the involvement of the 
Department of Primary Industries and Energy (DPIE) and its successor 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Australia (AFFA) in developing 
responses to farm poverty and explores how the organisational 
arrangements for farm welfare within the Commonwealth may have 
influenced policy outcomes. Chapter Six and Chapter Seven examine the 
effectiveness of interest groups and political parties respectively in 
representing the interests of poor farmers. Chapter Eight considers the 
impact of ideas on the policy process. It identifies some of the problems that 
can arise when the policy process is dominated by a particular paradigm, 
and how policies may be ineffective if they do not take account of relevant 
values. Chapter Nine returns to the policy process and makes the 
distinction between how policy is made and how it should be made. 
Drawing on the previous chapters, it looks at incrementalism as a normative 
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model and identifies some shortcomings in this approach. The concluding 
chapter draws all of these elements together and suggests that 
Commonwealth Government responses to farm poverty between 1989 and 
1998 provide a valuable case study of the risks associated with incremental 
policy development when an interest is not represented in the policy 
process. Key issues relating to farm poverty are consistently bypassed 
rather than confronted head on by policy makers and this raises the 
question of the apparent conflict between policy goals within the agriculture 
portfolio. This study also highlights the tendency of economic liberalism to 
focus on means rather than ends, exposing a gap in Australia's political 
debate about the future of agriculture. 
At the heart of the issue of farm poverty lie some fundamental judgements 
about family farming in Australia and its value to the community - both 
economically and as part of the national ethos. Stayner recognises this 
when arguing that 
it is important that any non -economic objectives and rationales [for 
adjustment policy] be more explicitly stated. This should include the 
explicit statement of the social, cultural and economic values which 
the farm sector is held to enshrine and transmit. (Stayner 1996, 
p194) 
The free market policies pursued by Australian governments in recent 
years, and advocated by the NFF, have resulted in a reduction in the 
number of small farms and an increase in larger operations (McColl et al. 
1997, p viii). Kingma describes an "inbu It tendency" within the free market 
"towards large scale production, a high division of labour and the demise of 
smaller farmers" (Kingma 1985, p2). However, whether this spells the 
demise of family farming is debatable - it may mean a new form of family 
farming (Schapper 1972; Lees 1997; McColl et al. 1997). This issue needs 
to be discussed in the public arena and he balance between the economic 
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and non -economic objectives of rural policy needs to be agreed and made 
explicit. 
In other areas of government policy, the Cabinet mediates between 
Ministers representing different interests. Each Minister has an area of 
responsibility for which he /she is an advocate, arguing the merits of a 
particular proposal from his /her Departmental perspective. This allows 
issues which involve community values to be debated by elected politicians 
around the Cabinet table. On farm welfare, the balance between the 
welfare needs of farm families in poverty and the need for structural 
adjustment in agriculture has been struck within one department, often 
within one Branch of that department. There is no high profile debate nor 
any real public discussion of the trade -offs inherent in the policy positions 
being developed. Campbell summed up the dilemma facing policy makers 
as follows: 
On the one hand, it can be argued that if these people will not follow 
the clearly indicated rational course of action and quit the land, there 
is a limit to which governments should continue to supplement their 
sustenance. On the other hand, many of these farmers in this 
category are over 50 years old and have little prospect of finding any 
alternative livelihood if they leave the land, particularly if the general 
unemployment rate is high. (Campbell 1980, p176) 
Comstock suggests, in the US context, that there are moral arguments for 
saving the family farm and that these carry with them an obligation to 
develop "a workable plan to save if' (Corn tock 1987, p399). Australian 
policy makers have yet to have this debate. Without it, policy makers will 
continue to muddle through, fine tuning and amending existing farm welfare 
policies while not recognising the fundamental issues. This thesis argues 
that incremental policy development has failed to produce effective 
responses to farm poverty as many of this safeguards associated with 
incrementalism, such as effective interest groups, are missing from the rural 
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policy process when farm poverty is under consideration. It is time that 
policy makers initiated a public debate about the future of family farming in 
Australia and worked towards more effective policies to address farm 
poverty than those which have been pursued for decades. Understanding 
how the policy development process itself has impacted on the 
effectiveness of policy and program outcomes is an important first step. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE POLICY PROCESS 
There has been ongoing debate in the political science literature about how 
policy is actually made, how it should be made, and whether the process is 
rational and logical or a sort of intelligent "muddling through" (Lindblom 
1959). This chapter discusses that debate and then examines the general 
policy development process in Australia in the 1980s and 1990s, setting the 
scene for the following account in Chapters Three and Four of the policies 
which were developed in response to farm poverty from 1989 to 1998. The 
question of how policy is made is an important one and can assist analysts 
in the task of identifying the strengths and weaknesses in government 
policy and how they came about. Although much of the discussion is 
familiar to political scientists, it is worth revisiting as it casts light on the case 
study which follows. 
One of the seminal contributions to the discussion was Charles Lindblom's 
1959 article, "The Science of "Muddling Through "" (Lindblom 1959) in 
which he provided a description of the policy development process. 
Although it is nearly half a century since its publication, the article still 
contains insights into policy making which are valuable to analysts and 
Lindblom's description of incrementalism has been widely accepted as an 
accurate summary of how policy is made in the real world (Wildaysky 1979; 
Hogwood and Peters 1983; Hogwood and Gunn 1984; Hayes 1992; Weiss 
and Woodhouse 1992; Ham and Hill 1993; Albaek 1995). He expanded on 
the model in later work (Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963; Lindblom 1964; 
Lindblom 1965; Lindblom 1979; Lindblom 1982; Lindblom and Woodhouse 
1993). The 1959 article has been reprinted in about 40 anthologies 
(Bendor 1995, p819), is "one of the most highly cited articles in the Social 
Science Citation Index" (Weiss and Woodhouse 1992, p267) and has been 
described as one of the "classics" (Curnow 1988, p320) and "one of the 
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most influential and most widely read articles written in recent decades" 
(Lessman 1989, p453). Attempts have been made to formalise the model 
mathematically (Bendor 1995) and it has been drawn on to explain policy 
development in areas as diverse as the Budget process in pre- reunification 
West Germany (Lessman 1989) and the utilisation of social science 
research in public policy making (Albaek 1995). 
The following sets out the key arguments about how policy is made in the 
real world and these will then be tested against the case study which 
follows. Chapter Nine will then return to Lindblom's model and, in the light 
of the discussion of Australian government responses to farm poverty, 
critically examine its normative value, identifying facets of the model which 
to date have received little attention. 
The Policy Process - synopsis or incrementalism 
Rational- comprehensive policy making 
Wiltshire has described the rational policy making process as "that golden 
fleece of public administration" (Wiltshire 1990, p28), based on the 
perception that good policy arises from an organised, orderly and structured 
process. The rational -comprehensive model suggests that policy makers 
seek to apply a scientific approach to decision making. Good policy is 
arrived at through a process which encompasses the setting of objectives 
and priorities, the collection of information, and the construction of options 
which are measured against the objectives, thereby arriving at the answer 
to the policy problem. This approach has been described as being "deeply 
rooted in Western thought" (Forester 1984, p24) and part of the "mastery- 
via- understanding tradition of Western civilization" (Weiss and Woodhouse 
1992, p267). 
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Although intellectually appealing, complete rationality in decision- making 
has been recognised by many writers as an unachievable ideal. Simon 
explains: 
Rationality implies a complete, and unattainable, knowledge of the 
exact consequences of each choice. In actuality, the human being 
never has more than a fragmentary knowledge of the conditions 
surrounding his action, nor more than a slight insight into the 
regularities and laws that would permit him to induce future 
consequences from a knowledge of present circumstances. (Simon 
1953, p81) 
Charles Lindblom's 1959 paper pointed to the gap between the 
rational -comprehensive model of how policy was made and the practice of 
real life policy administrators. He rejected the concept that policy could be 
developed in a rational, or in his words "synoptic" manner, arguing that the 
policy analyst's cognitive limitations combined with resource constraints 
made this approach to policy development unattainable (Lindblom 1959). 
Lindblom rejected the rational model's assumption that objectives and 
values are determined before policy options are considered, on the basis 
that agreement could never be reached on the values to serve as the 
criteria for decision. Even if such agreement could be achieved, the relative 
weight given to the range of objectives could not be determined. He argued 
that, in reality, the objectives to be achieved are determined at the same 
time as policy options are selected: "one simultaneously chooses a policy to 
attain certain objectives and chooses the objectives themselves" (Lindblom 
1959, p82). Related to this point, Lindblom argued that the real world policy 
maker does not search for the best means to reach agreed er ds. The test 
of "good" policy therefore becomes, not an assessment of whether the 
means achieve the ends, but whether there is agreement on the policy (the 
means) itself. 
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Criticism of the practicality of complete rationality has been generally 
accepted. Gordon et al describe it as a "dignified myth" (Gordon et al. 1993, 
p8) while Albaek suggests that 
The rational decision -making model is an idealized model .., its 
basic demands on a rational decision- making process are 
misleading, impracticable and inappropriate, and on the whole 
fundamentally irreconcilable with the way decisions are made in the 
real world. (Albaek 1995, p83) 
John argues that 
Even if the political system could adopt a rational decision - making 
strategy, the costs of reaching the standards required would probably 
paralyse decision- making processes, frustrate the groups involved in 
the policy process and limit the opportunities for policy -learning. 
(John 1998, p125) 
Simon suggests in the passage quoted above that the problem is even 
more fundamental than lack of time and resources - the limitations of 
human cognitive capacity. Lindblom describes this problem succinctly: 
"The human condition is small brain, big problems" (Lindblom 1977, p66). 
In spite of these criticisms, Ham and Hill suggest that the ideal of rational 
decision- making is alive and well and point to the introduction of such 
management techniques as program budgeting as examples of attempts to 
pursue rationality (Ham and Hill 1993, p87). These attempts have met with 
mixed success. Writing of the New Zealand experience with program 
planning and budgeting, Boston and Pallot explain: 
Even in the best -managed organizations, formal planning systems 
seemed to degenerate into medium -term control mechanismE largely 
divorced from the issues of strategic choice and organzational 
action...Governments faced additional problems including a lack of 
high level political /bureaucratic support, interagency rivalries, the 
tendency for longer term considerations to be crowded out by 
short-term political crises, and a failure to integrate strategic, 
budgetary, and performance management systems. Not surprisingly, 
given the sheer scope, scale, and complexity of governmental 
activity, the resources available to carry out the necessary analysis 
proved inadequate. (Boston and Pallot 1997, p384) 
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In addition to being unattainable, the rational- comprehensive model is seen 
by Davis et al as facing other "important constraints ", which happen to be of 
particular relevance in a policy area such as farm poverty, due to the high 
level of non -rational factors which drive farmer behaviour: 
These include a bias toward variables which can be measured, the 
arbitrary costs attributed to some variables and the danger of the 
technical overwhelming the ethical. (Davis et al. 1993, p163) 
Bounded rationality 
Having rejected the pure rational- comprehensive model as unattainable, 
theorists have suggested more realistic explanations of how policy is 
developed. Simon does not reject rational decision making completely but 
suggests that limits are set on the field of policy search to make the problem 
more manageable. 
Simon makes the distinction between means and ends. He argues that 
"whereas reason may provide powerful help in finding means to reach our 
ends, it has little to say about the ends themselves" (Simon 1983, p7). 
Therefore, if the ends are predetermined, rational decision making 
processes can be applied to arrive at the one correct answer to the problem 
(Simon 1944, p19). As Simon points out, however, the means -ends 
distinction is not clear cut, with some ends proving instrumental to more 
final objectives: 
We are thus led to the conception of a series, or hierarchy, of ends. 
Rationality has to do with the construction of means -ends chains of 
this kind. (Simon 1953, p62) 
The question of values in policy making is important and will be addressed 
in a subsequent chapter. 
The concept of restricting the area of search is referred to by Simon as 
"bounded rationality" - the decision making process is rational w.thin 
certain limits set by an organisation's goals, the ability to pursue those 
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goals and availability of information surrounding the decision- maker's 
action. These bounds are not necessarily "rational ", incorporating irrational 
and non -rational elements. However, once they are set, Simon argues 
"[t]wo persons, given the same possible alternatives, the same values, the 
same knowledge can rationally reach only the same decision" (Simon 
1953, p241). 
Like Simon, Kenneth Arrow does not reject synopsis completely. He 
argues that "from a purely formal point of view, the presence of uncertainty 
does not destroy the synoptic ideal" (Arrow 1964, p585) He also calls for 
the bounding of the decision making process, 
In short, I would argue that in any given problem area, we should 
create as well as we can a closed system of values and facts and act 
as if it were more or less the whole truth. In reality, it will not be, and 
in time we will know it not to be. (Arrow 1964, p587) 
In explaining bounded rationality, Simon suggests that the parameters are 
set by the organisation within which the decision -maker operates. He 
argues, 
One function that an organization performs is to place the 
organization members in a psychological environment that will adapt 
their decisions to the organization objectives, and will provide them 
with the information needed to make these decisions correctly. 
(Simon 1953, p79) 
The organisation removes the requirement to be completely comprehensive 
and limits the search area to a manageable size: 
If an administrator, each time he is faced with a decision, must 
perforce evaluate that decision in terms of the whole range of human 
values, rationality in administration is impossible. If he need 
consider the decision only in the light of limited organizational aims, 
his task is more nearly within the range of human powers. (Simon 
1944, p22) 
If decisions are made within the boundaries set by the organisation, 
reflecting its priorities and value system, this raises the question of which 
organisation should make which decisions. An examination of the 
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development of responses to farm poverty in Australia suggests that, by 
placing responsibility for a particular issue in an inappropriate organisation, 
resulting decisions could also be inappropriate. Where the issue under 
consideration is not part of an agency's "core" business, the location of 
policy responsibility in a particular portfolio can adversely influence the 
outcome of the policy development process. Gordon et al write that 
It has been suggested that in every government department there are 
'deep structures' of policy - the implicit collection of beliefs about 
the aims and intentions of the departments and about the relevant 
actors who influence or benefit from the policy (Gordon et al. 1993, 
P9) 
Lindblom also recognises the potential impact of the allocation of policy 
responsibility on the weighting given to particular values (Lindblom 1965, 
p238). As will be shown below, the approach of the Department of Primary 
Industries and Energy, which had policy responsibility for farm poverty, 
suggests that its 'deep structures' were not well -suited to coping with a 
welfare issue, in spite of the good intentions of individual officers within the 
Department working on the problem. The situation was compounded by 
organisational objectives which were apparently in conflict with each other. 
In addition to limiting the area of policy search, Simon suggests that policy 
makers arrive at their decisions by "satisficing ", ceasing the search for a 
solution once the first satisfactory answer has been found - it may not be 
the optimum outcome but it will suffice. With March, Simon argued that 
Most human decision- making, whether individual or organizational, 
is concerned with the discovery and selection of satisfactory 
alternatives: only in exceptional cases is it concerned with the 
discovery and selection of optimal alternatives. (March and Simon 
1958, p141 - italics in original) 
Simon also argues that this satisficing approach assists in balancing 
conflicting values: 
Reconciling alternative points of view and different weightings of 
values become somewhat easier if we adopt a satisficing point of 
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view: if we look for good enough solutions rather than insisting that 
only the best solutions will do, it may be possible - and it often is 
possible - to find courses of action that almost everyone in society 
will tolerate, and that many people will even like, provided we aren't 
perfectionists who demand an optimum. (Simon 1983, p85) 
In an article on the time pressures facing top Washington officials, Adams 
provides the following description of the policy process, one which neatly 
illustrates the satisficing concept: 
The question before them is not: "what is the best policy for the 
nation ?," but rather "what is the best policy I can come up with by 
Tuesday that Congress would take seriously ?" (Adams 1979, p549) 
Incrementalism 
Lindblom's rejection of the rational ideal is more final. He sees it as 
completely utopian and believes that attempts to pursue synopsis will result 
in poor decision making as important considerations are inevitably 
overlooked. Instead of aspiring to rationality, Lindblom describes a system 
of strategic, incremental policy- making through which the policy maker 
knowingly addresses only part of the problem at any one time, intending to 
return later to address both issues deliberately overlooked by previous 
decisions and unintended consequences of earlier policies. Following on 
his concern about the limited human capacity to undertake synoptic 
decision making Lindblom, like Simon, suggests that in order to arrive at a 
policy, analysts need to simplify the problem at hand. Lindblom's 1959 
article, mentioned above, was an attempt to formalise a model which more 
closely resembled real policy analysis and recognised that policy was 
actually developed through a process of strategic "muddling through" or 
"successive limited comparisons". Lindblom summarised his model as 
follows: 
Selection of value goals and empirical analysis of the needed action 
are not distinct from one another but are closely intertwined. 
Since means and ends are not distinct, means -ends analysis is often 
inappropriate or limited 
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The test of a "good" policy is typically that various analysts find 
themselves directly agreeing on a policy (without agreeing that it is 
the most appropriate means to an agreed objective). 
Analysis is drastically limited: 
i) Important possible outcomes are neglected 
ii) Important alternative potential policies are neglected 
iii) Important affected values are neglected. 
A succession of comparisons greatly reduces or eliminates reliance 
on theory. (Lindblom 1959, p81) 
Lindblom suggests that policy makers make their task manageable by 
limiting the search for the agreed policy to those options which differ only 
incrementally from policies already in place and by "ignoring important 
possible consequences of possible policies, as well as the values attached 
to the neglected consequences ". This neglect is not as alarming as it 
appears as policy "is not made once and for all: it is made and re -made 
endlessly" (Lindblom 1959, p86). 
Having concluded that all policy analysis and policy making is bad "even 
under the best circumstances" (Lindblom 1979, p519), Lindblom seeks to 
suggest how analysts could operate within their limitations. He bases his 
model on the concept of disjointed incrementalism. Policy makers compare 
and evaluate options which are only incrementally different from existing 
policies. From those possible incremental changes, they consider only a 
restricted number and only a limited number of consequences of the 
options are also considered. The process is serial and remedial, with a 
policy problem never solved but subject to "a never -ending series of attacks 
on it" (Lindblom 1965, p147) Lindblom summarises the contrast between 
smart incrementalism and utopian rationality as follows: 
The choice between synopsis and disjointed incrementalism - or 
between synopsis and any form of strategic analysis - is simply 
between ill- considered, often accidental incompleteness on one 
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hand, and deliberate, designed incompleteness on the other. 
(Lindblom 1979, p519) 
In spite of the depth of the debate over incrementalism as a normative 
model, there is a vagueness about the term which Lessman has identified. 
She makes the valid plea for clarification of the term, 
the looseness of the term incrementalism ... causes confusion. Are 
we talking about the decision- making process, the content of policies 
or the outputs produced? All three categories are currently 
subsumed under the same heading. (Lessman 1989, p457) 
This study will address all three categories. 
Partisan Mutual Adjustment 
In "The Intelligence of Democracy" (Lindblom 1965), Lindblom explores the 
role of groups in the policy community in the incremental policy process. 
He provides a useful description of this process with his exposition of the 
concept of "partisan mutual adjustment" (Lindblom 1965), a policy process 
in which different players interact to protect their own interests and to 
develop, incrementally, improved policy outcomes. Policy is not developed 
in large non -incremental leaps but rather in a manner which allows 
correction of earlier mistakes and which focuses on obtaining the 
agreement of partisans involved in the policy process to the policies 
produced rather than to their objectives. Lindblom rejects the need for 
common objectives, arguing that policy positions can be agreed by parties 
who are pursuing different objectives, and referring to the "useful role of 
conflict in mutual adjustment" (Lindblom 1965, p304). Unlike the synoptic 
approach, and to a certain extent that of Simon, Lindblom rejects the 
means -ends approach to decision- making. He argues that "such a 
means -ends relationship is possible only to the extent that values are 
agreed upon, are reconcilable and are stable at the margin" and he 
therefore suggests that in his model "means and ends are simultaneously 
chosen" (Lindblom 1959, p83). 
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Building on his 1959 article, Lindblom calls for diversity among the 
partisans participating in the policy process: 
One can easily imagine a decision maker who can return in later 
policy steps to no more than a few of a variety of neglected adverse 
consequences resulting from an earlier policy step. This possibility 
points directly to the need for a multiplicity of decision makers, and 
more than that, to a multiplicity marked by great variety of attitudes 
and interests, so that no line of adverse consequence fails to come to 
the attention of some decision maker. (Lindblom 1965, p151 - 
emphasis added) 
Under this model, policy is an outcome of the interaction of partisans who 
are involved in negotiation with others in the policy process - each with 
their own set of priorities and interests to protect. This process has been 
recognised by other writers (Jenkins -Smith 1988; Jaensch 1997), who 
describe how policy interests negotiate, persuade and lobby in order to 
achieve their objectives. In the process, they will adapt their position while 
protecting their "Deep Core" belief systems (Sabatier 1988). The process of 
mutual adjustment between these partisans leads to agreed policy 
outcomes, although, as noted above, the objectives of the policy may 
remain ambiguous. Lindblom and Woodhouse describe the value of 
interest group interaction as follows: 
By bringing diverse perspectives to bear on a problem, the 
interest -group system frequently can help evolve a policy choice that 
is more intelligent than what could be accomplished by a narrower 
policy- making process... (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993, p78). 
Partisan mutual adjustment provides a useful explanation of how much 
policy is developed in Australia. Important policy issues are often 
discussed with key interest groups and other stakeholders to obtain their 
agreement prior to a formal policy announcement. In some cases, Ministers 
will leave the actual determination of policy to this process rather than 
taking an executive decision. 
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Watchdogs 
In addition to providing for a diversity of views in the policy process and 
thereby addressing the cognitive limitations of a single decision maker, 
Lindblom's partisans have a role in protecting any values that may be 
neglected in the process of mutual adjustment. This is a "watchdog" role, 
ascribed to government agencies and interest groups whose function is to 
protect particular interests, and in so doing to achieve a degree of 
comprehensiveness in the policy outcome (Lindblom 1959, p85). Lindblom 
explains that among agencies, each major value neglected in the process 
is the major concern of at least one other agency: 
The virtue of such a hypothetical division of labor is that every 
important interest or value has a watchdog. And these watchdogs 
can protect the interests in their jurisdiction in two quite different 
ways: first, by redressing damages done by other agencies; and 
second, by anticipating and heading off injury before it occurs. 
(Lindblom 1959, p85) 
In later work, Lindblom identifies agencies as one set of policy decision 
makers within the process of partisan mutual adjustment. He includes 
agencies in his discussion of watchdogs and uses government bodies as 
examples of his point in the text (Lindblom 1965, p156). He suggests a 
specific role for agencies in the protection of values: 
For many values an allocation of authority to an agency, sometimes 
the creation of a new agency, will assign specific responsibility for 
the protection or pursuit of that value... (Lindblom 1965, p230) 
In the 1959 piece, Lindblom extends the watchdog role to interest groups as 
well, arguing that 
Almost every interest has its watchdog. Without claiming that every 
interest has a sufficiently powerful watchdog, it can be argued that 
our system often can assure a more comprehensive regard for the 
values of the whole society than any attempt at intellectual 
comprehensiveness. (Lindblom 1959, p85) 
Although he does not use the term watchdog regularly in later work, 
Lindblom remains concerned with the protection of a diversity of values 
40 
within the policy process. He optimistically suggests that the values of even 
a small group will be incorporated into policy: 
In partisan mutual adjustment in the United States and in the 
Western democracies almost any value that any even relatively small 
number of citizens moderately or strongly wishes to see weighted 
into the policy- making process will be weighted at some value 
significantly above zero. (Lindblom 1965, p229) 
He concedes however that this proposition is "weak" (Lindblom 1965, 
p229). 
The importance of watchdogs is implied in the work of many writers who 
ascribe to these groups a key role in the process of strategic, incremental 
policy making. Dahl acknowledges the importance of interest 
representation, suggesting that "[ejach of the major organized forces in a 
country prevents the others from making changes that might seriously 
damage its perceived interests" (Dahl 1982, p43 }. Jenkins -Smith accepts 
that interest groups exist to represent the diversity of views in the political 
system. He writes that : 
analysts specialize in one or more complex areas, and become 
members of the relevant 'policy subsystem' made up of those actors 
who play important roles in the identification of problems, the 
development, dissemination and evaluation of policy options, and 
the implementation of policies (Jenkins -Smith 1988, p170). 
Simon et al have suggested that interest groups will emerge as required, 
People who are directly affected by an agency's activities will soon 
make themselves known, and will insist on having something to say 
about its activities, either in the administrative process or by bringing 
pressure to bear on the legislature. (Simon et al. 1991, p412) 
This view of Simon reflects an assumption of a number of writers that 
interest groups will appear as needed, or will influence policy outcomes by 
virtue of their potential to come into being (Truman 1971; Bachrach and 
Baratz 1973, p26; Woodward 1985b, pp114 -115). The interests of these 
unrepresented groups are therefore taken into account by politicians. 
However, as Olson suggests 
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This contention is rather difficult to test empirically, because, if a 
group does not organize and act, the analytical pluralist can say that 
the damage to its interests was not serious or there was in fact no 
group interest. (Olson 1965, p128) 
Olson's concern is with the incentives that cause individuals to join interest 
groups, ie how individuals are stimulated to subordinate their own interests 
to attain the group's goal. Olson's study of organisations concludes with a 
small section entitled "The "Forgotten Groups" - Those who suffer in 
silence ", in which he argues that unorganised groups are "among the 
largest groups in the nation" (Olson 1965, p165). Poor farmers are certainly 
not one of the largest groups in the nation but they remain largely forgotten 
within the policy community. The problem facing this group of farmers 
appears to be that while they are well represented by their farming 
organisations on a wide range of economic policy issues, such as trade 
policy, these organisations have been almost mute on the question of farm 
poverty. Olson's analysis fails to explain why a collective organisation 
promotes the interests of its members in one area and not another. 
Hayes has described the Lindblom model as a "Political Market Model ", 
[i]nasmuch as policies represent an equilibrium of contending forces 
rather than a process of conscious decision ... incrementalism is the 
political analogue to the efficient and self- correcting market 
mechanism (Hayes 1992, pp22 -23) 
In his preface to The Intelligence of Democracy, Lindblom makes a similar 
point (Lindblom 1965). Some are more sceptical about the results of the 
interplay between different interest groups. Kelso is very critical of "laissez 
faire" pluralism (Kelso 1978, p6) arguing that "[als is true in the economic 
marketplace, a competitive political market is neither self- maintaining or 
self -correcting" (Kelso 1978, p23). Lowi also makes this comparison and 
points out that neither laissez -faire economics nor pluralism have "come to 
terms with the problem of imperfect competition" (Lowi 1979, p58). 
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Hayes has suggested that "there must be a rough balance of power among 
contending interests, so that no one actor exerts disproportionate influence 
over the final outcome" (Hayes 1992, p23). Dror goes further in his 
concerns about power imbalances, suggesting that "what is needed is 
positive action to strengthen the power of groups that are underrepresented 
in policymaking" (Dror 1968, p280). Kelso advances a similar proposition, 
advocating a form of "public pluralism" which involves a degree of 
Govemment management to ensure that all groups have a voice in policy 
making. The Government's role would include ensuring that the system 
remained competitive and, where necessary, "the government can act as an 
advocate, defending and even organizing interests like the poor or 
consumers who presently lack political clout" (Kelso 1978, p27). Observing 
that "Governments need pressure groups ... [i]f they do not exist it is 
necessary to invent them ", Davis et al note that in Australia 
state and federal governments sustain groups financially so that they 
can operate at [a] much higher level of activity than would otherwise 
be the case. (Davis et al. 1993, p145) 
This role was evident in the early 1990s in rural policy when the 
Department of Primary Industries and Energy actively encouraged the 
participation of the Australian Women in Agriculture in policy making, 
including through the establishment of a Rural Women's Unit within the 
Department aimed at maximising the potential for women's groups "to work 
in partnership with government and industry" (DPIE 1996, p77). 
Lindblom also recognised the problem of imbalance in representation, 
arguing that 
While a proliferation of public and private groups engaging in mutual 
adjustment brings a remarkably wide range of interests and 
considerations to bear on public policy, the same process tends also 
to take gains for the organized at the expense of the unorganized: 
gains for union labor at the expense of nonunion, gains for organized 
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agriculture at the expense of smaller unorganized farmers, or gains 
for producers at the expense of consumers. (Lindblom 1977, p141) 
In spite of these reservations, or perhaps because of them, Lindblom's 
model of the policy process provides a good starting point for the 
consideration of Australian government policy. It suggests that policy is 
unlikely to have been developed synoptically and draws attention to the 
importance of diverse values and the need for watchdogs to protect them in 
an environment of incremental policy development. As well as seeking out 
the watchdogs Lindblom identified within interest groups and government 
agencies, this study assesses whether Australia's political parties have a 
role in transmitting and protecting particular values. Lindblom did not 
explicitly address the role of parties as watchdogs, however it does not 
seem an unreasonable proposition that parties embody and attempt to 
protect particular values within the policy process. Each of Australia's 
political parties has historically been aligned with certain values and, in the 
area of rural policy, the National Party in particular would certainly seem to 
fit the definition of a watchdog. 
This thesis will approach Lindblom's model from two angles. First, it will 
use the model as a framework for analysing government responses to farm 
poverty in the period under review in an attempt to identify how the policies 
were shaped. Secondly, in Chapter Nine, the study will reflect on the 
normative value of Lindblom's approach, in light of the case study, and 
suggest some circumstances in which "muddling through" may not be the 
best approach to policy development. 
Policy Development in Australia 
The case study which follows examines the development of Australian 
government policy in response to farm poverty from 1989 to 1998 and 
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explores the nature of the policy development process. In so doing, it will 
attempt to identify problems within the process which may be hampering the 
development of effective policy. Before moving on to the case study, 
however, it is helpful to outline briefly the broader policy environment within 
which rural policy was developed in Australia in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The Hawke Governments (1983 -1991) 
Three key features of the Hawke government which distinguished it from its 
predecessors were the growing influence of economic liberalism in policy 
development, the emergence of environmental issues on the policy agenda 
and the implementation of the Accord. The first two of these trends 
impacted directly on rural policy while opposition to the latter was an issue 
pursued with vigour by the National Farmers' Federation. 
The last two decades of the twentieth century provided a range of 
challenges to Australian policy makers as they responded to a changing 
international economy. By the early 1980s, Keynesianism was dead or 
dying in much of the Western world as a guide to economic management 
and the election of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald 
Reagan in the United States saw the emergence of first monetarist and then 
neoclassical approaches to economic management (Kelly 1994, p35). 
Although Australia returned a nominally social democratic party to power in 
1983, the government policies which emerged from this time were clearly 
influenced by these international trends (Galligan and Singleton 1991, p xi). 
For example, over the course of the 1980s, the Hawke Labor government 
floated the Australian dollar, deregulated financial markets and initiated a 
program of tariff reductions. Stewart and Jennett argue that, under Hawke, 
'`social democratic outcomes [were] generally ... sacrificed to instrumental 
solutions" (Stewart and Jennett 1990, p4). Commentators differ in their 
assessment of the increasing strength of economic liberalism in policy 
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development over the period. Some such as Kelly regard the changes as a 
necessary and welcome recognition of structural flaws in the Australian 
economy (Kelly 1994). Focus on economic policy "made sense" because 
external pressures on Australia continually created new problems (Stewart 
and Jennett 1990, p3). Others are more cautious, pointing to the risk of 
pursuing economic values to the exclusion of others (Emy and Hughes 
1991; Walter 1996). Some commentators are hostile, describing the 
dominance of economic liberalism as "reducing the deliberative capacity of 
our Canberra policy apparatus" (Pusey 1993, p17) and as "anti- intellectual" 
(Rees 1994, p179). 
As the Lindblom model suggests, ends and means were not clearly 
separated as the economic means became the focus of government 
attention. Stewart and Jennett write that the Hawke government "refrained 
from promoting a sophisticated debate on the social consequences of its 
policies in contrast with the economic debate" (Stewart and Jennett 1990, 
p4). This thesis will argue that the avoidance of the discussion of values 
and policy ends is clear in government consideration of farm poverty 
between 1989 and 1998. 
When the Australian Labor Party won office in March 1983 under Bob 
Hawke, the party set out to differentiate itself from the style of the earlier 
Labor government of Gough Whitlam. Hawke established a "consensus" 
approach to government which sought to engage the major economic 
players in the policy process. The first stage in this process was the 
National Economic Summit which was held very soon after the election and 
which involved Australia's political, business, financial and union leaders - 
an event described by Paul Kelly as Hawke's "most brilliant piece of 
political theatre" (Kelly 1994, p65). The National Farmers' Federation 
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participated in the Summit, identifying the main causes of Australia's 
economic problems as declining international competitiveness of industry, 
'`an inadequate profits share of national income" and wage increases which 
were unrelated to productivity (Davidson 1983). One of the outcomes of the 
Summit was the formation of the Economic Planning and Advisory Council 
(EPAC), "the major institutional embodiment of corporatism in Australia" 
(Boreham 1990, p50). EPAC was set up to "act as a vehicle for community 
participation in the formulation of medium to longer term economic policy" 
(EPAC 1985, p1). The legislation setting up the Council stipulated that 
EPAC's membership include one representative of "rural industry". This 
compared with three business representatives and four from the union 
movement (EPAC 1985, p2). The Council's powers included the conduct of 
inquiries, information collection, consultation with government and 
community organisations, use of consultants and the preparation of reports 
(EPAC 1985, p7). This approach to economic policy attracted criticism from 
a number of quarters as it was seen as elitist, exclusionary and inconsistent 
with Labor Party objectives (West 1984; Maddox 1989; Head 1997). In 
terms reminiscent of Lindblom's caution about imbalances in 
representation, West summed up the concern with the Hawke consensus as 
follows: 
despite the emphasis on consensus decision- making at the Summit 
and EPAC, the Hawke Government has promoted through these 
bodies a new kind of political class structure in Australian society. It 
has created a new kind of polarisation between the organised and 
pc itically powerful on the one hand and the unorganised and 
politically powerless on the other; a polarisation between the big 
three power blocs, Government, big business and unionised labour, 
and the rest of us in the Australian community. (West 1984, p13) 
This analysis is not universally accepted. Gruen and Grattan suggest that 
membership of EPAC constitutes a "relatively superficial level of 
involvement" in the policy process and they cite Marsh's description of the 
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Council as an institutional "minnow ", "ancillary to the core machinery of 
government" (Gruen and Grattan 1993, p59). 
The Hawke consensus did appear to build a type of "policy community" 
which dominated the policy process. This thesis does not explore fully the 
concept of policy communities, however, it is valuable in understanding the 
relatively small circle of players influential in the development of rural 
policy. Richardson has described the policy community idea as "descriptive 
rather than definitional ... a metaphor rather than a model" (Richardson 
2000, p1006) although others have attempted precise definitions (Pross 
1986, p98). 
Pross divides the policy community into two segments - a 
sub -government, which includes key pressure groups, and an attentive 
public (Pross 1986, p98). Others have referred to members of this 
"sub -government" as "insider" groups because of their closeness to 
government and their ability to keep their issues on the agenda (Davis et al. 
1993, p140). Pross suggests that the attentive public is not a regular 
participant in the policy -making process while the sub -government is 
somewhat constrained by its need to maintain consensus (Pross 1986, 
p99). West identifies a similar problem of constraint under the Hawke 
consensus: 
with th ; advent of Labor's corporate state, as they were drawn first 
into thu Summit and then into EPAC, business and union interests 
lost much of their capacity to act as independent operators. (West 
1984, p4) 
Boreham also sees the limitations imposed by the corporatism of the Hawke 
government: 
During 1984 it was becoming clear that EPAC was a vehicle for 
finding common ground between business and unions and locking 
both parties into support for government policies, instead of an 
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institution for bringing different criteria to bear on macroeconomic 
policy making. (Boreham 1990, p49) 
From the government's perspective, the mechanism was therefore very 
effective: 
There can be no doubt that the Hawke government has been 
masterly at keeping business sufficiently on side or at bay to go on 
winning politically, feats that distinguish it from former federal labor 
governments. (Galligan and Singleton 1991, p xii) 
In September 1985, EPAC commissioned the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics to "analyse the outlook for the Australian agricultural sector 
taking into account both domestic and international factors" (EPAC 1986, 
p iii). The report was consistent with the prevailing economic policies of 
the government, suggesting that in order to improve the sector's prospects 
Most of the [policy] initiatives that can be made here, consistent with 
overall economic efficiency, lie in the removal of the range of 
distortions or inefficiencies in the Australian economy which 
adversely affect the farm sector. These include, of course, a 
reduction in the level of protection afforded to manufacturing industry, 
and moves to increase the efficiency and flexibility of a range of 
industries which serve agriculture. (EPAC 1986, p27 - emphasis 
added) 
One of the key innovations of the new government was the Prices and 
Incomes Accord with the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU). The 
Accord was negotiated between the ALP and the ACTU prior to the 1983 
election. Singleton describes the Accord as follows: 
The Accord is multi- faceted. It is a comprehensive incomes policy 
aimed at achieving economic growth, lower inflation and reduced 
unemploym ant. It includes an agenda for social reform. The Accord, 
as the basis of Labor's credentials for sound economic management, 
also has an electoral function. It is in these respects both the product 
and the tool of a close unity of purpose within the political and 
industrial wings of the labour movement to achieve their disparate 
but interrelated economic, electoral and philosophical objectives. 
(Singleton 1990, p156) 
This agreement provided the framework for economic policy which allowed 
the government to pursue a policy of fiscal stimulus without the risk of 
inflation resulting from a wages explosion (Walsh 1991, p36; Gruen and 
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Grattan 1993, p269) and also to manage potential conflict between 
business and the union movement (Singleton and Galligan 1991, p3). The 
Accord has been described as the "cornerstone of the Labor government's 
economic and industrial relations policies" (Deery et al. 1997, p8.31). 
There were seven variants on the Accord under the Labor government, 
providing the ACTU with "unprecedented political influence" (Matthews 
1994, p194), while allowing for a "remarkable transformation of the 
centralised wages system" (Deery et al. 1997) as each Accord moved 
industrial relations away from the industry level to the individual enterprise. 
The existence of the Accord caused some analysts to suggest that the 
corporatism many saw in EPAC and consensus politics was not balanced. 
In what became a very large debate, it was argued that the position of 
labour was consolidated and strengthened under the Accord (Boreham 
1990), while business only had a peripheral role. The arrangement - 
which was essentially bilateral in nature - was seen as a form of 
"corporatism without business" (Matthews 1991). Although the ACTU 
initially agreed to support the Accord on the basis that it would reintroduce 
and maintain full wage indexation (Singleton 1990, p155), it continued its 
support for the agreement after the demise of indexation and through a 
number of iterations which also saw the erosion of centralised wage fixing. 
Its critics saw the Accord as tempering the government's commitment to 
economic reform anc' providing too much power to the trade unions. 
However, it should be noted that over the period of the Accord there was a 
fall in real wages in Australia and the profit share increased (Matthews 
1994, p209). The existence of the Accord became an important source of 
tension between the Labor government and the farming community as the 
National Farmers' Federation adopted industrial relations reform as one of 
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its key objectives and, under Ian McLachlan, became actively involved in 
industrial disputes. 
Stewart and Jennett write that, under Hawke, 
the direction of government policy has demonstrated that, apart from 
the Accord, the pursuit of market liberalisation has been a 
fundamental feature of the ... government's public policy. (Stewart 
and Jennett 1990, p6). 
Gallígan and Singleton suggest that this trend can be explained by the 
international economic climate of the time (Galligan and Singleton 1991, 
p xi), while others saw the Government as captive of the economists in 
Treasury (Kelly 1994, p59) which had been increasingly dominated by 
economic liberalism over the course of the 1970s and early 1980s (Whitwell 
1986). Perhaps surprisingly, this did not cause ideological problems for the 
Labor Party. As Painter writes 
market liberalism became increasingly disassociated from partisan 
or sectional positions and came to form the basis for a new set of 
collective problem- solving arrangements. Despite its philosophical 
foundations in liberalism, it did not present itself to government as an 
ideology of social or political mobilisation but as a doctrine of 
problem solving and management. (Painter 1996, p293) 
Related to the growing economic focus of government policy approaches 
was a trend towards managerialism with "its emphasis on programme 
budgeting, performance evaluation and how best to use and rationalise 
increasingly scarce resources" (Gruen and Grattan 1993, p43). In 1987, the 
government undertook a major restructuring of the public service, 
amalgamating departments and creating "megaportfolios ", many with two or 
more responsible ministers. The reorganisation had many of the trappings 
of synoptic policy making seeking to deliver 
a range of benefits: enhanced ministerial control; better coordination 
and decision -making processes; broader perspectives and greater 
coherence in policy advice and programme development; greater 
scope for delegation to portfolios; reduction in overlap and 
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duplication; greater flexibility in portfolio operations and potential 
stability in machinery of government. (Gruen and Grattan 1993, p44) 
Gruen and Grattan note, however that "a good deal of policy is incremental" 
(Gruen and Grattan 1993, p265) and although the management of policy 
work may have had the appearance of increased rationality, a close 
examination of the policy outcomes indicates that policy makers were still 
operating as Lindblom would predict. 
Rural policy development was not immune from the changes which were 
introduced by the Labor governments. In 1987 the Department of Primary 
Industry was amalgamated with the Department of Resources and Energy 
to form the mega -portfolio of Primary Industries and Energy reporting to two 
Ministers and a Parliamentary Secretary. Like all government departments, 
the influence of economic liberalism increased within DPIE over the 1980s 
and 1990s. This was reflected across rural policy in areas such as changes 
to dairy marketing arrangement in 1986 which introduced a closer link 
between domestic and world prices (Martin 1990, p162) and the 
deregulation of the domestic wheat market in 1989. The rise of corporatist 
tendencies under Hawke was arguably less of a revolution in primary 
industry policy as this Department had traditionally worked very closely with 
farm representatives in the development of rural policy (Connors 1996). 
However, the industrial relations arrangements in the Accord attracted 
strong criticism from the farm sector. 
Although commentators vary in their interpretations of the Hawke 
consensus and the move to economic liberalism, these policy trends largely 
defined the 1980s. A further important characteristic of the decade was the 
increasing importance of environmental issues - a development which 
extended into the rural policy arena as the Minister for Primary Industries 
and Energy spoke out in favour of sustainable development and balancing 
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economic and environmental considerations (Kerin 1989; Kelly 1994, 
p540). 
The Labor platform at the 1983 election had contained a commitment to 
prevent the flooding of the Franklin and Lower Gordon rivers in South -west 
Tasmania. The "No Dams" campaign was highly successful with a 
September 1982 poll showing 49 per cent of Australians favouring federal 
intervention to prevent the dams, with 37 per cent opposed (Papadakis 
1990, p343). Papadakis and Moore have argued that the 1983 election 
was the first time that environmental issues had featured prominently in a 
federal campaign (Papadakis and Moore 1994, p340) and over the 
following thirteen years, environmental issues continued to be important. In 
1990, green preferences delivered Labor an unprecedented fourth term in 
government. Elsewhere, Papadakis goes so far as to suggest that 
"[ajrguments over environmental issues ... posed a deep threat to the 
politics of consensus advocated by the Hawke government (Papadakis 
1990). 
In 1984 a National Conservation Strategy for Australia was developed 
which agreed 4 objectives: 
To maintain essential ecological processes and life support 
systems 
To preserve genetic diversity 
To ensure the sustainable utilisation of species and ecosystems 
To maintain and enhance environmental qualities. (Hawke 1989, 
p5) 
In July 1989 the Prime Minister issued an Environment Statement Our 
Country Our Future which argued that it was "time to take stock and plan 
ahead" (Hawke 1989, p2). The Statement endorsed the objectives of the 
National Conservation Strategy and addressed a range of issues include 
biological diversity, endangered species, international cooperation, world 
53 
heritage, oceans and fisheries, the greenhouse effect and land 
degradation. A Resources Assessment Commission was established in 
1989 and from 1990 onwards the Government was involved in the 
development of a strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development. An 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment was concluded between 
the Commonwealth and the States in October 1990 and came into effect on 
1 May 1992. The agreement included the establishment of a National 
Environment Protection Council which proceeded to oversee the 
development of a series of National Environment Protection Measures. 
Primary Industries and Energy Minister in the Hawke Government, John 
Kerin reports that he pushed hard on the issue of ecologically sustainable 
development, and for the establishment of the Resources Assessment 
Commission, and that in Cabinet Hawke was firmly behind environmental 
issues (Kerin 2000, pers comm). This interest extended to increasing 
attention to the impact of European -style agriculture on the Australian 
landscape. In 1990 the Year and Decade of Landcare commenced, backed 
jointly by the National Farmers' Federation and the Australian Conservation 
Foundation and the ecologically sustainable development process included 
a Working Group on agriculture. 
The Keating Governments (1991 -1996) 
The removal of Bob Hawke as Prime Minister and his replacement with 
Paul Keating in December 1991 signalled few substantive changes to 
policy direction, although Kerin suggests that the Keating Cabinet was more 
economically- focussed (Kerin 2000, pers comm). The government's 
adherence to the policy prescriptions of economic liberalism continued. 
The main exceptions to this latter trend were the mildly expansionary One 
Nation economic statement brought down by Paul Keating in February 
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1992 shortly after he took on the Prime Ministership, and the Working 
Nation package which followed in 1994. These statements have been 
described as "political weapons" or "advertisements' by "an incrementalist 
government trying to appear `innovative" (Cockfield and Prasser 1997, 
p99). 
There were differences in style between Keating and his predecessor. After 
the unexpected win by Labor in the 1993 election, the partnership between 
the government and the ACTU showed signs of strain as Keating attempted 
to work within the Accord to introduce enterprise bargaining. The 
relationship between the government and business also changed, 
becoming "more `crash through' than consensus" (Singleton 1997, p143). 
In March 1992, Keating announced that EPAC's scheduled meetings were 
to be reduced to one a year. This compared with 41 meetings held 
between July 1983 and March 1992. Keating states that the objective of the 
change was to allow the Council "to concentrate on medium term issues" 
(EPAC 1992, p19). Gruen and Grattan suggest that this move underlined 
EPAC's "subordinate status" in the policy making process (Gruen and 
Grattan 1993, p59). Keating subsequently abolished EPAC, although other 
tripartite industry advisory bodies were retained (Singleton 1997). 
Edwards suggests that Keating entered his second term as Prime Minister 
without a major reform program in mind. He had overseen economic 
reforms as Treasurer and was left with few areas in which to move - for 
example industrial relations reform was seen as out of bounds for a Labor 
Prime Minister already stretching his relationship with the union movement 
(Edwards 1996, pp512 -513). This interpretation seems to be an 
overstatement, as Keating's second term saw the release of the Hilmer 
Report recommending the implementation of a comprehensive National 
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Competition Policy. In October 1992 an Independent Committee of Inquiry 
into National Competition Policy had been established under the 
chairmanship of Professor Fred Hilmer. The Committee proposed a policy 
approach comprising six key elements 
Limiting anti -competitive conduct of firms 
Reforming regulation which unjustifiably restricts competition 
Reforming the structure of public monopolies to facilitate competition 
Providing third -party access to certain facilities that are essential for 
competition (eg access to the telecommunications network) 
Restraining monopoly pricing behaviour 
Fostering "competitive neutrality" between government and private 
businesses when they compete. (Hilmer et al. 1993, p xvii) 
A National Competition Council was set up to oversee the policy which 
included a major program of legislative review. The National Competition 
Policy caused some consternation in the rural sector as it was seen as a 
threat to remaining statutory marketing arrangements, that had survived 
earlier deregulation, and the export monopoly arrangements for wheat and 
sugar. Such was their concern that the Grains Council of Australia lobbied 
in the lead up to the 1996 Federal election to obtain assurances from both 
the Labor Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, Senator Bob Collins 
and the Opposition Spokesman John Anderson about the future of the 
Australian Wheat Board's single desk export arrangements. 
Environmental issues continued to be important. In December 1992, all 
Australian governments endorsed a National Greenhouse Response 
Strategy with its stated goal 
To contribute towards effective global action to limit greenhouse gas 
emissions and enhance greenhouse gas sinks; to improve 
knowledge and understanding of the enhanced greenhouse effect; 
and to prepare for potential impacts of climate change in Australia. 
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(National Greenhouse Response Strategy 1992, p10 - italics in 
original) 
In December 1992, Keating announced an environment package, the 
centrepiece of which was spending on cleaning up the Murray Darling river 
system (Mussared 1992, p1). The statement was described by 
commentators at the time as "pragmatic" (Canberra Times 1992, p8) and 
"cautious" (Taylor 1992, p1). In addition to spending on a water pollution 
and land degradation rescue package in the Murray Darling Basin, the 
statement included an announcement that the Government would ratify 
international conventions on biodiversity and climate change (Taylor 1992). 
Opposition Policy to 1996 
During the years of the Hawke government, the Opposition was undergoing 
a degree of ideological turmoil. The senior Coalition partner, the Liberal 
Party had a "serious identity problem" (Emy and Hughes 1991, p190) as 
debates waged between small 'I' liberals, who saw some role for 
government in the economy and favoured retention of the arbitration 
system, and free market advocates within the party who supported 
deregulation of industrial relations, financial markets and foreign investment 
and a reduction in the size of government (Hughes 1998). The policy 
direction which emerged was a triumph for the economic liberals - small 
government, dismantling of the arbitration system and the Accord, a 
program of privatisation and general deregulation of the economy (Kelly 
1994, p109). By 1990 the ideological debate had been resolved, 
The party which emerged under John Hewson after the 1990 
election ... looked more united, more ideologically cohesive, but also 
further to the Right than at any stage in its history. The party now 
professed a fundamental commitment to economic rationalism, small 
government and the market economy... (Emy and Hughes 1991, 
p190) 
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Following Hewson's defeat at the 1993 election, the Opposition, under first 
Alexander Downer and then John Howard moved away from presenting a 
radical program of change. 
The First Howard Government 
After its March 1996 election victory, the first Howard government continued 
along the same general economic policy line as that established by its 
predecessor (Barrett 2000, p130), in spite of the participation of the National 
Party in the Coalition. Its major policy moves, such as the changes to the 
industrial relations framework represented in the Workplace Relations Act 
1996 would not have been possible if the policy groundwork had not been 
laid by the changes to industrial relations negotiated by Labor through the 
Accord. The overall economic direction was unchanged, being "firmly in the 
economic rationalist mould" (Woodward 1997, p432). The Howard 
government did, however, dismantle the institutions of Hawke- Keating 
corporatism with the abolition of the Accord: "[t]he rise and fall of 
corporatism in Australia thus coincide with the shift from the Hawke to the 
Howard governments" (Head 1997, p352). The National Competition 
Policy reform agenda was continued although this caused some disquiet 
within the Coalition as some National Party members expressed concern 
about the impact of the policy on rural Australia. 
Environmental issues continued to appear on the Government's agenda 
with the introduction of the high profile Natural Heritage Trust environmental 
package, funded by the sale of one -third of the telecommunications carrier, 
Telstra. The Trust committed $1.15 billion over the five years from 1996 "to 
directly engage the most pressing environmental challenges faced by this 
nation" (Anderson 1996a). Negotiations leading up to the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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focused Government attention on greenhouse gas reduction and the Prime 
Minister made a statement on the Government's response to Greenhouse in 
December 1997 and established an Australian Greenhouse Office. Other 
environmental initiatives include the National Strategy for the Conservation 
of Australia's Biological Diversity and the National Forest Policy Statement 
(Papadakis and Young 2000, p163). The work program of the National 
Environment Protection Council continued with, for example, the 
implementation of a National Pollutant Inventory. 
In the area of rural policy, policy initiatives included the privatisation of the 
wool stockpile, the privatisation of the Australian Wheat Board, the 
replacement of the statutory authorities in the meat industry with 
industry-owned companies and a National Competition Policy review of the 
sugar industry. The Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service was 
restructured following the completion of a review that had commenced 
under the previous government. 
Conclusion 
In 1959, Charles Lindblom sparked a long and important debate about how 
policy is made -a debate which remains highly relevant today. Modern 
management techniques, such as program budgeting, suggest that policy 
makers and managers still aspire to comprehensiveness, however their 
practice reveals a high level of incrementalism. 
The victory of the Hawke -led Labor Party in Australia at the 1983 federal 
election signalled the beginning of a new approach to policy development. 
Hawke's preference for consensus -building and the Accord that had been 
agreed with the ACTU ushered in an era that has been described as 
"rationalist -managerialist" (Wiltshire 1990, p27) and corporatist. 
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International economic trends put pressure on the government and 
increasingly market -based solutions to policy problems were sought. The 
dominance of more instrumental approaches to policy and the neglect of 
public debate over values and policy ends continued through the Keating 
and Howard governments. As will be highlighted later, this neglect of value 
considerations, while consistent with Lindblom's model of policy 
development, carries risks as ends become shaped by policy means. 
Running counter to these trends, environmental issues gained a new 
prominence in the Australian political arena, although Papadakis argues 
that the manner in which they were managed in Australia ensured that 
economic factors were incorporated in policy responses to environmental 
concerns (Papadakis and Moore 1994). 
The strength of economic liberalism in Australia in the 1980s and 1990s, 
combined with managerialism and an emphasis on efficiency in public 
administration superficially suggests that policy was being developed In 
accordance with the rational -comprehensive model. However, a closer 
examination of the policy process and its outcomes suggests that 
Lindblom's description of policy making, developed in the 1950s in the 
United States, holds true for Australia some thirty or forty years later. To 
illustrate this point, the following case study examines the development of 
responses to farm poverty in Australia between 1989 and 1998. 
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CHAPTER THREE: FARM INCOME SUPPORT POLICY 1989 TO 
1993 
The following two chapters set out to illustrate the incremental nature of 
government responses to farm poverty in the period 1989 to 1998. Farm 
income support policy evolved over the ten years from its position as part of 
the 1988 version of the Rural Adjustment Scheme to the establishment of 
separate programs under the Agriculture Advancing Australia package 
which was announced in 1997. This chapter covers the period to 1993 at 
which time the government had a new rural policy package in place and 
was confident that it had accounted for the various adjustment and income 
support needs of Australia's farmers. Chapter Four examines the policies 
developed from 1994 to 1998. In 1992 and for the first half of 1993 the 
writer was an officer in the Rural Policy Branch of the Department of Primary 
Industries and Energy and an active participant in the policy process, 
including a period as Acting Assistant Secretary with policy responsibility 
for the schemes examined in this chapter. 
The outlook for the agricultural sector at the beginning of 1989 was 
promising. In December 1988, the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics (ABARE) issued an up -beat forecast, reporting that 
"short term prospects for Australian rural industries are sound ". A strong 
recovery from low returns in the mid 1980s led ABARE to report "the most 
favourable rural outlook since the beginning of this decade" (ABARE 1988, 
p310). However, by late 1990 Australia was experiencing the recession it 
"had to have" (Kelly 1994, p617). In 1991 ABARE reported that the 
"Australian rural economy is in a period of sharp decline, caused primarily 
by falls in the prices of several important commodities" (Hall et al. 1991, p7). 
This was part of a long term trend which was exacerbated by the growth in 
agricultural protectionism among traditional importers of agricultural 
produce and a subsequent downward pressure on world free market prices 
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(Musgrave 1990, p248). By mid 1992 the situation had deteriorated further 
as drought conditions worsened. In 1994, ABARE estimated that Australia's 
national income had been reduced by around $2 billion as a result of the 
drought, or equivalent to 0.5 percentage points lower than would otherwise 
have been the case for the financial year 1994 -95 (ARMCANZ 1994b, p7). 
As outlined in Chapter One, the Commonwealth Government has been 
concerned with farm incomes for decades. For many years the market for 
primary produce was subject to "a bewildering array of policy instruments" 
affecting farm prices (Throsby 1972a, p13) and these provided a 
mechanism for addressing inadequate farm incomes (Lewis 1967, p303). 
As the Australian economy has developed, agriculture's contribution to both 
GDP and, more recently, exports has declined along with farmers' terms of 
trade. As a result, rural Australia has been under varying degrees of 
economic pressure with the expression "rural crisis" in common usage for 
many years. 
These economic pressures were accompanied in the 1990s by stress on 
farm families and on rural communities. For many communities, the 
downturn was accompanied by the withdrawal of government and other 
services. Many farmers found themselves seeking financial assistance to 
meet household needs for the first time in their lives. Providing that 
assistance proved to be a policy challenge for governments, as they 
struggled to ensure that any welfare measures did not undercut their 
economic policy objectives for the farm sector. 
In recent years, the government's broader rural policy objectives, 
particularly in the area of rural adjustment policy, have set the parameters 
within which responses to inadequate farm incomes have been developed. 
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As a result of this close linkage between structural adjustment in the farm 
sector and poverty, this study examines the Government's rural adjustment 
policy and drought policy, both of which have included income support 
measures. 
This account is limited to policies directly aimed at income support for 
farmers who are unable to meet the day to day needs of the family. It 
excludes consideration of the aged pension, pensions payable to veterans 
and education support programs such as Austudy, although it should be 
noted that many of the issues confronting farmers in gaining access to 
income support, such as the application of an assets test, also apply to 
these other forms of assistance. Family payments have also been 
excluded, as during the period under review farming families did not appear 
to have been unduly disadvantaged by the means tests applied to this 
payment and their rate of access to this benefit equated with that of the 
general population (Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport 
References Committee 1995c, p xviii). This case study commences in 1989 
with the introduction of the revised Rural Adjustment Scheme which had 
been reviewed in 1988 and the watershed announcement by the 
Government that drought was to be removed from the Commonwealth -State 
arrangements for responding to natural disasters, the Natural Disaster 
Relief Arrangements (NDRA) (Burdon 1996b, p86). 
The Issues 
In responding to farm poverty, governments are confronted with a number of 
important policy issues. First, policy- makers are faced with the structure of 
the family farm and how, or whether, an attempt should be made to 
separate the farm business from the farm family. This is a key issue in the 
second policy issue: an appropriate government policy towards drought. It 
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is also a contributor to the third issue, the application of the assets test to 
social security payments. 
A major difficulty for farmers seeking support, and for policy makers 
developing schemes to provide support, is the "unity of business and 
household" (Mauldon and Schapper 1974, p65) within the family farm, and 
the perception that any assistance provided to the farm family is a de facto 
subsidy to the farm business. This concern has ensured that consideration 
of income support for farmers has been very closely linked to the 
Governments structural adjustment objectives for the farm sector. In 1988 
then Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, John Kerin set out clearly 
the philosophy underpinning the government's approach to rural 
adjustment: 
the purpose of this scheme is to allow effective structural adjustment 
to take place in farm business enterprises. It is not aimed at keeping 
farmers on the land. Using the scheme to prop up businesses that 
are not viable in the long term is not on. The scheme is aimed at 
making farm businesses independent of assistance as soon as 
possible or, if this cannot occur, helping farmers to leave the sector 
with dignity. The retention of farming as a desirable lifestyle will be a 
result of effective management of farm businesses and effective 
adjustment, not an objective of it. (Kerin 1988) 
This approach sets limits on the ability of governments to respond to poverty 
per se as structural adjustment remains the key objective. 
The onset of drought exacerbates underlying farm adjustment problems 
and poverty is highlighted as an issue requiring a government response. It 
was mostly in this context that farm welfare needs were considered in the 
1990s, particularly during the first half of the decade when large numbers of 
farmers were affected by severe drought conditions. The drought followed 
a period of low commodity prices and high interest rates and many farmers 
experienced financial hardship. The approach articulated by Kerin ensured 
that while responding to the growing welfare needs of this group, policy 
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makers were also focusing on the structural adjustment needs of the farm 
sector, including the perceived need to facilitate farm exit by less productive 
farmers to improve the overall productivity of the sector and increase its 
international competitiveness. 
The general social security system does not cope well with the needs of 
farmers. Australia's social security system has three distinct types of 
payments: allowances (such as the unemployment benefits - JobSearch 
and NewStart Allowances), family payments, and pensions (eg age and 
disability) (Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References 
Committee 1995c, p2). Since 1984, assets tests have been applied to 
social security payments in Australia, with the most stringent tests applying 
to unemployment benefits. Initially designed to prevent wealthy people 
from rearranging their affairs in order to gain access to welfare support, the 
assets test has hit farm families disproportionately hard (Synapse 
Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd 1992, p49). This outcome is a result of the low 
yielding nature of investments in farm land and other primary production 
assets. None of these issues has been conclusively resolved and will no 
doubt continue to test policy makers. Hardship provisions are available 
within the general welfare system, however they are not seen as 
sympathetic to the needs of farm families as one of the eligibility criteria has 
been that the farm be offered for sale. 
Government policies 
The Australian Labor Party was in Government for the first seven years of 
the period under review. In 1989 the Minister for Primary Industries and 
Energy was John Kerin, who held the portfolio from the election of the 
Hawke Government in 1983 until June 1991. His replacement, Simon 
Crean, was almost immediately faced with dealing with a worsening 
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drought and the effects of the rural crisis. In December 1993, the portfolio 
passed to Senator Bob Collins who held the position until the defeat of the 
ALP Government at the March 1996 election and whose term as Minister 
was also largely dominated by the drought. 
Table One: Major Policy Developments 1989 -1993 
Year Development Key Income Support Features 
1989 Removal of drought from the 
Natural Disaster Relief 
Arrangements 
Commencement of the Rural 
Adjustment Scheme 1988 
Part C Household Support, available for up to 
two years, in theory the first six months to be a 
grant for those leaving farming, the balance to be 
repaid or deducted from a subsequent 
re- establishment grant 
Drought support provided through Part B 
carry-on assistance 
Re- establishment grant 
1990 Report of the Drought Policy 
Review Task Force 
Recommended RAS as the most appropriate 
mechanism for delivering farm welfare support 
1991 Modified JobSearch Allowance Access to social security benefits for "financial 
hardship" farmers who were long term viable and 
ineligible for Part C support 
provided exemption from assets test for 
on -farm assets 
1992 Review of RAS 88 Consultants recommend the separation of 
welfare assistance from adjustment support 
1992 National Drought Policy Agreed policy framework based on principles 
of self -reliance and risk management 
Announced intention to establish a separate 
farm household support scheme 
1993 Commencement of the Rural 
Adjustment Scheme 1992 
Introduction of exceptional circumstances 
provisions which provided access to enhanced 
interest rate subsidies during times of severe 
downturn 
Limited to farmers with long term prospects of 
profitability and sustainability in the farm sector 
Re- establishment provisions for farmers 
choosing to leave the sector 
1993 Farm Household Support 
Scheme 
Provided household support payments at the 
level of the JobSearch Allowance to farmers 
unable to access commercial financial support 
Available for up to two years 
For farmers leaving the land, the first nine 
months of payments converted to a grant, the 
balance a loan repayable with interest 
For farmers not leaving the land, the full 
amount was repayable with interest 
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Table One sets out the various programs considered in this chapter, the 
date of their introduction and their key income support features. 
Under Labor, income support for farm families was provided through the 
Rural Adjustment Scheme, a modified unemployment benefit, the Farm 
Household Support Scheme, the Drought Relief Payment and, where 
eligibility criteria were met, the standard social security system. 
The Commonwealth Government has been involved with the delivery of 
rural adjustment -type schemes since the introduction of a debt 
reconstruction scheme in 1935. In 1971 the debt reconstruction program 
was replaced by a broader rural reconstruction scheme which included 
assistance for marginal farmers who were leaving the land and faced 
personal; financial hardship. In the mid- 1970s, the rural reconstruction 
scheme changed focus in response to the structural adjustment pressures 
facing the farm sector, and in 1976 the Rural Reconstruction Scheme was 
replaced by the Rural Adjustment Scheme, which included household 
support payments for the first time. The Rural Adjustment Scheme (RAS) 
continued until 1997 with major modifications in 1985, 1988, and 1992. 
RAS 88 
The 1988 version of the Rural Adjustment Scheme (RAS 88) came into 
effect on 1 January 1989 and continued with some minor amendments until 
31 December 1992. Although largely funded by the Commonwealth 
Government, the scheme was delivered by the States through Government 
Departments or Statutory Authorities, known collectively as the State RAS 
Authorities. 
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The 1988 Rural Adjustment Scheme increased the focus of the program on 
long term structural adjustment and microeconomic reform and there was to 
be greater emphasis on training, professional advice and diagnosis of 
adjustment needs than had been the case under the 1985 version of the 
scheme (Musgrave 1990, p255). According to the legislation, the primary 
purpose of the scheme was 
to assist in maintaining and improving the efficiency of Australian 
rural industry and so better place the industry to meet international 
competition and contribute to the national economy. (States and 
Northern Territory Grants (Rural Adjustment) Act 1988, Section 4 (1)) 
RAS 88 was divided into three parts: A, B and C. 
Part A of the scheme, "improving the farm ", was aimed at lifting farm 
performance through the acquisition of improved skill levels, the adoption of 
technological developments, an increase in farm size or capital intensity, 
farm program changes and access to information on technological 
developments and their application, training needs and opportunities, and 
appropriate farm programs (States and Northern Territory Grants (Rural 
Adjustment) Act 1988, Section 6 (2)). Support was delivered in the form of 
interest rate subsidies on borrowed finance, or loans or grants offered by 
the States. These features were aimed at viable farmers with a long term 
future in agriculture. 
Part B of the scheme, "maintaining the farm ", provided carry-on assistance 
for farmers in difficulty due to circumstances beyond their control (DPRTF 
1990, Volume 3, p74). These provisions were used to deliver support to 
farmers during drought in the period January 1989 to December 1992 and 
for the establishment of a crop planting scheme in 1992 which delivered a 
75 per cent interest rate subsidy on commercial finance for those growers 
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unable to access such finance in the absence of a subsidy (Burdon 1996a, 
p24). 
Part C, "leaving the farm ", was the main income support measure in the 
1988 Rural Adjustment Scheme. It provided household support payments 
and re- establishment assistance "to permit farmers to make an orderly exit 
from rural industry" (States and Northern Territory Grants (Rural Adjustment) 
Act 1988, Section 6(3)). Under Part C, farmers were to receive household 
support for up to two years during which time they arranged the sale of the 
farm. On leaving the farm, they could apply for a re- establishment grant, 
subject to an assets test. When the 1988 legislation was passed, this grant 
was worth up to $28,000 and was subject to an assets test equivalent to the 
grant, which reduced on a dollar for dollar basis until it cut out completely at 
an assets level of $56,000. The grant was indexed annually to the 
Consumer Price Index and by 1992 was worth around $35,000. The 
intention was that the value of the re- establishment grant be reduced by any 
household support payments received in excess of six months, however, 
the funding for RAS 88 was such that there was little incentive for the State 
RAS authorities to make this deduction. These funds were repayable to the 
Commonwealth and the Policy Guidelines for the scheme gave the State 
RAS Authorities the discretion to convert household support payments to a 
grant if the farmer left farming within two years. As a result, many farmers 
received the household support payments as a grant for the full two years. 
Under the 1988 Rural Adjustment Scheme, the policy dilemma of the unity 
of farm and family was dealt with by treating the farm as a single entity. 
Household income support was available under Part C as a component of 
the re- establishment package, which contributed to the structural 
adjustment objectives of RAS. As noted, drought was included under 
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Part B of RAS, again treating the farm as a single entity with support in the 
form of carry-on finance. To use Musgrave et al's typology of poverty 
referred to earlier (Musgrave et al. 1975 ), the 1988 Rural Adjustment 
Scheme provided support for farmers experiencing structural poverty, either 
Type A or C, but only if the non -viable farmers were prepared to leave the 
industry. Those suffering more temporary (Type B) poverty were supported 
through carry-on assistance. Expenditure on the income support 
components of RAS was small compared with the structural adjustment 
elements of the scheme, as illustrated in Table Two. 
Table Two: Expenditure on RAS 88 ($'000) 
Part A Part B Part C 
1988/89 40,384 7 5,690 
1989/90 43,384 53 5,156 
1990/91 49,384 35 5,233 
1991/92 105,470 18,600 18,777 
Table drawn from (Synapse Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd 1992, Appendix 6; 
Rural Adjustment Scheme 1993, p16) 
In later work, Musgrave observed of the 1988 Rural Adjustment Scheme: 
The resource -oriented components of debt reconstruction, farm 
build -up, carry-on finances and farm improvement would seem to 
have a major welfare dimension. 
...Despite this, the type of measures included in the scheme lead to 
the neglect of some classes of welfare problem associated with 
adjustment, particularly the problems of those applicants to the 
scheme who are classed as non -viable but who stay on the farm. 
(Musgrave 1990, p259) 
This highlights one of the problems with attempting to address welfare 
issues in an adjustment context. Not all applicants will agree with the 
assessment that they are not viable. In so doing they do not accept the 
re- establishment option and are then deprived of household support. 
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Particularly during downturns, this can have severe effects on individual 
farm families. Musgrave concluded of RAS 88 that "the scheme would not 
seem to be particularly efficient or effective in dealing with farm poverty" 
(Musgrave 1990, p262). It is worth noting the relatively small numbers of 
farmers supported through the carry-on, household support and 
re- establishment provisions of RAS 88 between 1988 -89 and the scheme's 
replacement in 1992. Table Three sets out the number of applicants 
approved for assistance under these provisions. 
Table Three: Applications approved 
Part C support under RAS 88 
for Part B carry -on and 
1988- 1989- 1990- 1991- 1992- 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Part B carry -on 23 4 1 2671 887 
Household support 254 172 516 622 273 
Re- establishment 188 126 207 438 313 
Table drawn from (RASAC 1993, p96) 
The relatively high number of applicants approved for carry-on finance in 
1991 -92 reflects the fact that this was the "first year since the early 1980's 
that Part B had been activated in a significant way" (Rural Adjustment 
Scheme 1993, p15) as it became a vehicle for providing support to 
drought -affected farmers in Queensland and New South Wales. 
Drought Policy Review 
Shortly after the 1988 version of the Rural Adjustment Scheme 
commenced, the Government introduced a policy change which 
fundamentally altered its approach to drought relief - the removal of 
drought from the Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements. This was followed 
by the establishment of a Drought Policy Review Task Force to examine the 
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most appropriate form of government response to drought. Although the 
purpose of the review did not mention income support explicitly, the Review 
Team made some recommendations in this area. 
Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements 
Drought had been included under the Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements 
(NDRA) in 1971 (Synapse Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd 1992, p44). The NDRA 
are a Commonwealth -State arrangement for responding to natural 
disasters, with the details set out in Terms and Conditions determined by 
the Commonwealth Minister for Finance. The States and Territories have 
primary responsibility for disaster relief and provide the initial financial 
resources to respond to a disaster event. The Commonwealth provides 
financial support once a predetermined spending threshold has been 
triggered by the States and also provides benefits to victims through the 
Department of Family and Community Services (Department of Finance 
and Administration 1999). Prior to 1996, this support was provided through 
the Department of Social Security. 
On 13 April 1989, Finance Minister Peter Walsh announced that drought 
was no longer to be covered by the NDRA. It is likely that the decision was 
primarily driven by budgetary considerations, as there had been "persistent 
reports" that the Queensland government was "over -hasty in declaring 
areas drought affected" (Gerritsen 1991, p285), and there was a perception 
in Canberra that the National Party government in that State was using 
drought support for party political purposes (Wettenhall 1991, p368). 
Writing in 1987, Lawrence argued 
So- called 'natural disaster' relief is considered an essential backstop 
by all political parties. The plight of rural producers suffering the 
consequences of some unforeseen disaster is the stuff of television 
documentaries and political speeches. The image of a party is 
72 
no -doubt enhanced by its generosity in aiding the hapless producer 
suffering through an Act of God. (Lawrence 1987, p207) 
By 1989, this political advantage was overridden by the demands of "fiscal 
responsibility" and the need to cut Commonwealth spending. It was also 
becoming increasingly untenable to argue that drought was an unforeseen 
event in a country as dry as Australia. Nevertheless, the decision to remove 
drought from the NDRA was not universally accepted. The National Party 
saw its removal as a weakness in the Governments approach to rural 
adjustment. Deputy Leader Bruce Scott went so far as to promise that 
the coalition will be putting severe drought - and I emphasise that it 
is only severe drought, not ordinary dry periods - back into the 
cooperative Federal State natural disaster arrangements (Scott 
1992). 
Wettenhall has argued that "[d]isasters are social, not physical events: they 
happen to human communities" (Wettenhall 1991, p356). In that context 
drought, particularly extreme drought, would seem to qualify. However, the 
new approach to drought policy with its emphasis on economic concepts of 
productivity and sustainability changed the mood of drought policy. 
Drought was no longer seen as a social event affecting human communities 
- the response was tailored to addressing the economic impact on 
producers. Aside from arguments about the validity of its removal from the 
NDRA in policy terms, the move signified a major shift in attitudes towards 
drought. 
t is now generally agreed in policy circles that the decision to remove 
drought from the Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements was well founded. 
In spite of Bruce Scott's remarks, the Coalition government after 1996 gave 
no consideration to the reinstatement of drought into NDRA. Australia is the 
driest inhabited continent on earth and extreme climatic variability is a 
feature of Australian farming (Burdon 1996b, p75). As such, drought of 
some magnitude is a common occurrence. In addition, recent advances in 
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the understanding of climate patterns, and particularly the influence of the 
El Niño phenomenon on Australia's rainfall, have increased the 
predictability of dry seasons. 
Drought Policy Review Task Force 
In May 1989, an independent Drought Policy Review Task Force was 
appointed by the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, John Kerin, to 
look at Australia's drought policy framework. The objectives of the review 
were to: 
(1) identify policy options which encourage primary producers 
and other segments of rural Australia to adopt self -reliant 
approaches to the management of drought 
(2) consider the integration of drought policy with other relevant 
policy issues; and 
(3) advise on priorities for Commonwealth Government action in 
minimising the effects of drought in the rural sector. (DPRTF 
1990, Vol 1 p2) 
The Task Force rejected the concept of drought as a natural disaster and 
placed its emphasis on the uncertainty of the farming environment and the 
need for farmers to employ risk management approaches to dealing with 
commodity price pressures, other economic pressures and drought. This 
emphasis was reflected in the description of drought adopted by the Task 
Force which was that "[d]rought represents the risk that existing agricultural 
activity may not be sustainable, given spatial and temporal variation in 
rainfall and other climate conditions" (DPRTF 1990, Vol 1, p3). Climate 
variability was seen as "clearly the norm" with extreme drought occurring 
when "agricultural production has been out of equilibrium with variable 
climatic conditions for extended periods of time" (DPRTF 1990, Vol 1, p4). 
The Task Force called for the implementation of a National Drought Policy 
and laid down a number of principles which should underpin the provision 
of Government assistance during drought. These included that assistance: 
be provided in an adjustment context 
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be based on a loans -only policy 
permit the income support needs of rural households to be 
addressed in more extreme situations. (DPRTF 1990, Vol 1 
p18) 
The Review included an overview of the income support arrangements 
available through the universal Social Security system and concluded that 
"[t]he income support needs of rural families in severe financial difficulties 
are appropriately addressed through the Rural Adjustment Scheme" 
(DPRTF 1990, Vol 1, p27). The Task Force argued that the "key to this 
issue is to consider welfare needs, while a producer stays in farming, as a 
logical extension of industry adjustment ". The Review also concluded that 
changes to the general Social Security system to address the income 
support needs of farmers were "not appropriate" (DPRTF 1990, Vol 2, 
p163). In explaining its preference for retaining welfare support within RAS, 
the Task Force explained that it was 
anxious that the integrity of the social security system should be 
respected. The possible extension of the unemployment benefit to 
cover the specific needs of primary producers and their families 
during periods of adversity, while they still remain in farming, would 
seem to be inappropriate. (DPRTF 1990, Vol 3 p68) 
This position was consistent with the views of the Department of Social 
Security which opposed arrangements providing special treatment for a 
group of self -employed business people through the existing social security 
structure. 
Senate Inquiry into Drought Policy 
In November 1991, the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional 
Affairs received a reference to inquire into and report on A National Drought 
Policy: Appropriate Government responses to the recommendations of the 
Drought Policy Review Task Force. The Committee reinforced the 
directions and recommendations of the Drought Policy Review Task Force, 
expressing its concern that, by early 1992, the Government had yet to 
respond to most of the Review's recommendations (Senate Standing 
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Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs 1992, p3). Like the Task Force, 
the Senate Committee recommended against the reinstatement of drought 
into the Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements in recognition that drought is 
a recurring feature of Australia's climate "that must be prepared for and 
managed" (Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs 
1992, p xi). It also made a distinction between normal climate variation 
and severe drought, stating that 
The Committee is of the view that individual landholders within rural 
industries should be responsible for preparing and managing 
variable climatic and seasonal conditions. However, it considers that 
there are limits to the self -reliance of farmers to cope with severe 
drought. (Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs 
1992, p xvi) 
The Committee touched only briefly on income support arrangements in its 
consideration of drought policy, identifying some problems with "the 
interaction of RAS with social security provisions (Senate Standing 
Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs 1992, p19), particularly with 
respect to the new "modified" JobSearch Allowance. 
"Modified" JobSearch Allowance 
The Drought Policy Review had endorsed the long held view that 
inadequate farm incomes were the result of adjustment pressures and 
therefore appropriately addressed through the Rural Adjustment Scheme. 
However, while consideration of a National Drought Policy was under way 
in 1991, there was a perception among policy makers that the income 
support provisions of the 1988 Rural Adjustment Scheme and the standard 
Social Security safety net were not addressing all of the welfare needs of 
farmers experiencing hardship due to the rural downturn. As a result, a 
scheme was announced in October 1991 which became known as 
"modified JS1\" (Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs 
1992, p16). It allowed limited access for some farmers to the 
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unemployment benefit or JobSearch Allowance (JSA) through 
modifications to the scheme's eligibility criteria. The Minister for Primary 
Industries and Energy, Simon Crean explained that the scheme was 
targeted at "farmers in severe financial hardship whose farms, whilst not 
profitable at present, are potentially profitable" (Crean 1991, p3678). The 
scheme was initiated by the Department of Primary Industries and Energy 
and, reluctantly, given effect by an amendment to legislation within the 
social security portfolio. The scheme was very unpopular with the 
Department of Social Security because it created a very specific category 
within social security legislation which was then subject to differential 
treatment. The Department was concerned about the "special precedents" 
created by these arrangements which allowed people of workforce age 
special exemptions from the general eligibility requirements for support 
(Synapse Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd 1992, p48). 
Under modified JSA, farmers were able to obtain an exemption for farm 
assets, including livestock and machinery, from the assets test which 
normally applied to the JobSearch Allowance (Social Security Act 1991, 
Section 27(2)). These were defined under the legislation as "unrealisable 
assets" and were those considered by the relevant State Rural Adjustment 
Authority to be "essential to the long -term profitability" of the farm (Social 
Security Act 1991, Section 27(1)). The scheme also exempted farmers from 
the JobSearch Allcwance `activity test" which required that applicants "must 
be actively seeking and willing to undertake suitable paid work or willing to 
undertake suitable vocational training" (Senate Rural and Regional Affairs 
and Transport References Committee 1995c, p5). Under the modified JSA 
arrangements, the RAS authorities issued a "financial hardship farmer" 
certificate which was current for a period of up to 12 weeks. These 
certificates were then presented to the Department of Social Security as 
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evidence that the applicant qualified for benefits under the new provisions. 
In order to qualify for a certificate, a farmer needed to be in "severe financial 
hardship ", although the farm was "likely to be profitable in the long- term" 
(Social Security Act 1991, Section 26(5)). The farmer also needed to apply 
for Part C assistance under the Rural Adjustment Scheme and to be ruled 
ineligible, and be unable to access commercial carry-on finance. The 
scheme was targeted at a very specific group, which was seen to be viable 
in the long term, and therefore ineligible for the household support and exit 
provisions of RAS, unable to access commercial finance, and ineligible for 
standard social security support due to the assets test. The scheme was not 
linked to specific events such as drought and, subject to the eligibility 
criteria described above, was available across Australia. 
The scheme was an attempt to address poverty among viable farmers who 
failed to qualify for support through the social security system and at the 
same time could not obtain commercial financial backing. It addressed the 
problem of the assets test by exempting farm assets and as such, it was 
hoped that the modified scheme would alleviate the hardship of many farm 
families in difficulty. However, after nearly a year of operation by August 
1992 only 285 farmers had accessed the modified JobSearch Allowance 
(Burdon 1996a, p41). The low take -up was attributed by some to the 
complexity of applications, requiring assessment by up to three different 
agencies before support was forthcoming (Senat9 Standing Committee on 
Rural and Regional Affairs 1992, p17). Like support under the Rural 
Adjustment Scheme, the scheme relied on farmers' accepting the RAS 
authority's assessment of their viability. Although the scheme was targeted 
at those who were viable, farmers approaching the RAS Authorities for a 
determination ran the risk of being told they were non -viable, and therefore 
candidates for support under the income support and exit provisions of 
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Part C of RAS. As was described to the Senate Standing Committee on 
Rural and Regional Affairs: 
Many farmers in poor financial situations who are not receiving 
benefits had in fact been assessed as eligible for Part C but because 
they were not prepared to accept this verdict, were foregoing the 
available income support. (Senate Standing Committee on Rural 
and Regional Affairs 1992, p18) 
To return to the typology of Musgrave et al, modified JSA was set up to 
address type B or temporary poverty which, as noted above, was not 
covered by the household support provisions of the Rural Adjustment 
Scheme. However, it did not meet the needs of non -viable farmers who 
chose to stay on the land. The scheme was explicitly linked to the Rural 
Adjustment Scheme with the Minister suggesting that it would "underpin" 
the government's "farm restructuring strategy ". He went on to say that "[t]he 
aim of this package, together with the money provided through the rural 
adjustment scheme, is to ensure that we protect our asset base" (Crean 
1991, p3679). Modified JSA provided welfare support to a small number of 
farmers but it was very much a temporary measure and was abolished with 
the commencement of the new Farm Household Support Scheme in March 
1993. 
The National Drought Policy 
In August 1991 a working group of officials of the State and Commonwealth 
governments was set up by the Australian Agricultural Council (AAC) to 
agree a National Drought Policy (AAC 1991, p9). While this work was 
taking place, the Rural Adjustment Scheme was also under review, along 
with the Income Equalisation Deposits Scheme. The Income Equalisation 
Deposits Scheme was an income smoothing measure available to farmers 
who had erratic incomes and were therefore disadvantaged by the income 
tax system. It allowec money to be put aside at favourable tax rates in high 
income years, to be drawn down in low income years (DPRTF 1990, Vol 3 
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p115). From the establishment of the Drought Policy Working Group in 
August 1992 there was a flurry of policy activity on drought and related 
issues. Figure One sets out the programs that were available to farmers 
between 1989 and 1993 along with the reviews and inquiries that took 
place and the policy work that was being undertaken by the Department. 
In February 1992, the AAC "noted that limited progress had been made ... in 
gaining Commonwealth and State agreement on the framework for and 
components of a national drought policy" (AAC 1992, p23). Ministers 
agreed that a National Drought Policy would be based on the principles of 
self -reliance, risk management and recognition of drought as a natural 
feature of the climate. It was also agreed that the Rural Adjustment Scheme 
would be the principal source of Commonwealth drought assistance and 
that drought would not be reinstated within Natural Disaster Relief 
Arrangements. In cases of "severe and exceptional drought ", consideration 
would be given by the States and the Commonwealth to an appropriate 
response (AAC 1992, p25). 
A new National Drought Policy was announced following the July 1992 
meeting of the Ministerial Council. Consistent with the recommendations of 
the Drought Policy Review Task Force, the policy was centred around the 
revised Rural Adjustment and Income Equalisation Deposits Schemes on 
the basis that "drought is cne of several sources of uncertainty facing farm 
businesses and is part of the farmer's normal operating environment" 
(ACANZ 1992, p13). Farmers were therefore to be encouraged to manage 
the risk of drought, with the Rural Adjustment Scheme to provide "support to 
farmers who have prospects of sustainable long -term profitability with a 
view to improving the productivity of their farm units" (Rural Adjustment Act 
1992, Section 3(2)(b)). 
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FIGURE ONE: PROGRAMS AND POLICY ACTIVITY 19891993 
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The new arrangements foreshadowed the development of a separate Farm 
Household Support Scheme to provide assistance to needy farmers to 
meet day to day living expenses. The policy was based on "principles of 
sustainable development, risk management, productivity growth and 
structural adjustment in the farm sector" (ACANZ 1992, p13). The 
objectives of the National Drought Policy were to 
encourage primary producers and other sections of rural 
Australia to adopt self -reliant approaches to managing climatic 
variability 
maintain and protect Australia's agricultural and 
environmental resource base during periods of extreme 
climate stress; and 
ensure early recovery of agricultural and rural industries, 
consistent with long -term sustainable levels. (ACANZ 1992, 
p13) 
As was subsequently pointed out, "there were difficulties with the move to 
make farmers more self -reliant during harsh conditions of high interest rates 
and drought" (Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References 
Committee 1994b, p14), although at the time of the development of the 
policy in 1992, it could not be known that the severe drought conditions 
would continue well into 1996. 
The details of the National Drought Policy were developed at Departmental 
level with the work being undertaken by a Working Group of the Standing 
Committee on Agriculture. Ministers then discussed the drafts provided by 
officials at meetings of the Ministerial Council. Such discussions were often 
brief and limited to identificatior and negotiation of any areas of 
disagreement between the States and the Commonwealth. In July 1992 
the National Drought Policy which was released by Ministers was not 
changed from the version submitted by the Standing Committee for 
approval. 
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The policy made one significant departure from the recommendations of the 
Drought Policy Review Task Force and that was the decision to address 
farm welfare needs separately from the Rural Adjustment Scheme through 
a new Farm Household Support Scheme. However, the integrity of the 
social security system was to remain intact as it was agreed that the scheme 
be established under new, separate legislation in the Primary Industries 
and Energy portfolio. This scheme would address the income support 
needs of all eligible farmers, not just those in drought- affected areas, but 
like the household support and exit provisions of the 1988 Rural Adjustment 
Scheme and the modified JobSearch Allowance before it, it would retain a 
structural adjustment objective. The Farm Household Support Scheme is 
discussed later in this chapter. 
The Review of RAS 88 
Concurrently with the work on the National Drought Policy, a review of the 
1988 Rural Adjustment Scheme was being undertaken by Synapse 
Consulting. The consultants recommended an overhaul of the scheme to 
increase the focus on farm adjustment and to "target those farms that can 
make a difference, those that can make a significant economic contribution ". 
The Review Team noted that 
The prime modus operandi of RAS has been intervention in farm 
financing for which, in theory there should be less and less 
justification due to deregulation of the financial sector ... (Synapse 
Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd 1992, p iii) 
They went on to argue that 
The intent of any intervention in farm financing should be to improve 
the effectiveness of commercial financing rather than as a 
mechanism to replace the commercial sector with a subsidised 
sector. (Synapse Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd 1992, p33) 
In contrast to the Drought Policy Review Task Force, the consultants were 
critical of the household support prcvisions in the Rural Adjustment 
Scheme, arguing that the "inclusion of income support measures within 
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RAS detracts from the focus of the Scheme upon farm adjustment ", 
although they recommended the retention of the re- establishment 
provisions (Synapse Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd 1992, p ix). in spite of this, 
the Report recognised the importance of addressing the income support 
needs of farmers as 
Farmers in serious financial difficulty are more likely to take 
short-term decisions that cause land degradation than farmers who 
are in more secure economic situations. (Synapse Consulting (Aust) 
Pty Ltd 1992, p47) 
The Review Team identified three possible income support options for 
consideration by government: 
a new income support category within the Rural Adjustment Scheme 
modification of existing social security arrangements; or 
changes to taxation arrangements to provide temporary income 
support. 
The first option was for a new "Part D" income support category within RAS 
which would be a temporary arrangement aimed at viable farmers and /or 
non -viable farmers yet to accept Part C support to exit farming. 
Alternatively, it was suggested that a combined Department of Social 
Security/Department of Primary Industries and Energy program could be 
developed especially for primary producers, with a time limit on the 
availability of support. Two to three years was suggested. 
The second option would see the replaceme,it of the hardship provisions in 
the Social Security system with a modified assets test which applied only to 
off -farm assets, of which up to $100,000 would be exempt to allow for 
working capital for the farm. 
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The third option proposed cashing out the value of accumulated tax losses 
at a standard rate of tax, for example the company tax rate, up to a set 
annual amount. It was proposed that the relevant JobSearch Allowance 
(unemployment benefit) rate was the appropriate ceiling. This option had 
the advantage of simplicity of administration, lower total cost to Government 
revenue and possible extension to other self -employed. In spite of its 
appeal, this option was not given serious consideration by the Government 
at the time, due to the review of the Income Equalisation Deposits Scheme 
which was also under way in 1992 and Treasury's reluctance to consider 
any further amendments to the income tax legislation (Kingma 1999, pers 
comm). 
Each of these options indicates that the consultants continued the approach 
of linking any welfare support to farm families with the economic objectives 
of structural adjustment policy. In addition, they were very concerned about 
the equity of welfare responses to farm hardship arguing that 
...the government cannot as a matter of general principle apply 
different income support arrangements to primary producers unless 
these can be justified by reference to special conditions applying to 
this category of people. Thus, there is a need to ensure that the 
treatment of primary producers is consistent with that of other groups, 
particularly self -employed business people. (Synapse Consulting 
(Aust) Pty Ltd 1992, p48) 
With respect to "emergency situations ", including drought, the consultants 
recommended that "there would be no change to the eligibility and 
assessment criteria [for RAS] ... but the levels of interest subsidies could be 
raised" (Synapse Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd 1992, p xiii). This meant that 
drought support would be targeted at farm businesses not farm families - 
and only at those businesses with viable futures in the industry. 
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RAS 92 
In presenting the Rural Adjustment Bill 1992 to the House of 
Representatives, the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, Simon 
Crean, described the scheme as "the cornerstone of the Government's 
overall rural policy approach for achieving a more sustainable, productive 
and profitable farm sector" (Crean 1992b). 
One of the notable features of the 1992 Rural Adjustment Scheme was the 
further move towards the market. In contrast to RAS 88, under which the 
State RAS authorities had determined whether farmers were viable in the 
long term, and therefore eligible for assistance, RAS 92 moved the 
assessment of "viability" into the commercial financial sector. Farmers who 
were able to convince a commercial financial institution to continue 
supporting them were seen to be viable in the eyes of the market, and 
therefore were viable in the context of the 1992 Rural Adjustment Scheme. 
This shift was intended to ensure that the scheme "should support the 
commercial financial system rather than act to usurp or compete with 
commercial institutions" (Crean 1992b). The rationale for support under 
RAS 92 therefore was to encourage productivity improvement by these 
viable farmers to strengthen their self -reliance and ultimately move them off 
the Rural Adjustment Scheme altogether. Support available through RAS 
92 was in the form of interest subsidies on loans for productivity 
improvement measures and grants for training, planning, appraisal and 
support services. 
The new RAS retained re- establishment grants as an incentive for 
non -viable farmers to leave the industry, however household support was 
moved into a new stand -alone Farm Household Support scheme. The level 
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of the re- establishment grant was increased significantly from around 
$35,000 to $45,000. 
Linkage with the National Drought Policy 
As outlined above, the new RAS was a key part of the National Drought 
Policy agreed at the July 1992 meeting of the Ministerial Council. It was 
focused on "improved farm productivity, profitability and sustainabílity 
through structural adjustment and more effective management of the farm 
business" while still allowing the Government to "respond to crises, but in a 
consistent, structured way rather than through ad hoc policy changes" 
(Crean 1992b). This crisis response was in the form of the new 
"exceptional circumstances" provisions which were introduced into the 
scheme to address such contingencies as severe drought or substantial 
commodity price downturns. When these provisions were triggered, the 
maximum interest rate subsidy available to eligible farmers was increased 
from 50 per cent to 100 per cent. Consistent with the Rural Adjustment 
Scheme's focus on supporting viable farmers, exceptional circumstances 
support was not available to marginal farmers. 
RASAC 
The 1992 Rural Adjustment Act also established the Rural Adjustment 
Scheme Advisory Council (RASAC). This Council was set up to provide the 
Minister for Primary Industries and Energy with independent, expert advice 
on the operation of RAS from a national and strategic perspective, to 
recommend the Budget for the scheme and to advise of the existence of 
exceptional circumstances (Crean 1992b). The Council's membership 
comprised up to seven members with one member to represent the States, 
an officer of the Commonwealth Department of Primary Industries and 
Energy, a representative of the National Farmers' Federation and up to four 
"special expertise" members selected "because of their expertise in 
economics, financial administration, banking, sustainable agriculture, farm 
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management or training" (Rural Adjustment Act 1992, Section 6(3)). Due to 
the worsening drought, the work program of RASAC in its first three years 
was dominated by consideration of applications for exceptional 
circumstances drought declarations. Under Labor, the Minister for Primary 
Industries and Energy did not make public the advice he received from 
RASAC, thereby ensuring any criticism of decisions was directed away from 
the Council. This practice was not continued by the Coalition after 1996. 
Although RASAC's role did not initially impact on policy towards farm 
poverty, the subsequent introduction of the drought relief payment created a 
link between exceptional circumstances drought declarations and income 
support, increasing the pressure on the Council to find in favour of the 
existence of exceptional circumstances. The Drought Relief Payment is 
discussed in Chapter Four. 
Farm Household Support Scheme 
As indicated above, a new Farm Household Support Scheme was 
introduced along with the 1992 Rural Adjustment Scheme as part of the 
National Drought Policy package. This was intended to complement the 
structural adjustment objectives of RAS 92 as reflected in the Objects of the 
Act which were: 
(a) to provide financial assistance to farmers who are unable to 
meet day -to -day living expenses and cannot obtain 
commercial loans; and 
(b) to provide a financial incentive for such persons to leave 
farming. (Farm Household Support Act 1992, Section 6) 
The scheme replaced the income support component of the 1988 Rural 
Adjustment Scheme (Part C) and was aimed at those farmers who were 
unable to access commercial finance and were therefore ineligible for RAS 
support, other than re- establishment assistance. The scheme riso replaced 
the modified JobSearch Allowance which had been introduced in late 
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1991. Farm Household Support (FHS) was offered as a loan at commercial 
rates of interest for a period up to two years. Payments were made 
fortnightly at the level of the JobSearch Allowance. If the farm was sold 
within nine months of commencing on FHS, the balance of the nine months 
of payments was received as a lump sum. If the farm was not sold, all of the 
FHS payments received were repayable to the Commonwealth with 
interest. If the farmer sold within two years, payments received in excess of 
nine months were also repayable (Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and 
Transport References Committee 1994b, p7). This basic structure was 
similar to the 1988 household support arrangements except that the loan 
nature of the payments was explicit. 
In light of the move towards the determination of viability by the commercial 
finance market, one would have thought there was no need for a household 
support scheme of any type. The Rural Adjustment Scheme guidelines 
included household expenses in the assessment of a farm's sustainable 
long term profitability (Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport 
References Committee 1994b, p10), so "viable" farmers should have been 
able to meet household expenses. Farmers who no longer had the support 
of their financial institution should technically have been eligible for 
re- establishment support. 
However, the Department of Primary Industries and Energy argued 
successfully that market failure was occurring in the delivery of farm finance 
and that a scheme along the lines of Farm Household Support was 
required to address the needs of two groups: those who were accessing 
the re- establishment provisions of the Rural Adjustment Scheme and 
required ongoing finance to meet household needs while they arranged the 
sale of the farm and, secondly, those farmers who were denied commercial 
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finance but who believed in their future on the land and would be in a 
position to "prove" themselves to their financial institution (Crean 1992a). 
As indicated above, this latter group would then need to repay the 
household support they had received from the Commonwealth government, 
with interest. In combination with RAS 92, FHS had the capacity to address 
all types of poverty experienced by farmers. However, those experiencing 
structural poverty arising from inadequate resources or long term industry 
conditions (Musgrave et al's types A and C), and who did not subsequently 
leave farming, were left with a debt at commercial rates of interest and no 
avenues for obtaining further income support. 
The Farm Household Support Scheme was generally agreed to have been 
a failure. It was subject to a great deal of criticism for its loan nature, being 
represented by the Opposition and others as unfair because farmers were 
seen as the only group in the community required to repay "welfare" 
payments. In April 1994 there were 346 farmers receiving FHS (Senate 
Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee 1994b, 
p7). By contrast, in late 1993, 920 farm families were in receipt of either the 
JobSearch Allowance or the NewStart Allowance, in spite of the difficulties 
faced by farmers in accessing standard Social Security benefits. The 
Department of Social Security reported in 1994 that "a significant majority of 
benefits were being paid to spouses" (Senate Rural and Regional Affairs 
and Transport References Committee 1994b, p8). In June 1995 the number 
of Farm Household Support recipients had dropped to 107 (DSS 1995, 
p347) and by June 1996 there were only 42 farmers using the scheme 
(DSS 1996, p362). 
The development of the Farm Household Support Scheme was hampered 
by both the need to justify the scheme in purely economic terms and the 
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incremental approach to the development of the scheme - it needed to be 
like Part C of the 1988 Rural Adjustment Scheme to facilitate the transition 
of farmers between the schemes but offer more of an incentive to farmers to 
consider leaving the land. The scheme was ultimately a hybrid - it was 
designed to be consistent with the government's structural adjustment 
objectives for the farm sector by not providing incentives for "non viable" 
farmers to remain on their farms. At the same time, its origins in Part C of 
RAS 88 and its linkage with the JobSearch Allowance in terms of the 
amount of support payable presented the scheme as a welfare measure. 
As a mechanism for adjustment, FHS could be justified as addressing 
market failure in the delivery of commercial finance to farm businesses. As 
a welfare scheme, it was subject to much criticism due to the loan nature of 
the scheme. A typical criticism of the scheme was made by Democrats 
Senator John Woodley in February 1995 when he stated that Farm 
Household Support recipients were 
among Australia's worst off farmers, and they are being penalised for 
not being able to sell up their properties and get out of farming 
altogether. Given the situation in rural Australia at the moment, 
farmers in many parts of Australia would be lucky to give their farms 
away, let alone to sell them. In spite of this, these people are ... going 
to have to repay a debt to the Commonwealth. It is a debt 
accumulated while they were basically living in poverty; a debt on 
which the government will charge a commercial interest rate. 
...since the object of farm household support payments is solely to 
cover the day -to -day living expenses of totally destitute farm families, 
the payments should be made as a grant. (Woodley 1995) 
Farm Household Support and Part C compared 
As explained above, the Farm Household Support Scheme was developed 
to complement the new 1992 Rural Adjustment Scheme following the 
Synapse review of the 1988 RAS. Although there were some superficial 
differences between FHS and the household support provisions of RAS 88 
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that it replaced, the overall scheme was only incrementally different from its 
predecessor. 
The main apparent differences between the two schemes were the 
legislative framework for the scheme and the explicit loan nature of Farm 
Household Support. Under the 1992 rural policy package, separate farm 
household support legislation was developed in an attempt to make a clear 
distinction between support for the farm business and assistance to the farm 
family. The linkage between FHS and other rural policy elements was clear 
though as the legislation was enacted in the Primary Industries and Energy 
portfolio not the Social Security portfolio. The loan nature of the scheme 
was developed to give farmers who were leaving the land the option of 
paying back any household support debt out of their re- establishment grant 
or, if they wished to keep the grant intact to purchase a home etc, to repay 
the debt over time. This choice was not offered to farmers under Part C. 
Their re- establishment grants were automatically reduced by the amount of 
the debt. However, as this reduction was disguised, the loan nature of the 
household support under the 1988 scheme was in effect hidden and, as 
explained, in some cases the debt was waived altogether by the State RAS 
Authorities who had no interest in its collection. 
Where household support payments under Part C of the 1988 scheme were 
made to farmers by the State RAS authorities, payments under the 1992 
Farm Household Support Scheme were made by the Department of Social 
Security acting on an agency basis for the DPIE. This effectively shifted 
responsibility for the administration of the farm household support 
component of rural adjustment policy from the States to the Commonwealth. 
The State RAS authorities were no longer involved in assessing the viability 
of farmers seeking household support as the main eligibility criterion was 
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inability to access further commercial finance. Evidence for this was 
provided through a certificate provided by a commercial financial institution. 
The explicit loan nature of Farm Household Support also meant that the 
RAS Authorities did not need to include household support payments in 
their calculation of re- establishment grants. Both FHS and Part C of 
RAS 88 linked household support payments to farm exit, although the Farm 
Household Support scheme was also intended to help farmers who no 
longer had bank support but believed they were viable. Household support 
payments under the 1988 scheme were intended to be provided as a grant 
for six months, while FHS extended this to nine months. 
The overall philosophy of the schemes was the same. Farm poverty was 
regarded as a result of a slower than optimum pace of adjustment. The 
view was that, with the Rural Adjustment Scheme to improve the 
productivity of those farmers with potential and to provide incentives for exit 
to those who were not viable in the long term, there was little need for a 
household support program, except in the cases of financial market failure 
as outlined above. 
To use Lessman's distinction (Lessman 1989), both the policy making 
process and the content of the policies were characterised by 
incrementalism. FHS was not developed on a blank sheet of paperf - 
policy makers began with Part C of RAS 88 and worked from there to 
improve the scheme and reframe it as a separate stand -alone program. 
Part of the rationale for this was to facilitate the transfer of farmers from one 
scheme to another. There were also limited time and staff resources to take 
a synoptic approach to the development of the scheme and Farm 
Household Support was generally regarded as the least interesting or 
The writer was responsible for much of the drafting and implementation of the Farm 
Household Support Scheme during 1992 and early 1993. 
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important part of the policy package. There was a recognition that some 
sort of household support component was needed but the real interest of 
the DPIE was in the new Rural Adjustment Scheme and the broader 
National Drought Policy. In terms of output, the 1992 FHS scheme 
appeared to be a radical departure from the household support provisions 
of the 1988 RAS. It was not delivered by the RAS Authorities, it was a loan 
and a certificate was required from a financial institution to prove eligibility. 
These changes were, however, largely cosmetic. In terms of its overall 
objectives, the underlying approach to farm poverty, the amount of money 
available and who was eligible, little had changed. 
Conclusion 
The use of structural adjustment programs such as the Rural Adjustment 
Scheme to address farm poverty has always been a problem. It has been 
argued that a scheme designed to deliver economic adjustment has no 
role in addressing welfare issues. Musgrave suggests that 
if the objective of policy is to improve the efficiency of resource use, 
then it should operate on those resources and their markets ... if the 
objective of policy is to redistribute income, it should be founded on 
methods of operating directly on incomes and not on the market for 
resources. (Musgrave 1990, p52) 
Unfortunately, a proposal to provide welfare support to farmers in the latter 
form would have been unlikely to pass the scrutiny of the economists in the 
coordinating Departments in 1992, particularly the Department of Finance. 
Among the concerns of these officials was the private enterprise nature of 
the farm business and a suspicion that a welfare program for farmers would 
provide an indirect subsidy for the business. This concern was not new. 
Writing in 1974, Mauldon, and Schapper observed that 
unity of farm business and farm household, which is an inherent 
feature of typical commercial family farms, makes it difficult to sustain 
the distinction between social assistance which increases 
farm -business profit or reduces loss, and that which increases 
farm -household income. (Mauldon and Schapper 1974, p116) 
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In its submission to the later review of RAS 92, the Industries Commission 
picked up this point arguing that the "obvious danger with income support is 
that it could undermine the incentives of farmers to adopt their own risk 
management strategies ". Perhaps surprisingly, the IC went on to state that 
"[i]n some circumstances, however, events are likely to conspire sufficiently 
against the farmers to warrant income support on welfare grounds" (Industry 
Commission 1996, p57). 
By early 1993, the Government had in place a complete policy package 
which it regarded as capable of supporting the farm sector to become more 
self -reliant, productive and sustainable (Crean 1992b). The package 
included support for productivity improvement, mechanisms such as income 
equalisation deposits to enhance risk management through accumulation 
of financial reserves, farm household support for those unable to access 
commercial finance or social security, and exit support through the 
re- establishment provisions. Farm poverty was regarded as a result of 
adjustment pressures and the Government's response was carefully 
constructed to ensure the adjustment process was not undermined. It was 
believed that the enhanced interest rate subsidies available under the new 
exceptional circumstances provisions of RAS 92 would prove sufficient to 
see viable farmers through severe events. As the Minister said of RAS 92: 
This [scheme] will have, over the remainder of this decade, a 
significant impact on the development of a stronger, more resilient 
and more competitive farm sector. It will drive the process of 
structural adjustment necessary to address the formidable economic 
and environmental problems facing the sector. 
...The provisions for exceptional circumstances will allow us to 
respond quickly and appropriately to severe downturns without 
undermining the direction and purpose of the scheme as a whole. 
(Crean 1992b) 
This optimism was short lived. Over the next two years, the Minister was 
responding to a continuous stream of requests for exceptional 
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circumstances declarations and there were ongoing debates about the 
definition of drought and at what point it became exceptional. Incidences of 
farm poverty began to attract media attention and the issue began to grow 
in importance as the drought worsened. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: FARM INCOME SUPPORT POLICY 1993 TO 
1998 
The Commonwealth's rural policy package had come into effect at the 
beginning of 1993. The exceptional circumstances provisions of the Rural 
Adjustment Scheme were triggered almost immediately and became the 
largest expenditure item in the RAS 92 budget over the next four years. At 
the end of 1994, the drought which had been emerging was being 
described as "the worst in history" (Wahlquist and Kidman 1994). As the 
drought continued through 1994, pressure increased on the 
Commonwealth Government to respond with further assistance to farm 
families. The media increasingly ran stories on the severity of the drought, 
and the Southern Oscillation Index and El Niño became part of the public 
vocabulary. From July 1993 until March 1995 the writer worked as an 
adviser in the office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy and in 
that role was responsible for providing policy advice in the areas of drought, 
rural adjustment and farm income support. Between 1994 and 1998 the 
high level of policy activity in the area of rural adjustment and drought 
continued as illustrated in Figure Two. 
Throughout 1994, the Rural Adjustment Scheme Advisory Council 
undertook a series of investigations into State claims for new "exceptional 
circumstances" declarations for drought affected areas. As the declarations 
were made, increased resources were made available through RAS, 
however, consistent with the National Drought Policy, this support remained 
targeted at farmers with prospects of long term profitability in the sector. For 
farmers who were unable to access commercial finance and were therefore 
ineligible for RAS support, the options remained re- establishment 
assistance and exit from farming, the loans -based FHS or, if possible, the 
JobSearch Allowance under its standard provisions. 
FIGURE TWO: PROGRAMS AND POLICY ACTIVITY 1994 -1998 
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There remained a group of farmers who were in need but not receiving 
assistance from the government in any form - those who no longer had the 
support of a commercial lender but who either did not wish to leave farming, 
had exhausted the maximum two years on FHS or did not wish to take on 
any further debt. From October 1994, this group was assisted through the 
Drought Relief Payment. 
The Policy Process 
From early 1994 as the drought worsened, the issue of support for 
struggling farmer families became much more politically sensitive than it 
had been previously. Between 1989 and 1993 there had been broad 
bipartisan agreement on the National Drought Policy and the direction of 
rural adjustment policy. Increased media attention provided the opportunity 
for drought policy to become a more political issue. In 1993 as Minister for 
Primary Industries and Energy, Simon Crean had faced fewer than ten 
questions without notice on rural adjustment, drought or the rural downturn, 
several of which were friendly "Dorothy Dixers" from Labor backbenchers. 
In 1994 the new Minister, Senator Bob Collins responded to an increasing 
number of questions on drought -related issues with 35 being asked in the 
parliamentary sitting period between 23 August and 8 December 1994 
alone. The Prime Minister also answered a number of questions on the 
drought in September following his visit to southwest Queensland. The 
tone of the questions also changed with more emotive and colourful 
language being used by Opposition members. For example on 19 
September 1994, Senator Tierney referred to the "sheer human misery that 
has been created by what is possibly the worst drought this century" 
(Tierney 1994). In August 1994, Senator Grant Tambling suggested that 
"drought is probably the most important issue that this parliament can 
currently address" (Tambling 1994). The Opposition suggested that the 
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Labor government demonstrated a "lack of understanding of the extent of 
severe drought in Australia" (Tambling 1994), attempting to capitalise on a 
widespread feeling in rural Australia that Labor was not sympathetic to 
farmers and therefore could be doing more to support drought- affected 
farmers and communities. 
Politics also became important in the relationship between the 
Commonwealth and State governments. There was much debate between 
State and Commonwealth Ministers about the declaration of exceptional 
circumstances drought, arising from the lack of a clear definition of 
"exceptional circumstances ". This was compounded by the different 
drought declaration procedures in place in the different States, varying from 
the declaration by the members of the individual Rural Lands Protection 
Boards (RLPBs) in NSW to a more rigorous and scientific approach in 
Queensland. Accordingly, the Commonwealth developed a rough yardstick 
of two years of drought in three to determine whether a case may exist for 
an exceptional circumstances declaration. In 1994 the issue came to a 
head when the Commonwealth received exceptional circumstances 
submissions for a number of RLPBs in NSW. On going through the rainfall 
records for a number of the areas covered by the submission, the 
Commonwealth Minister's Office determined that some of the areas had 
experienced as few as 15 months of drought declarations in 36. This led to 
a heated debate between the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, 
Senator Bob Collins and the NSW Minister for Agriculture, Ian Causley 
about the definition of "two years out of three ", with Collins arguing that two 
years in three should translate to a minimum of 24 drought declared months 
in 36. 
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Heightened political and media attention being given to the drought 
situation resulted in increased involvement of the Ministerial Office in the 
detail of drought policy. In one incident, tensions arose between the Office 
and the Department over the premature release by a Departmental officer of 
a draft list of regions to be declared subject to the exceptional 
circumstances provisions. When the official announcement omitted some 
areas that had been named by the Officer, the Minister was faced with 
dealing politically with accusations of having removed particular areas from 
eligibility for support. 
At the Departmental level, the Standing Committee on Agriculture and 
Resource Management convened a drought declaration Workshop on 
18 October 1994 to consider a uniform national process for exceptional 
circumstances drought declarations (ARMCANZ 1994a, p5). Later that 
month, at its meeting on 28 October 1994, the Agriculture and Resource 
Management Council of Australia and New Zealand agreed on 
a harmonised system for considering future drought declarations 
based on the following common set of core criteria which are to be 
take into account by both the Commonwealth and the 
States/Territories in future consideration of any drought and 
exceptional circumstances declarations: 
1. meteorological conditions; 
2. agronomic and stock conditions; 
3. water supplies; 
4. environmental impacts; 
5. farm income levels; and 
6. scale of the event. (ARMCANZ 1994a, p3) 
Policy makers continued to respond within the broad framework of the 
National Drought Policy, without really addressing the key issues of 
delivering effective income support to Australia's farm families. By 
mid -1996, the drought was mostly over and there had been a change of 
government at the Commonwealth level. 
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The new Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, John Anderson 
instituted an ambitious review of rural policy in the first twelve months of the 
new Coalition Government. In fulfilment of an election promise, a National 
Rural Finance Summit was held in Canberra in June 1996. Reviews of the 
Rural Adjustment Scheme and of the impact of the Social Security assets 
test on farmers were also commenced, followed in early 1997 by a review of 
the National Drought Policy. Policy responses to the issues of farm poverty 
continued to evolve based on principles of self -reliance and enhanced 
productivity. The path of this evolution was barely interrupted by the 
election of the Coalition Government as the changes which the new 
Table Four: Major Policy developments 1994 -1998 
Year Development 
1994 Farm Hand Appeal 
1994 Drought Relief Payment 
Key Income Support Features 
Public Appeal to assist farmers with meeting 
day to day necessities 
Funds raised were matched dollar for dollar by 
the Commonwealth Government 
Available as a grant in drought exceptional 1 
circumstances areas 
Assets test on off-farm assets only 
Not limited to farmers with long term prospects 
in farming 
Available at the rate of the JSA 
Included exemption from the Austudy assets 
test and access to a Health Care Card 
1994 Senate Inquiry into Rural 
Adjustment, Rural Debt and 
Rural Reconstruction 
Welcomed the introduction of the Drought 
Relief Payment 
Called for a significant overhaul of the Farm 
Household Support Scheme 
1996 National Rural Finance Called for a "welfare system that works for rural 
Summit Australians" 
1996 Special Rural Task Force 
Review of the Assets Test 
21 recommendations to improve the 
operation of the assets test 
Recommended that the requirement to offer 
the farm for sale be removed from social security 
hardship provisions 
1996 Review of RAS 92 Concluded that RAS was not appropriate to 
the adjustment needs of Australian agriculture 
Called for more responsive welfare 
arrangements 
1997 Agriculture Advancing 
Australia 
Extended the Drought Relief Payment to a 
new Exceptional Circumstances Relief Payment 
Introduced the Farm Family Restart Scheme 
which provided household support payments 
Re- establishment grants available for the first 
two years of the scheme 
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Government implemented were in many ways a natural progression from 
the policy developments which took place under Labor. Mr Anderson was 
replaced by Mr Mark Valle following the 1998 election in the new, smaller 
portfolio of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. 
Table Four sets out the policy developments in the period 1994 to 1998 
along with their main features. Like the schemes outlined in Chapter Three, 
these programs continued to be developed incrementally and in the context 
of the government's structural adjustment objectives. 
Farm Hand2 
While both State and Commonwealth Governments attempted to contain 
their policy responses to the drought within the confines of the 1992 
National Drought Policy, pressure was building from the churches and 
welfare groups to respond to a perceived welfare crisis in rural areas, 
particularly in the worst hit regions of southwest Queensland and northern 
New South Wales. Television news stories in metropolitan Australia were 
including nightly reports of the drought, with graphic footage of dying sheep 
and parched landscapes. In August 1994, the Farm Hand appeal was 
launched by television personality Ray Martin, seeking public donations to 
assist farm families who were having difficulty meeting day -to -day living 
expenses (Burdon 1996b, p117). The fund collected $10 million during its 
existence and this was matched by the Commonwealth Government. The 
objective of the fund was specifically to address farmers' problems with 
meeting living expenses and the only non -household debts which were 
assisted were basic necessities such as car registration or tyres in cases 
where families were particularly dependent on their vehicles. Most of those 
who received support had around $10,000 -$12,000 of identifiably personal 
2This section on Farm Hand based on an Interview with Doug Miel, Farm Hand Appeal 
Coordinatcr, Canberra, 2 February 1999 
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or family debt, as distinct from debt associated with the farm business. 
These debts were largely owed to the local community so Farm Hand had 
the added benefit of easing the impact of the drought on small non -farm 
businesses in drought affected areas. The assistance was originally 
targeted at supporting families in areas declared to be in drought 
exceptional circumstances, however, following the introduction of the 
Drought Relief Payment, the emphasis shifted to families in need outside 
these areas. 
Over 7,000 families were assisted by Farm Hand at an average level of 
around $2,700, with most families receiving in excess of $1,000. The 
assistance was based on an honour system - applicants were not required 
to provide details of tax file numbers, sources of income or large amounts of 
personal information. The organisers uncovered some attempts at double 
dipping where families applied under both their town and farm addresses 
and around $100,000 was probably saved in this area through 
cross -checking the Farm Hand database. Donations to the Fund were 
largely from the general public. There were also donations from 
corporations, including the banks, and the Maritime Union of Australia 
made a significant donation of nearly $70,000 to the Appeal (Nicholson 
1999, pers Comm). Farm Hand raised awareness in urban Australia of the 
plight of many farmers and it also brought home to the farmers themselves 
that they vere not alone, easing some of the stigma of seeking assistance. 
The profile of the appeal also gave the impression that the community was 
stepping in where the Government was not prepared to act. The then 
Opposition were quick to exploit this impression, claiming the Government 
had been "shamed" into the introduction of the Drought Relief Payment 
(Anderson 1994). 
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The Drought Relief Payment 
In September 1994, Prime Minister Keating, at the urging of then Minister 
for Primary Industries and Energy, Senator Bob Collins (Lake 1999, pers 
comm), visited drought- affected areas of Queensland to meet farmers and 
see conditions first hand. Keating's visit marked a shift in the Government's 
attitude to supporting drought- affected farmers. In a speech to farmers, he 
said that "much of the Australian legend is tied to the bush, and it's time the 
rest of the country helped battling farmers ". He went on to say that the 
Government "won't leave the country people of this nation behind" (Wright 
1994). 
During the week following his visit, on 21 September 1994, the Prime 
Minister announced the introduction of the Drought Relief Payment. This 
was to be paid to farm families, in areas declared to be in exceptional 
circumstances drought, at the level of the JobSearch Allowance. 
Importantly, the payment was not linked to the viability of the farm business. 
Farm assets were excluded from the assets test, although a test on off -farm 
assets applied. In recognition that the difficulties of the drought would not 
cease immediately with the first rains, the DRP was to be available for six 
months after the exceptional circumstances declaration was lifted (Senate 
Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee 1994b, 
p56). Farmers in receipt of Farm Household Support in drought exceptional 
circumstance:; areas could transfer without penalty to the DRP. By 30 May 
1995, 10,500 farm families were in receipt of the Drought Relief Payment, 
benefiting over 30,000 people (Collins 1995). 
One of the consequences of the introduction of the DRP was that obtaining 
a drought exceptional circumstances declaration became much more 
attractive. Where previously such a declaration provided interest rate 
105 
subsidies of up to 100 per cent, after October 1994 this was accompanied 
by possible access to the DRP, a Health Care Card and exemption from the 
assets test for Austudy. This increased the pressure on the Rural 
Adjustment Scheme Advisory Council to find in favour of applications for 
exceptional circumstances declarations. 
The combination of medía attention and the Prime Minister's involvement 
fent a sense of urgency to the policy process as government responses to 
farm poverty moved into the public spotlight. The DRP was implemented by 
an amendment to the Farm Household Support Act 1992 and arrangements 
were made for payments to begin immediately and to be back -dated to 
1 October 1994 (Beddall 1994). This urgency contrasted sharply with 
applications for the modified JSA which had taken eight to ten weeks to 
process (Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs 1992, 
p17). Unlike FHS, which was developed as part of an overall policy 
package in 1992, the drought relief payment was very much a response by 
the Government to mounting public pressure and to a perception that the 
existing schemes were inadequate to address the welfare needs brought 
on by the prolonged drought conditions. As a result, there was no need to 
present the DRP as part of a structural adjustment package, addressing an 
identified market failure. The only concession to the objectives of the 
National Drought Policy was that DRP payments were linked to drought 
exceptional circumstances declarations made under the Rural Adjustment 
Scheme and were not generally available outside these areas. However, 
within drought exceptional circumstances areas, no distinction was made 
between farmers with long term prospects in the industry and those who 
were no longer viable. The support was available to meet the cost of daily 
necessities for all who passed the income and off -farm assets test - 
irrespective of the health of their business. The Drought Relief Payment 
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was therefore a significant departure from previous policies in that, instead 
of seeing the family's welfare as an adjunct to the farm business, the farm 
household was given priority and its needs were addressed. The welfare of 
farming families was no longer subordinated to structural adjustment and 
farm poverty could be addressed more effectively. Throughout 1995 -96 an 
average of 10,000 families per month received the Drought Relief Payment 
at a cost to the Commonwealth of $129 million. In June 1996, the 
Department of Social Security reported that 9,710 farmers were benefiting 
from the scheme - by contrast there were 42 recipients of Farm Household 
Support (DSS 1996). 
The December 1994 Package 
The Drought Relief Payment package was followed in December 1994 by a 
$112 million package of long term measures designed to assist farmers 
with drought preparation. Farm Management Bonds, a variation on income 
equalisation deposits, were enhanced through an increase in the deposit 
limit. An investment allowance was introduced for fodder and water storage 
for livestock, conveyancing and minimum tillage equipment, along with 
further funding to Landcare in drought areas to prevent environmental 
degradation. More funds were provided to help restructure farms in 
drought -prone areas and improve productivity and further money was 
provided for research into climate forecasting. The package also included 
additional exceptional circumstances drought declarations (Wahlquist 
1994). 
Senate Inquiry into Rural Adjustment, Rural Debt and Rural 
Reconstruction 
In March 1994 the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport 
References Committee received a reference into rural adjustment, rural 
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debt and rural reconstruction. The Committee's recommendations were 
consistent with the overall direction of government policy with its focus on 
self reliance and risk management. However, the Report did express the 
view that there was "considerable confusion in the rural community about 
the focus and objectives of RAS 92" (Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and 
Transport References Committee 1994b, p ix). Part of this concern related 
to the dominance within the scheme of the exceptional circumstances 
component. The Committee recommended that the exceptional 
circumstances provisions be removed form RAS and set up as a separate 
scheme subject to a Commonwealth -State agreement. With respect to farm 
poverty, the Report welcomed the introduction of the Drought Relief 
Payment but called for the Farm Household Support Scheme to be 
overhauled significantly (Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport 
References Committee 1994b, p xiii). 
Senate Inquiry into the Operation of the Assets Test 
The difficulties associated with providing appropriate welfare support to 
families in hardship due to the drought once again focused attention on the 
assets tests that applied to social security payments. It had long been 
recognised that the low yielding nature of farm assets, the application of the 
superannuation investment and family home exemptions, and the difficulty 
of partially liquidating farm assets to meet current expenditure cause 
special problems for farmer3. It has been suggested that, in combination, 
"these constraints on primary producers ... ensure a much harsher impact of 
DSS ... assets tests than applies to the population generally" (Synapse 
Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd 1992, p49). 
The Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References 
Committee received two references in 1994 relating to the impact of the 
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assets test on farm families. The first, referred on 30 June 1994, related to 
the assets test applying to Austudy and the second, received on 24 August 
1994, related to the impact of the assets test on social security benefits. On 
31 August the two references were combined (Senate Rural and Regional 
Affairs and Transport References Committee 1995b, p xi). The Committee 
noted that the JobSearch and NewStart Allowances were "not designed to 
provide a guaranteed minimum income regardless of circumstances" but 
were programs "designed for those unemployed people who are actively 
seeking work" (Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport 
References Committee 1995b, p xvii). To qualify for JSA, applicants 
needed to be unemployed and registered as such with the Commonwealth 
Employment Service, and pass the activity test and the income and assets 
tests. While many farmers could not satisfy the activity test due to ongoing 
maintenance requirements of the farm property, many of their spouses were 
genuinely seeking off -farm employment and were satisfying the income and 
activity tests. However, this group was often prevented from accessing 
benefits because the assets test was applied to the total assets of the 
couple, ie they were not apportioned. In order to avoid the assets test, 
farmers could apply for assistance under the hardship provisions, which 
required that the farm be offered for sale. Many farmers did not comply with 
this requirement because they were "hoping that their viability would 
improve" (Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References 
Committee 1995b, p8). 
The Senate Committee recommended that "applicants for social security 
payments under the hardship provisions for JobSearch or NewStart 
Allowances should no longer be required to offer their property for sale." 
(Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee 
1995b, pxvii) While recommending against the general exemption of all 
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farm assets from the assets test on social security payments, the Senate 
Committee did recommend an urgent review by the Minister for Social 
Security of the hardship provisions of all social security payments (Senate 
Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee 1995b, p 
xxi). 
National Rural Finance Summit 
As promised by the incoming Coalition government, a National Rural 
Finance Summit was held in Canberra from 3 -5 July 1996. It involved 230 
participants and was aimed at developing "a greater appreciation of farm 
financial issues" and identifying strategies to "contribute to long term 
sustainability, profitability and international competitiveness of the farm 
sector" (ARMCANZ 1996, p87). Following the Summit an Activating 
Committee was established, chaired by the Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, to examine the 135 
recommendations which came out of the summit. A Final Report of the 
Activating Committee was provided to the Minister in February 1997. 
Key points raised by the Summit included recognition of the need for "a 
welfare system that works for rural Australians" and for more effective rural 
adjustment arrangements (Special Rural Task Force 1997. P45). Along 
with a Business Plan for Australian Agriculture, these were also the 
priorities identified by Minister Anc'erson in his closing address to the 
Summit (ARMCANZ 1996, p87). 
The National Drought Policy Revisited 
The August 1995 meeting of the Ministerial Council, ARMCANZ, had 
agreed to review the responses of Governments to the drought, consistent 
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with the objectives of the National Drought Policy. The Review was set up 
to 
examine existing drought response measures and evaluate the 
impact and appropriateness of these measures and the relative 
contributions of the Commonwealth and drought- affected States, 
in meeting the objectives of the National Drought Policy (NDP); 
identify policy options for future droughts which would continue 
the development of a self -reliant, competitive and 
environmentally sustainable farming sector. (ARMCANZ 1995, 
p85) 
A draft Future National Drought Policy Statement was considered by 
Ministers at the September 1996 ARMCANZ meeting. This draft included 
consideration of farm welfare measures and suggested that the 
Commonwealth 
review the ability of farmers to access general welfare measures 
through a Department of Social Security Rural Task Force with a 
view to ensuring farmers have equitable access to welfare 
(ARMCANZ 1996, p10). 
The February 1997 ARMCANZ meeting discussed drought policy in the 
broader context of farm business risk management. Ministers "accepted the 
need to integrate the approaches to risk management, adjustment and 
welfare" and also that "business support needed to be reoriented away from 
relief measures, including interest rate subsidies, and towards 
preparedness measures" (ARMCANZ 1997, p19). Ministers agreed to an 
"integrated National Risk Management (including Drought) Policy" which 
was focused on self reliance, good natural resource management, 
structural adjustment, risk management .Ind ensuring farm families could 
secure their welfare requirements (ARMCANZ 1997, p21). 
This approach differed little in substance from previous policy directions. It 
continued to rest on principles of self -reliance and risk management. There 
was incremental movement in the area of farm poverty as the Social 
Security portfolio was drawn into the policy net. Up until this point the 
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Department of Social Security's involvement with poor farmers had been 
limited to the delivery of programs on an agency basis for the Department of 
Primary Industries and Energy. 
Special Rural Task Force Review of the Assets Test 
On 11 September 1996, the Minister for Social Security announced the 
establishment of a Special Rural Task Force to investigate the impact of the 
assets test on the ability of farm families to access social security benefits. 
The Task Force was set up "in response to concerns across rural 
communities that the current Social Security assets tests and hardship 
provisions may disadvantage farming families" (Special Rural Task Force 
1997, p4). The Terms of Reference for the Task Force drew particular 
attention to the impact of the assets test in situations where farmers were 
unable to sell their properties "due to market conditions "; the position of 
farmers on small, non -viable holdings; the operation of the hardship 
provisions; the impact of the assets test on inter -generational transfer and 
the valuation of land and curtilage (up to 2 hectares surrounding the house) 
for the purposes of the assets test. 
In terms of the main income support measure being sought by farmers, 
unemployment payments, the income and assets tests were particularly 
tight. The rationale for this was the need "to maintain work -force incentives 
and to reinforce the fact that these payments are not intended for long -term 
support" (Special Rural Task Force 1997, p12). Farmers in difficulty had 
been able to access benefits through the hardship provisions of the Social 
Security Act, however, these provisions were quite stringent requiring the 
farmer to demonstrate that they: 
could not sell their property because there was no buyer or 
there was some legal impedime:it to selling; 
could not use their property as security for borrowing; and 
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were not receiving or were not eligible to receive other income 
support payments, such as Farm Household Support (Special 
Rural Task Force 1997, p13). 
The requirement that the farmer offer the farm for sale was considered 
"proof that they have relinquished the ongoing commitment to their farm' 
(Special Rural Task Force 1997, p20). This was considered particularly 
harsh as in most cases this also meant selling the family home. 
The Task Force noted that there were many cases where farmers were not 
accessing support to which they were entitled for a variety of reasons, 
including wrongly self- assessing themselves as ineligible (Special Rural 
Task Force 1997, p18) and a reluctance to seek "welfare" (Special Rural 
Task Force 1997, p41). The valuation of the farm family home was also an 
issue of concern as the assets test exempts the family home, resulting in the 
perception that urban home owners with million dollar homes could access 
social security benefits while farms with similar (non- exempt) asset levels 
were excluded from support (Special Rural Task Force 1997, p37). 
The Special Task Force made 21 recommendations in response to its 
Terms of Reference. With respect to the hardship provisions, it 
recommended that 
the Social Security Act be amended to remove the requirement for 
people claiming an allowance payment ... to offer their property for 
sale. However, a test of reasonableness ... will apply to ensure 
applicants could demonstrate an attachment to the farm as well as a 
two year time limit on accessing Social Security payments. (Special 
Rural Task Force 1997, p7) 
The Task Force proposed amending the activity test to "reflect rural and 
farming situations ", possibly by allowing participation in "Landcare, 
environmental or other community activities that contribute to the social and 
physical capital of the area" (Special Rural Task Force 1997, p7). With 
respect to the valuation of the farm home and curtilage, the Task Force 
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recommended that the "national average value of pensioner house, as 
determined by the ABS, be assigned to the farm house and curtilage" 
(Special Rural Task Force 1997, p9). 
The Task Force also addressed the welfare position of farm families in the 
context of the ongoing adjustment process, emphasising the need to 
separate business support from farm welfare (Special Rural Task Force 
1997, p31). The recommendation in this area was that a "time limited, 
income triggered payment to farmers in severe financial circumstances" be 
developed. This payment would be for farmers who were accessing an 
adjustment package and would be "conditional upon farmers entering 
financial counselling and whole farm planning" (Special Rural Task Force 
1997, p8). 
The Task Force was chaired by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister 
for Social Security (Newman 1996). This marked something of a change in 
the attitude of the Social Security portfolio towards the welfare needs of 
farmers. All previous consideration of farm income support had been 
initiated and driven by the agriculture portfolio with any needed DSS 
involvement, such as for the modified JSA and Farm Household Support 
schemes, provided with some reluctance. The fact that both FHS and the 
Drought Relief Payment were delivered through legislation in the Primary 
Industries and Energy portfolio was indicative of the low level of DSS 
involvement at a policy level in farm welfare issues to this point. The 
chairing of the Task Force by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for 
Social Security meant that primary bureaucratic responsibility for the work 
of the Task Force lay with officers of the Department of Social Security. 
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The Review of RAS 92 
On 10 September 1996, the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, 
John Anderson announced a comprehensive mid -term review of the Rural 
Adjustment Scheme. The Review was to consider the appropriateness of 
the program, its performance, and the management, administration and 
delivery of the Scheme. (Anderson 1996b) 
The Review Report emphasised the need for Government policy to focus on 
profitability, sustainability, competitiveness and self reliance, however, it 
concluded that "RAS 92 is not appropriate to the adjustment needs of 
Australian agriculture in either today's business environment or that 
expected in the next century" (McColl et al. 1997, p ix), stating that "RAS 92 
has generally addressed symptoms rather than causes" (McColl et al. 1997, 
p118). The Report was critical of the scheme's main support mechanism, 
interest rate subsidies, arguing that "[t]here appears to be no compelling 
evidence of significant failure of financial markets warranting government 
intervention to lower farmers' borrowing costs" (McColl et al. 1997, p 37). It 
is worth noting that the Synapse Review of 1992 had been similarly 
concerned about the use of interest rate subsidies, recommending that they 
"be viewed, at best, as fall back strategies" (Synapse Consulting (Aust) Pty 
Ltd 1992, p35). 
The 1997 Review identified a number of major themes, including the need 
for farmers and government to distinguish clearly between the objectives 
and needs of the farm business and the farm family. The Review Team 
recommended the termination of RAS 92, to be replaced by a new Farm 
Business Improvement Scheme, which focused on skills enhancement, a 
separate re- establishment scheme, and "more responsive welfare 
arrangements" to meet short term welfare needs (McColl et al. 1997, p xii). 
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Like the Senate Inquiry, the Review team was very concerned about the 
confusion over the purpose of RAS 92, noting that RAS expenditure up to 
1997 had been dominated by funding ongoing commitments under RAS 88 
and exceptional circumstances interest subsidies. While recognising that 
"acute welfare problems" (McColl et al. 1997, p114) had occurred during 
the drought, the Review team argued that 
[ wjelfare assistance should not be delivered through instruments that 
assist businesses. Such an approach confuses the objective of the 
intervention, doesn't effectively target the welfare problem and 
distorts market signals to farm businesses receiving assistance. 
(McColl et al. 1997, p38) 
The Review endorsed the recommendations of the Special Rural Task 
Force, stating that these recommendations "should make the welfare 
system a more effective safety net for farmers" (McColl et al. 1997, p141). 
The Governments response to the review of RAS 92 was to announce that 
the scheme was to be wound up and replaced by a new program. In 
announcing his decision, the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, 
John Anderson said that the 
Government intends to wind up the RAS and replace it with a better 
program tuned to the need to encourage farmers to improve their 
planning and risk management skills, or to coin a phrase, to get 
smart (Anderson 1997d) . 
A special meeting of ARMCANZ was held in June 1997 at which Minister 
Anderson sought the input from State Ministers into an Integrated Rural 
Policy Package aimed at addressing rural adjustment, risk management, 
drought, farm welfare, farmer business management skills development 
and training and rural community development (ARMCANZ 1997, p4). 
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Agriculture Advancing Australia (AAA) Package 
On 14 September 1997, John Anderson announced the Agriculture 
Advancing Australia integrated rural policy package. Mr Anderson 
identified four key objectives of the package 
to help individual farm businesses profit from change; 
to provide positive incentives for on -going farm adjustment; 
to encourage social and economic development in rural areas; 
and 
to ensure the farm sector had access to an adequate welfare 
safety net (Anderson 1997b). 
In introducing the Bill to Parliament, the Minister addressed the issue of the 
structure of farm businesses and farm households, stating 
In the past, the interrelationship between rural welfare and business 
policy objectives has not been fully appreciated. In a sense, the 
integration of family life and welfare with the management of the farm 
business has been taken for granted. This interrelationship needs to 
be recognised in addressing the welfare needs of farming families. It 
is imperative if we are to ensure the current transition in outlook from 
the family farm to the family farm business runs to a successful 
conclusion. This means that welfare measures need to be distinct 
from measures targeted at improving the profitability of farming 
businesses. (Anderson 1997b) 
Although expressed in a new way, the emphasis on farming as a business 
was not original. In 1992, Simon Crean was referring to farmers as "farm 
business managers" (Crean 1992b). Elements of the package also 
sounded familiar, addressing "issues of rural adjustment, farm business risk 
management and skills development, drought, farm family welfare and rural 
community development" (Anderson 1997c). The package contained a 
number of components, including: 
a new tax -linked Farm Management Deposit Scheme, replacing the 
existing Income Equalisation Deposits and Farm Management 
Bonds; 
a Farm Business Improvement Program to improve farmers` business 
management skills; 
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assistance to facilitate inter -generational transfer of farm ownership; 
continuation of exceptional circumstances provisions but with a 
phase down of the maximum level of interest subsidy available and 
the extension of the DRP to an exceptional circumstances relief 
payment; and 
a Farm Family Restart Scheme providing welfare support and 
re- establishment assistance (Anderson 1997c). 
The influence of the Special Rural Task Force was most evident in the 
Retirement Assistance for Farmers Scheme (RAFS) - the main innovation 
in the AAA package. RAFS was a scheme to facilitate intergenerational 
transfers of farm ownership by amending the gifting provisions associated 
with the age pension. Under the provisions of the Social Security 
legislation, a person in receipt of the age pension could make gifts of up to 
$10,000 per year without their eligibility for the pension being reassessed. 
Until the AAA package, farmers who handed the farm on to a family member 
found that they were ineligible for the age pension for five years as the gift 
was worth more than $10,000. The Retirement Assistance for Farmers 
program provided a short time period during which this provision was 
waived for farmers, allowing them to access the age pension as soon as the 
farm had passed on to the next generation. 
Family income support components of the AAA package were incorporated 
in the new Exceptional Circumstances Relief Payment and the new Farm 
Family Restart package. 
Exceptional Circumstances 
The exceptional circumstances package remained little different from the 
RAS 92 exceptional circumstances provisions. The benefits were to apply 
in the event of `exceptional circumstances, such as severe drought, beyond 
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the scope of normal risk management" (DPIE 1998a). The key difference 
was the extension of the Drought Relief Payment to cover exceptional 
circumstances other than drought under the new Exceptional 
Circumstances Relief Payment. The extended payment would be available 
"to farmers suffering financial hardship as a result of rare and severe events 
including, but not restricted to, extreme drought" (Anderson 1997b). As was 
the case with the Drought Relief Payment, eligibility for the payment would 
not be limited to long -term viable farming operations. 
Farm Family Restart Scheme 
The Farm Family Restart Scheme (FFRS) was set up as "the government's 
key program for delivering income support to the farm sector" (Anderson 
1997b). It was targeted at low income farmers experiencing financial 
hardship who could not borrow further against their assets. Payments 
would be available for up to one year at the equivalent of the 
unemployment benefit, now known as the NewStart Allowance. There was 
to be no activity test and no requirement to offer the farm for sale. The 
scheme imposed a binding obligation on recipients to obtain professional 
advice on the future viability of the business, and career counselling where 
appropriate. Financial support was made available to obtain this advice 
(Anderson 1997a). 
Although the Minister made a point of distinguishing this new scheme from 
the FHS scheme introduced by the previous government in that support 
"will be provided as a grant - not as a loan scheme" (Anderson 1997b), any 
payments received would be deducted from a subsequent re- establishment 
grant. In other words, the "grant" became a loan to be repaid by those 
leaving farming but remained a grant for those who stayed in farming. This 
feature of the scheme seems contrary to the intention of encouraging 
marginal farmers to consider seriously the option of leaving the farm as 
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those who remained were not required to repay the support received. 
Although it had been roundly criticised, the FHS had been consistent in the 
message it was sending to farmers - the scheme was a loan unless the 
farmer left the land in under nine months. Farm Family Restart provided 
support irrespective of whether the farmer stayed or left. The new scheme 
addressed both structural and temporary poverty, however, it was time 
limited and once farmers reached their support limit they were again faced 
with the choice between exit and poverty. 
The AAA package and its predecessors compared 
Farm Family Restart and FHS 
The most obvious difference between FFRS and the Farm Household 
Support Scheme appeared to be that FFRS was not a loans scheme. This 
was true of farmers who remained on the land. However, as explained 
above, farmers who accepted re- establishment grants had them reduced by 
the amount of household support payments received, making the new 
scheme more like Part C of RAS 88 that FHS had replaced. Both FFRS and 
its predecessor were available only to farmers unable to access further 
commercial finance and both were time limited. Where FHS was delivered 
by the Department of Social Security, FFRS was managed by the 
government's new welfare delivery agency, Centrelink. 
Both FFRS and FHS were developed as part of an overall structural 
adjustment package for agriculture and both had economic objectives. 
There is nothing in the structure of the FFRS package to suggest that policy 
makers looked much beyond the existing policy framework in devising the 
new scheme. The underlying rationale for the scheme remained 
unchanged and the amendments that were made were incremental in 
nature. 
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The Exceptional Circumstances Payment and the DRP 
The exceptional circumstances payment was a straight forward extension of 
the DRP to allow for payment to farmers subject to exceptional 
circumstances declarations other than drought. The revised payment 
appears to be very generous and, as with the introduction of the DRP, will 
increase pressure on politicians to declare exceptional circumstances 
events. Like its predecessors, this benefit does not address the needs of 
farm families outside declared areas. RASAC, since renamed the National 
Rural Advisory Council, will be under considerable pressure to ensure that 
declarations are scientifically justified as this payment has the potential for 
misuse in similar fashion to the Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements. 
Re- establishment Grants 
While the package retained the re- establishment grant for those leaving 
farming, it was only to be available during the first two years of the scheme's 
operation. This move suggested a shift away from earlier policy. 
Re- establishment grants have been a feature of rural adjustment support for 
many years and, during the drought, enhanced grants were offered to 
farmers in exceptional circumstances drought areas as a further sweetener 
for those considering farm exit. 
The objective of re- establishment grants has been to facilitate the structural 
adjustment of the farm sector by supporting those farmers without long term 
prospects of productivity to leave farming with dignity and some resources 
on which to draw in establishing post- farming. Lawrence has argued that 
where farm exit is considered desirable to accelerate structural adjustment, 
there are two ways the liberal theorists can go. They either argue 
that where inefficient farmers choose to remain in farming their 
personal circumstances are of no concern to society; or they argue 
that since society is ultimately penalized by the inappropriately 
employed resources, the state must intervene to ... rehabilitate those 
leaving [farm businesses]. (Lawrence 1987, p89) 
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The latter has been the rationale for offering increasingly generous 
re- establishment grants to farmers leaving the sector, although as outlined 
above, this approach only works if the farmer is prepared to accept the 
judgement that they are not viable and takes the incentive to leave. As 
Synapse suggested, there is a further potential problem with 
re- establishment grants: 
There is some evidence to suggest that farmers with higher levels of 
human capital exhibit a higher tendency to leave the industry under 
adjustment pressure (owing to their greater potential for alternative 
employment, and linked often to age). If these are also the ones with 
the greatest potential to make a contribution to wealth 
creation /economic efficiency in farming then there are opportunity 
costs associated with not having that potential recognised. The 
apparent inability or unwillingness on the part of lending institutions 
to allow for this potential should ... be recognised as a market failure. 
(Synapse Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd 1992, p26) 
Supporting farmers who wish to stay on the land raises the issue of whether 
the community should be expected to support what is essentially a lifestyle 
choice by this group to remain in farming by ensuring they have an 
adequate income to meet household requirements. Mauldon and 
Schapper, writing in the early 1970s argued that 
People in ... [other] self -employed occupational groups expect, and 
are expected to look after themselves. If they cannot earn adequate 
income within their occupation they expect and are expected to 
change to another. Nor is this thought to be unreasonable for 
farmers under the conditions of prosperity and full employment which 
Australia has been experiencing for the last three decades. (Mauldon 
and Schapper 1974, p110) 
The situation is arguably quite different in an era in which unemployment in 
Australia appears to be a persistent problem. Coupled with the fact that the 
average age of Australia's farmers is approaching fifty (Haberkorn et al. 
1999, p56), the prospects of a farmer taking a re- establishment package 
and finding alternative paid employment are slim. If the family simply 
moves to the nearest rural town in order to preserve established social and 
community networks, employment opportunities are even more limited. A 
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review of the Farm Family Restart Scheme undertaken in March 2000 found 
that of those farmers who took re- establishment grants, 71 per cent took 
up residence in the same postcode area after exit (O'Neil et al. 2000, p i). 
The other major difference between the farmer and other self -employed 
people is the nature of family farming. In a study on the causes of stress on 
family farms, Gray and Lawrence stated that 
[t]he feature of farm life which distinguishes it from other occupations 
is the intimate connection between the farm as workplace, home, 
career and family tradition. A threat to one is a threat to all. (Gray and 
Lawrence 1996, p175) 
Under these circumstances, a re- establishment grant may not be the 
incentive to leave the farm sector that its designers intended. In spite of the 
1997 RAS Review finding that "there is no objective evidence that 
availability of re- establishment grants has been a major factor in decisions 
by farmers to leave agriculture" (McColl et al. 1997, p51), the government 
has continued to offer the grants. The AAA package initially included a 
sunset clause on such grants, however this has been extended twice so 
that they are now available until 30 November 2003. The FFRS review 
found that 79 per cent of farmers who took re- establishment grants would 
have left farming anyway (O'Neil et al. 2000, p i). The review also reported 
that "the overwhelming majority of farmers in receipt of income support 
indicated that the availability of the [re- establishment] grant would not 
influence them to leave the farm" (O'Neil et al. 2000, p iv) This raises 
serious questions about the value of the grant as an incentive to accelerate 
adjustment by removing non -viable farmers from the land and therefore 
about the logic of the Government's decision in the 2000 -2001 Budget to 
extend the scheme. 
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The Evolution Of Farm Welfare Policy 1989 -1998: A case study 
in incrementalism 
In the area of farm poverty, incrementalism provides a very accurate 
description of the policy development process underpinning Australian 
government responses, as can be seen from the above description of the 
policies developed between 1989 and 1998. A few key decisions, such as 
the removal of drought from the Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements in 
1989, marked an important change in the policy mix but, on balance, the 
basis of structural adjustment and drought policy has remained 
unquestioned as has the linkage to household support. The Farm 
Household Support Scheme, for example, was closely modelled on the 
household support provisions of the 1988 Rural Adjustment Scheme. Part 
of the rationale for this similarity was to ease the transition for farmers from 
one scheme to the other, but it was also the case that, as predicted by 
Lindblom and Woodhouse. consideration was only given to a "relatively 
narrow range of alternatives" in developing the program (Lindblom and 
Woodhouse 1993, p4). The succession of programs from Part C, through 
the Farm Household Support Program and Farm Family Restart were 
sufficiently similar to each other to support Braybrooke and Lindblom's 
argument that 
policy making proceeds through a sequence of approximations. A 
policy is directed at a problem; it is tried, altered, tried in its altered 
form, altered again, and so forth. (Braybrooke and Lindblom 
1963,p73) 
Resource limitations were a very real factor in the development of policy 
towards farm poverty. For example, the Rural Policy Branch which had 
responsibility for co- ordinating the Standing Committee on Agriculture and 
Resource Management Working Group which was preparing the National 
Drought Policy, responding to the consultant's report into RAS 88 and 
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developing RAS 92, and developing the Farm Household Support 
Scheme, comprised four officers, including the Branch Head. At the time of 
the final drafting of the RAS 92 and FHS legislation, this was reduced to 
three officers, one of whom was acting in the Branch Head's position. 
To state that the policy process has been incremental is not to suggest that 
there was no coherent intellectual framework within which incremental 
changes were made. In 1989, the Government set out its policy direction for 
the rural sector in a major Rural Policy Statement which incorporated 
environmental sustainability and long term profitability and set out the roles 
it saw for itself and farmers in the future of the rural sector. This approach 
was reflected In the objectives of the 1992 Rural Adjustment Scheme and 
also evident in the development of such government schemes as the 
Landcare program. 
The principles of self -reliance and risk management spelt out in the 1992 
National Drought Policy continued to inform the policy process throughout 
the period under review. Gradual changes occurred within this framework 
as responses to farm poverty were moved from within the Rural Adjustment 
Scheme to stand -alone programs and then to a point where, in the case of 
the Drought Relief and Exceptional Circumstances Relief Payments, welfare 
support was decoupled completely from structural adjustment policy for 
those farmers located in exceptional circumstances areas. 
Over the decade from 1989 a number of attempts were made to address the 
welfare needs of Australia's farm families. The high interest rates and low 
commodity prices of the late 1980s and early 1990s were exacerbated by 
the severe drought which affected eastern Australia until around mid -1996, 
resulting in genuine hardship for many farmers. The social security safety 
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net proved inadequate at addressing the particular asset structure of family 
farms and alternative approaches had to be developed. Although some of 
the rhetoric changed, incrementalism remains the best description of the 
policy process during the period under review, in all three categories 
identified by Lessman - the decision making process, the content of the 
policies and the outputs produced (Lessman 1989, p457). The National 
Drought Policy introduced in 1992 remained largely unchanged from its 
introduction with its principles of self -reliance and risk management being 
unchallenged. The rhetoric of the policy played well to the farmers' self 
image of independence, although an aversion to "welfare" by many farmers 
has at times made policy development particularly difficult where genuine 
hardship has been experienced. 
Given that the Department of Social Security showed no inclination to 
provide some scheme for farmers affected by the rural crisis and the 
drought, the task of providing income support was left to an "industry" 
Department - necessitating the use of the market failure argument, and 
the devising of schemes aimed at addressing the perceived shortcomings 
in the commercial financial markets and linked explicitly to the 
Governments structural adjustment objectives for the farm sector. Complex 
linkages were established between access to welfare and achieving the 
sought adjustment outcomes. 
The consistency in the policy model is largely attributable to the high level 
of bureaucratic control over the policy development process. Key 
developments such as the preparation and subsequent review of the 
National Drought Policy were carried out by officials and approved by 
Ministers. The notable breaks in the linear evolution of farm income 
support, such as the development of the Drought Relief Payment, were 
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initiated and driven more by Ministers and their Offices (Lake 1999, pers 
comm). Keating's statement of September 1994 that the Government was 
committed "not to leave behind" farm families was therefore a watershed 
(Kingma 1999, pers comm) in the development of income support policy for 
farmers. It recognised for the first time that the state had a role in providing 
income support to small business people (albeit a limited subset of that 
group) in addition to wage earners. Having made this step, changes in 
policy since the introduction of the DRP have continued to be incremental. 
Also over the period, the issue of separating family issues from those of the 
farm business shifted. From the recommendation of the Drought Policy 
Review Task Force in 1991 that RAS was the appropriate mechanism for 
delivering farm welfare support, through the separate Farm Household 
Support Scheme to the chairing of the Special Rural Task Force by the 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Social Security, there was a 
gradual transition in the treatment of farm income support. However, after 
the Task Force had reported, policy development remained in the 
agriculture portfolio and the program changes that were implemented were 
once again incremental in nature. 
The extension of the DRP is a curious development. "Exceptional 
circumstances" were originally described in terms of "severe drought or 
substantial commodity downturns" (Crean 1992b), although the term was 
never actually defined in the legislation. The first exceptional 
circumstances declaration was made in early 1993 for excessive rain in 
South Australia and the only other non -drought declaration related to the 
wool industry at a time of low prices. The provision of income support for 
farmers facing low commodity prices could be seen as de facto price 
support for the industry and appears to run counter to the self -reliance 
127 
emphasis of policy over the past decade. It also raises the question of how 
long -term declines in world prices are to be addressed - when is a price 
drop an exceptional event and when is it one of the normal risks faced by a 
farm manager? Over the years there has also been pressure for 
exceptional circumstances to be declared for a "combination of events", 
where one event, such as a normal drought, is of itself not exceptional, but 
in combination with other circumstances such as mouse plagues or low 
commodity prices is putting severe pressure on farmers. 
One of the rationales for responding to severe drought with the DRP was 
the duration of the event and the fact that the farmers' problems were not at 
an end once it rained. This does differentiate drought from other 
"exceptional events ". The excess rain declaration of 1993 was always 
dubious. The extension of the DRP to cover other exceptional 
circumstances is likely to increase the probability of this type of declaration 
and could see massive transfers of public money into the farm sector. 
Entitlement -based welfare payments can become very expensive - 
between October 1994 and December 1996, the DRP cost the 
Commonwealth Government $270.4 million. If the Government has 
decided that it is reasonable for these transfers to take place, it surely must 
raise the question whether it is time for a total welfare package which is not 
tied to particular events but responds to the needs of farmers and their 
families in an equitable manner. 
It is unlikely that the "AAA" package introduced by John Anderson will be 
the end of the policy development process, although Anderson's successor, 
Mark Vaile listed its implementation as his top priority shortly after taking on 
the agriculture portfolio (Vaile 1998). Rhetoric aside, the welfare 
components of the package did not offer major departures from the policies 
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introduced by the Labor government. The focus remained on ensuring 
welfare responses were consistent with the objective of structural 
adjustment and policy makers continued to devise schemes to circumvent 
the assets tests which applied to the standard social security safety net and 
to persuade marginal farmers to leave the industry. 
Over the years from 1989 to 1998, Australian governments introduced a 
series of schemes aimed at addressing inadequate incomes. The policy 
process was highly incremental with only a few innovations, such as the 
development of the Drought Relief Payment - although even this was 
based on existing schemes in terms of the amount payable, the level of the 
assets test and the definition of off -farm assets. The DRP itself has in turn 
been changed incrementally to become the exceptional circumstances 
payment. 
Lindblom's description of the incremental policy process appears to fit this 
history of government responses to farm poverty. However, his model 
includes a number of features which ensure that incrementalism is an 
"intelligent" process, these being the existence of a multiplicity of decision 
makers promoting a diversity of values and the existence of watchdogs in 
the policy process whose role is to protect a range of interests. The next 
three chapters focus on the latter, seeking to identify watchdogs within the 
policy community who were working to ensure that the interests of poor 
farmers were represented in the policy process. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DPtE AND FARM POVERTY 
Lindblom's model of incrementalism ascribes a watchdog role to 
government agencies with each major value being the concern of at least 
one agency (Lindblom 1959, p85). Apart from brief Department of Social 
Security involvement through the Special Task Force on Assets Testing, 
responsibility for farm income support policy during the period under review 
was located in the agriculture Department. This was not new. The portfolio 
has been responsible for structural adjustment policies since the first Rural 
Adjustment type schemes were set up in the 1970s and these programs all 
incorporated an income support component. Prior to this time, the 
Department was more explicitly concerned with achieving reasonable farm 
incomes and the myriad price stabilisation and orderly marketing schemes 
were designed with this objective. During the 1970s a change occurred in 
the prevailing economic wisdom and by the early 1980s industry support 
measures were increasingly out of favour as economic liberalism became 
accepted by policy makers as the framework within which policy was 
developed. As a consequence, over time, the government's emphasis has 
moved from providing assistance to primary industry to support farm 
incomes to promoting structural change in the farm sector in the belief that 
this was essential in order to retain Australia's position as a leading 
producer and exporter of agricultural products (Industry Commission 1996). 
History 
In spite of constitutional arrangements which suggest that farming should 
be a State responsibility, the Commonwealth Government has had an 
active role in supporting agriculture for many years. Initially, programs were 
developed which were unashamedly aimed at supporting farm incomes 
through various income and price support schemes across a range of 
industries. McKay reports that 
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The objective of raising farm incomes was most clearly stated before 
the war and in the period immediately following the war. These were 
periods when government thinking was largely influenced by very 
low levels of income and indeed outright poverty in many rural areas 
and industries. (McKay 1972, p29). 
He suggests that there were three broad objectives to price stabilisation 
policies: general economic stability, including farm income; "greater 
efficiency of resource use by reducing the risk and uncertainty in farming "; 
and "the welfare of the farmer" (McKay 1972, p27). 
The 1960s 
Throughout the 1960s, farmers benefited from being represented strongly 
by the Country Party in the governing Coalition. As Mauldon and Schapper 
argue this politically advantageous position ensured that "farmers got social 
assistance because of their political power, not only because of their needs 
and the economy's needs" (Mauldon and Schapper 1974, p93). From 
January 1959 until Labor won power at the 1972 election, the Minister for 
Primary Industry was a member of the Country Party. Policy making within 
the Department of Primary Industry (DPI) involved close consultation with 
industry pressure groups and there was extensive government intervention 
in agriculture (Warhurst 1982). The policies which were developed during 
this period were ad hoc and unco -ordinated (Campbell 1974, p170; 
Warhurst 1982, p15) and often developed in response to demands from low 
income producers for support (Watson 1979p 161). Campbell reports "a 
tendency under the Liberal- Country Party régime to provide financial 
succour for ailing rural industries, irrespective of the need for long -term 
readjustment in the industry." (Campbell 1974, p171) 
The 1970s 
The change of government in 1972 brought with it a new attitude towards 
rural policy. Convinced that the involvement of producers in the operation 
of rural policy under the Country Party had been too cosy, the Labor 
Government looked to a new approach. The incorporation of agriculture in 
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the ambit of the new Industries Assistance Commission (IAC) was an 
important step in this process, forcing more rigorous scrutiny of claims for 
assistance. The involvement of the IAC in rural policy was not welcomed by 
the DPI who did not appreciate another voice in government on agriculture 
(Warhurst 1982). The Department was seen by its critics as more or less 
captive of its "clients" with strong alliances between relevant areas of the 
Department and industry pressure groups (Campbell 1974, p171). 
Warhurst has argued that the involvement of the !AC permanently changed 
the nature of rural policy debate "by an injection of economic rationality into 
most of the participants" (Warhurst 1982, p32) and also generated the 
"spread of agricultural economists" through the rural policy community 
(Warhurst 1982, p29). 
In the lead up to the 1974 election, Labor made explicit the need for 
structural adjustment in agriculture. Watson reports that 
This emphasis did not reflect any substantial change from the 
policies of rural reconstruction adopted by the previous government 
in response to the problems of the dairy industry and the wheat -wool 
recession: the rhetoric was rather different, however, because the 
coalition parties seldom confront their entrenched rural clientele with 
appeals to economic rationality by highlighting the need for change 
in the economic structure of farming. (Watson 1979, p161) 
Although Labor's moves towards reforming agricultural policy were seen by 
the rural sector as hostile, they were nevertheless being developed in a 
climate of more interventionist, Keynesian economic policy making. The 
DepartmE nt's policy direction was therefore consistent with the economic 
approach being pursued more generally across Government. In 1974 a 
Green Paper on Rural Policy argued that 
The Government's involvement with assistance for farm adjustment is 
... designed to reduce the income problems which arise when help is 
not provided, and to lessen the inefficiency in the use of the nation's 
resources that the slow rate of adjustment implies. (Harris et al. 1974, 
p279) 
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The reference to adjustment is not the primary focus of this advice - it is 
important but secondary to the goal of alleviating low farm incomes. 
Elsewhere in the report it is suggested that there are two major justifications 
for adjustment policy - social and economic: 
The social basis for government action to assist adjustment in the 
rural industries is to avoid or mitigate the severe welfare problems 
which can arise as a result of the unimpeded action of market forces. 
The economic basis for adjustment assistance is that the market 
does not ensure an efficient adjustment in the allocation of resources 
in response to changes in economic conditions. (Harris et al. 1974, 
p203) 
The suggestion that market failure occurs on both social and economic 
efficiency grounds contrasts sharply with later attitudes towards the role of 
market forces in the economy. This shift is discussed below. 
Although the DPI was suspicious of the IAC, the Commission was also 
operating within the prevailing approach to economic management. The 
IAC received two major references related to rural adjustment and rural 
incomes in the 1970s, resulting in three reports to Government. In 1975 the 
Commission reported on Rural Income Fluctuations - Certain Taxation 
Measures (IAC 1975) which addressed the issue of tax averaging and 
which recommended the introduction of an income equalisation deposits 
scheme. A report on rural reconstruction was completed in 1976 (IAC 
1976) and the second part of the rural income fluctuations reference was 
delivered to the government in 1978 (IAC 1978). 
The Reports took account of welfare concerns and recognised the human 
impact of the adjustment process. Neither report produced any new 
evidence on farm poverty, relying on the Henderson Commission and 
related research (eg Vincent 1976) as the basis for its consideration of farm 
welfare measures. In the rural reconstruction report, the Commission 
suggested there were four objectives of Government assistance for farm 
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adjustment. These included the "alleviation of harsh and disproportionately 
borne consequences of change where existing measures are inadequate 
or inappropriate" (IAC 1976, p15). The 1976 Report also went so far as to 
suggest that "[m]arket forces left to themselves can seriously undermine the 
confidence of farmers and other sectors of the economy with which they are 
linked" (IAC 1976, p4). The Report also rejected the suggestion that low 
incomes were a result of inefficient allocation of resources and that farm exit 
was the necessary solution: 
The Commission believes that low income is not necessarily an 
indication that resources are not employed efficiently; in some cases 
they may not have a better alternative use. Additionally, the 
Commission believes that any individual has the right to choose his 
[sic] `way of life'. Pressure should not be brought to bear on a low 
income farmer to move out of agriculture against his will; rather he 
should be assisted to acquaint himself with the opportunities that are 
available to him in other sectors of the economy, and be enabled to 
take advantage of them if he wishes to do so. (IAC 1976, p3) 
This approach is quite different from the tone of the mid -1990s when 
removing farmers from the land was an explicit performance indicator for 
the DPIE (DPIE 1997). The IAC's 1978 report on income fluctuations 
recommended that "[s]ocial welfare objectives such as the alleviation of low 
incomes as far as possible be achieved by welfare measures" (IAC 1978, 
p63). 
The return to Coalition Government in the mid -70s saw something of a 
resurgence in the influence of producers over primary industry policy 
(Warhurst 1982, p31). On the welfare front, the eligibility criteria for the 
unemployment benefit were eased in 1976 to allow payment of the benefit 
to farmers (IAC 1978, p32) and this provided support to many low income 
farmers during the drought of the early 1980s. By the late 1970s, the 
Department of Primary Industry was out of step with the economic 
philosophy of the Treasury which had, over the previous decade, virtually 
134 
abandoned Keynesian policies and was embracing neo- classical 
economics (Whitwell 1986, p178). The DPI continued to resent the 
involvement of the IAC in rural policy determination. Writing in 1982, 
Warhurst observed that the Department "contrives not even to recognize the 
existence of the IAC" (Warhurst 1982, p29). 
The Department of Primary Industry's 1979 -80 Annual Report clearly 
illustrates the view it was taking of its role at this time. Its key function was 
outlined as follows: 
The Department is responsible for the provision of advice to the 
Minister for Primary Industry on rural, forestry and fisheries policies 
within the constitutional competence of the Commonwealth 
Government and for the implementation and administration of 
Commonwealth programs and legislation concerned with those 
areas of activity. (DPI 1980, p1) 
Apart from being more prosaic than later Departmental mission statements, 
this statement also reflects much less grandiose ambitions for government 
in shaping agriculture's future. The nature of the policies being pursued is 
reflected in the description of the Department's activities: 
A major part of the Department's functions is concerned with the 
development of proposals for statutory programs related to the 
primary industries. (DPI 1980, p1) 
The Report then goes on to list existing programs administered on behalf of 
the Minister for Primary Industry: orderly marketing, price stabilisation, 
statutory research schemes, land settlement schemes, rural adjustment 
measures, assistance fDr forestry, "general and specific financial assistance 
to rural industries ", control of fisheries, "financial assistance to 
ex- servicemen in relation to their re- establishment in civilian life ", "schemes 
for the promotion of the sale of rural commodities" and export inspection 
and certification (DPI 1980, p1). Given this level of intervention and the 
focus on assistance, including financial assistance, concern for the welfare 
of low income farmers would not have seemed out of place within the 
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Department's work program. In 1978, the IAC had expressed its concern 
with this policy direction arguing that 
price stabilisation has been pursued for a number of objectives, but 
as a method of seeking to stabilise the incomes of individual 
producers the Commission considers that it is not efficient (IAC 1978, 
p5). 
As noted, the (AC's involvement in rural policy was not welcomed by DPI 
which was less than fully cooperative with the Commission and resisted the 
transfer of IAC staff into its own ranks, although the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics worked closely with the Commission providing data and in 
house research results as background for its deliberations (Warhurst 1982). 
The 1980s 
In September 1981 the Minister for Primary Industry in the Fraser 
government, Peter Nixon set up a Working Group to produce a "Policy 
Discussion Paper on Agriculture" (Balderstone et al. 1982). The chairman 
(later Sir) James Balderstone was a grazier and director of a number of 
Australia's top pastoral and resources companies. It is worth noting that 
one of the Committee members was JC McColl who later chaired the 1997 
review of the Rural Adjustment Scheme. The Balderstone Report was 
wide -ranging, covering among other topics Commonwealth -State issues, 
general economic policy, marketing, trade policy, transport, resource 
management and rural communities issues. Although the report has been 
described as being "less closely argued from an economic standpoint" than 
the 1974 Green Paper (Malcolm 1989, p140), it demonstrated a preference 
for market -driven measures to achieve policy objectives. In setting out the 
aims and objectives of agricultural policy, the Report stated that "the Group 
considered that it was not appropriate to prescribe particular growth aims or 
to try and specify a desirable size for the farm sector or individual industries" 
(Balderstone et al. 1982, p2). This indicates that farm policy had moved on 
from McEwen's policies of the 1950s with their explicit production targets. 
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Among the aims it set for agricultural policy the Balderstone Report argued 
that agricultural policy should 
be responsive to national and international economic 
developments; 
create conditions under which the agricultural sector can 
handle change and at the same time realise its full potential In 
contributing to national economic growth; 
aim to encourage the efficient use and conservation of the 
nation's resources; [andj 
promote the adoption of new technology and increased 
productivity in the farm sector (Balderstone et al. 1982, p2) 
It saw the RAS as "facilitating adjustment at the margin" (Balderstone et al. 
1982, p67) and argued for the scheme's continuation. In the area of farm 
welfare, the Working Group was opposed to any easing of the 
unemployment benefit to increase its accessibility to farmers, arguing that 
Unemployment benefits are essentially aimed at people on wages 
and salaries and their application to the self -employed raises 
questions about the usage of a social security measure to underwrite 
the incomes of businesses. (Balderstone et al. 1982, p154) 
This was an argument that was to be repeated throughout consideration of 
income support for farmers in the 1980s and 1990s. The Working Group 
argued that Rural Adjustment Scheme was the most appropriate 
mechanism for the delivery of welfare support to farmers. The Balderstone 
Report was "rather overtaken by events" (Malcolm 1989, p140) as it was 
released in the middle of what was at that time considered to be the worst 
drought of the twentieth century. However, the conventional wisdom was 
retained that farm welfare issues belonged in the agriculture department 
rather than with the social security portfolio. 
As has been outlined in Chapter Two, the new Hawke Government very 
quickly adopted the economic agenda which had been evolving in the 
Treasury during the 1970s. In 1986 the Prime Minister, Bob Hawke and the 
Minister for Primary Industry, John Kerin released an Economic and Rural 
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Policy Statement. In this paper, the approach to farm issues had shifted 
markedly from the more paternalistic policies of the Country Party era to a 
market -oriented position, in which structural adjustment was to be 
encouraged and farmers were exhorted to regard their farming enterprises 
in business terms. It would be simplistic to assume that this policy direction 
was purely a result of the Government's becoming captive of the 
economists in the bureaucracy. Within Labor's own ranks, there were 
advocates of structural change in agriculture. A decade before sociologist 
Michael Pusey sparked debate about economic policy with his book 
Economic Rationalism in Canberra (Pusey 1991), Watson was writing that 
within the Labor Party 
an emerging group of economic rationalists are [sic] inclined to allow 
market forces to operate in agriculture, arguing that the economic 
casualties would be treated by welfare measures that are part of an 
overall social security programme rather than specific programs for 
farmers. (Watson 1979, p171) 
In the mid -1980s relations between the Government and the rural sector 
became strained and there was a growing level of hostility between the 
President of the National Farmers' Federation Ian McLachlan and the Labor 
leadership. In the 1986 Statement the Government offered the rural 
community a "clear choice ": 
It can either participate fully in the arrangements that are proposed - 
make a firm commitment to bring about genuine, constructive 
change, working with the Government and other interested parties - 
or attempt to deal with the 'slues independently. The Government 
wants to work constructively with the rural sector, as indeed it is 
working with other sectors, to find effective and durable solutions to 
its problems. We look to the rural sector to take up the challenge. 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1986, p8) 
The 1986 statement also expressed clearly that structural adjustment 
objectives would dominate, and that social security support should not be 
allowed to undermine the adjustment process. The government advised 
the rural sector that 
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The provisions of the Social Security Act are not intended to provide 
income support to self -employed people, whether primary 
producers or other small business people while they are still running 
their businesses. To do so would distort the economics of farm and 
business operations. (Commonwealth of Australia 1986, p78) 
As well as seeing a shift in the focus of agricultural industry policies away 
from industry support to the promotion of self -reliance, the 1980s saw 
changes to three other policies which impacted on the ability of poor 
farmers to access income support. These were the introduction of the 
assets test on social welfare payments, the removal of drought from the 
Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements and the change in the emphasis of 
the Rural Adjustment Scheme from addressing financial need to supporting 
farmers with good prospects of long term profitability. These changes 
closed off three avenues of support which, in the past, had provided 
financial assistance to farmers in need. The first two of these decisions 
were the responsibility of other Government portfolios, Social Security and 
Finance respectively, however they proved to have a significant impact on 
policy development within DPIE. The assets test meant that the standard 
social welfare safety net was no longer available to many farm families. As 
described in Chapter Three, the NDRA decision was instrumental in 
pushing drought policy away from disaster response to an emphasis on risk 
management and drought preparation and this philosophy was later 
reflected in the 1992 Rural Adjustment Scheme. 
Although the DPI was slower than others to change its policy approach in 
the early years of IAC involvement in rural policy (Warhurst 1982), by the 
mid- 1980s, the Department was pursuing policies which were consistent 
with the neo- liberal direction of the central agencies. The Government's 
economic philosophy meant that issues of farm income support sat less 
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comfortably within the Primary Industries portfolio than had been the case 
up until the 1970s. However, there was no other obvious Department to 
take on the role. The Department of Social Security's programs were 
predominantly tailored to address the welfare needs of wage- earners and 
specific categories of disadvantaged people, and were certainly not 
structured to address the concerns of the asset -rich but income -poor, or the 
self -employed. The DSS was also not regarded very highly by farmers who 
considered the Department to be largely unsympathetic to their situation 
and lacking in understanding of farm issues (eg Senate Standing 
Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs 1992, pp17 -18). Farmers' 
reluctance to be seen to be accepting welfare further reduced the likelihood 
of the successful delivery of income support programs through the DSS 
portfolio. This latter sensitivity was a consideration in the naming of the 
Drought Relief Payment in terms suggestive of natural disaster rather than 
welfare -based income support. 
For all of these reasons, responsibility for the human consequences of 
structural adjustment policy remained with the Commonwealth agriculture 
portfolio in its various forms. 
Organisational arrangements 
Within DPIE, responsibility for structural adjustment policy and farm welfare 
was moved several times between 1989 and 1998. At the beginning of the 
period under review, responsibility for the administration of the Rural 
Adjustment Scheme was located in the Agriculture and Forests Secretariat 
which was a stand alone Branch within the Agriculture and Forests Group, 
reporting directly to the Group's Executive Director (Deputy Secretary level). 
Issues relating to rural communities, such as service delivery, infrastructure, 
and the impact and effectiveness of government policies and programs 
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were handled by the Rural and Provincial Policy Unit in Corporate Policy 
Division in Headquarters Group. 
A Rural and Provincial Affairs Unit had been established within the then 
Department of Primary Industry's Corporate Policy Division in 1985. The 
purpose of this unit was to 
assist the Government to develop, provide and integrate policies and 
programs for rural and provincial Australia and to increase 
awareness of these policies and programs in rural and provincial 
areas (Commonwealth of Australia 1986, p84). 
John Kerin reports that the establishment of this unit was driven from his 
Office and was initially fought by the Department (Kerin 2000, pers comm). 
The unit was later renamed the Rural and Provincial Policy Unit (RPPU) 
and, by late 1991, included in its remit the examination of Cabinet 
submissions from other portfolios to ensure that the interests of rural and 
remote Australia were considered. The Unit also undertook projects such 
as working with Austel to determine the adequacy of telephone services in 
rural and remote areas. The RPPU was led by a Section Head who 
reported directly to the Head of Corporate Policy Division. 
These arrangements meant that welfare and rural communities issues were 
being handled at the highest levels in the Department by a different 
Executive Director from the one responsible for the administration of the 
RAS. In late 1991, the modified JobSearch allowance, which was designed 
as a short term measure to respond to low income problems arising from 
the rural crisis, was developed within the RPPU even though it included a 
role for the State RAS Authorities. 
In October 1991, the Rural Policy Division was established from relevant 
portions of Corporate Policy Division and moved from the Headquarters 
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Group to the Agriculture and Forests Group. The functions which were 
moved into the new Division included 
marketing policy and statutory marketing policy coordination; further 
processing; agribusiness; drought; the Rural Adjustment Scheme; 
rural research and development; and rural communities and 
statistics. (DPIE 1992, p17) 
The implementation and management of the RAS remained with the 
Agriculture and Forests Secretariat which sat outside the Divisional 
structure and reported directly to the Executive Director (Deputy Secretary) 
responsible for the Agriculture and Forests Group. The new Rural Policy 
Division's purpose was "to concentrate on initiating, supporting and 
monitoring innovative policies for a sustainable, competitive and socially 
just rural Australia." (DPIE 1992, p17). In his introduction to the 
Department's 1991 -92 Annual Report the Departmental Secretary 
expressed the rationale for the formation of the new Division as follows: 
A more focussed Rural Policy Division was created to improve our 
ability to respond to the human and structural problems being 
experienced in agriculture, as a result of drought and persistent 
world market problems. (DPIE 1992, p x). 
This reference to the human dimension of the rural crisis was the last time in 
the 1990s that the Department's Annual Report gave such prominence to 
the difficulties being experienced by the people involved in farming. Later 
references to community and social issues were couched in terms of 
improving access to government and other services and improving the 
infrastructure on which resource -based industries rely. 
Within the new Division, the Rural Policy Branch held policy responsibility 
for responding to the 1992 consultants' report into the Rural Adjustment 
Scheme, coordination of the National Drought Policy Working Group and 
the development of the Farm Household Support Scheme. In 1992 this 
Branch only consisted of a Branch Head (Assistant Secretary), one Section 
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Head (Director)3 and two Assistant Directors. Rural Policy Branch therefore 
relied heavily on the Agriculture and Forests Secretariat for input into the 
development of the new Rural Adjustment and Farm Household Support 
schemes in the form of advice about the operation of the existing RAS 
scheme and its management, The staff of the RAS Secretariat were clearly 
annoyed that the review of the scheme was being undertaken by another 
area of the Department whose officers did not have their level of familiarity 
with the operation of RAS 88 and as a consequence were reluctant 
participants in the process. This situation was compounded by a 
personality difference between the Head of the Rural Policy Division and 
the Assistant Secretary responsible for the RAS Secretariat, making the 
resolution of any differences at a more junior level more complicated. 
The exchange of information was not always smooth and in some cases the 
Secretariat staff failed to point out where the management of RAS in fact 
delivered different outcomes from the legislated intention. An example of 
this oversight, which subsequently caused considerable public relations 
problems for the government, was in the area of the nature of household 
support provided under Part C of the 1988 Rural Adjustment Scheme. 
Under this scheme, any household support a farmer received after the first 
six months' worth of payments was deducted from the re- establishment 
grant provided when the farm was sold. As was the case with the later Farm 
Household Support scheme, if the farmer did not leave the land, all 
household support payments were repayable. In practice, the RAS 
authorities did not always explain to farmers that deductions of household 
support payments had occurred in the calculation of the re- establishment 
grant they received. The FHS scheme by contrast was explicitly a loan 
scheme with the re- establishment grant being calculated without any 
3 The writer held the position of Director in the Rural Policy Branch from March 1992 to June 
1993 
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household payments being removed. Farmers could then opt to repay from 
the grant or make other arrangements. The effect of this change, in light of 
previous practice, was to give the impression that FHS was a much tougher 
scheme because it required the repayment of the household support 
payments. This had in fact happened under RAS 88 but had been hidden 
in the calculation of the re- establishment grant. In addition, States had the 
discretion under the 1988 Scheme to convert some Part C household 
support loans to grants. In some States, this conversion was virtually 
automatic - which was not surprising as the loans to be collected were 
Commonwealth funds and the States were therefore able to be very 
generous with this discretionary power at no expense to themselves. 
In developing the FHS Scheme, the Government decided to increase the 
generosity of the household support payments by increasing the grant 
component of household support from six months to nine. However, in 
those States where the loans had been converted to grants as a matter of 
course, the new scheme was not an improvement and its credibility was 
further undermined by the complaints about its explicit loan nature. Had the 
Agriculture and Forests Secretariat communicated more effectively with the 
Rural Policy Branch about the prevailing practice in the administration of the 
scheme, it is likely that this problem would have been addressed. 
In October 1992, a decision was taken to co- locate policy and program 
delivery areas and the Rural Policy Division and the Agriculture and Forests 
Secretariat were combined to form the Rural Division. The purpose of the 
merger was "to provide closer co- operation between policy development 
and program administration and to encourage a stronger, sustainable, more 
innovative, responsive and market oriented rural sector' (DPIE 1993, p18). 
The new Division's role included the promotion of "a more equitable, 
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socially just and economically resilient rural sector" (DPIE 1993, p117). 
However, the Division's focus remained overwhelmingly economic, with the 
primary performance goal for Rural Division being to "support farm level 
adjustment and productivity growth and development by providing financial 
incentives, counselling, education and training and other services to 
farmers" (DPIE 1993, p117). 
From 1993, the structure of the Rural Division remained relatively stable, 
retaining responsibility for both the policy and program elements of 
adjustment as well as communities and welfare issues. The staff working 
on rural policy expanded considerably from four officers in 1992 to 45 by 
1997. This reflected an increased emphasis on rural adjustment within the 
Department and also the extra work generated by the drought. In 
December 1993, the Division was moved from the Agriculture and Forests 
Group back to the Headquarters Group and in 1994 a new Rural 
Adjustment Branch was established to manage RAS 92 and provide the 
Secretariat to the Rural Adjustment Scheme Advisory Council. 
Departmental mission and objectives 
The changing focus of Departmental policy over the period under review is 
reflected in the objectives and performance measures of the Rural 
Adjustment and Services sub -program reported in the Department's Annual 
Reports. In 1990 -91, this sub -program's objectives were quite specific: 
Provide in an efficient and effective manner, financial incentives and 
counselling assistance to enable farmers to 
Overcome short term financial difficulties arising from causes 
beyond their control 
Improve farm performance through changing farm sizes, 
improving managerial and financial skills, and /or by adoption 
of improved practices and technology 
Make an orderly exit if, after all options have been considered, 
they are without prospects in the industry. 
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Improve access to services and government programs in 
non -metropolitan areas 
Provide accessible and relevant community -based education and 
training in rural areas. 
Encourage the development of a new marketing ethos by training 
key people in the marketing chain in marketing skills with a view to 
increasing exports among Australia's primary and allied industries. 
(DPIE 1991, p112) 
In addition to the emphasis here on financial support to farmers, the Annual 
Report for 1990 -91 included as the first point under "Departmental 
Philosophy ": "[s]ensitively consider the impact of our activities and 
recommendations on the people affected by them" (DPIE 1991). This 
philosophy was repeated in the Annual Reports for 1991 -92 and 1992 -93 
but disappeared thereafter. 
By 1996 -97 the DPIE Annual Report was almost completely focused on the 
economic performance of the rural sector. The objectives for the Rural 
sub -program had become: 
Encourage the realisation of the sustainable economic potential of 
the rural sector. 
Redress barriers to rural people's access to the full range of 
Government and other social, economic and rural services. (DPIE 
1997, p65) 
The program's performance measures included "take -up by non -viable 
farmers of re- establishment support, freeing resources for more productive 
use" (DPIE 1997, p66). This was the first time the removal of farmers from 
the land had been explicitly listed as a performance indicator for he 
Commonwealth Department. 
Throughout the 1990s, there was no reference in either the Department's or 
the Division's objectives to income support. The reference to social issues 
was in the form of a strategy to "[e]stablísh access to necessary social and 
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welfare services for communities on which non -metropolitan enterprises 
depend ". This was to "include education and training for farmers, health 
policies for rural areas, industry strategies for indigenous people and the 
inclusion of rural women in policy making" (DPIE 1997, p11). 
The election of the Howard Government in 1996 did not mark a return to the 
policies of the 1960s. The tradition of placing a National Party Minister in 
charge of the agriculture portfolio was respected, but the policy direction 
remained little changed from that pursued by the previous government. As 
will be discussed later, this policy direction had the full support of the 
farmers' pressure group, the National Farmers' Federation. 
References to farm welfare appeared in the 1997 -98 Annual Report of the 
DPIE in the context of the promotion of the new Government's Agriculture 
Advancing Australia (AAA) policy package. As has been discussed, the 
welfare component of this program was very similar to the earlier Farm 
Household Support and Part C of the 1988 Rural Adjustment Scheme, with 
income support being available only for a limited time and linked to farm 
exit. Under the AAA package, the Drought Relief Payment was extended to 
become the Exceptional Circumstances Relief Payment, although it was 
made clear that this was 
not engineered to underwrite the fortunes of individual farmers, and 
should not impede the normal adjustment processes necessary for 
Australia to maintain a competitive and profitable farm sector. 
(RASAC 1999, p3) 
In 1997 -98, DPIE was clear about the future of farming: 
Over recent years the focus has changed from "the family farm" to the 
"family farm business" encouraging farmers to seek greater skills in 
business management, risk management and to take full advantage 
of computers and other information technology. (DPIE 1998b, p52) 
Farm welfare was mentioned in the Department's Annual Report as part of 
"Top Priority Project 1.5" which was to "[d]evelop an integrated Rural Policy 
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Package which covers rural adjustment, risk management, drought, farm 
welfare, skills development and training, and rural development" (DPIE 
1998b, p108). The Report stated that the farm welfare component of this 
objective had been met through the Farm Family Restart, Retirement 
Assistance for Farmers and the Exceptional Circumstances schemes (DPIE 
1998b, p110). The Rural Adjustment Scheme Advisory Council Report for 
1998 -99 described the MA programs as "critical in assisting the 
management of adjustment related human issues" (RASAC 1999, p3). The 
Report stated that the aim of the package was "to continue to facilitate the 
processes of efficient and socially just structural change and to promote a 
more productive and profitable farm sector." (RASAC 1999, p3) 
The Focus of RAS 
The focus of the Rural Adjustment Scheme also provides a good indicator 
of the direction in which DPIE thinking was moving through the 1990s. The 
1989 -90 Annual Report of RAS, reporting on the first full year of the 1988 
scheme, described its structural adjustment focus as follows: 
An important aspect of the arrangements introduced in 1989 is the 
emphasis that farming is first and foremost a business which must be 
run on proper business management lines if it is to survive and 
prosper. The RAS is not aimed at keeping farmers on the land or 
propping up farm enterprises that are not viable in the long term. 
(Rural Adjustment Scheme 1990, p4) 
In spite of the strength of this statement, support was provided on the basis 
of financial need. Although the 1991 -92 Annual Report of the Rural 
Adjustment Scheme (1988) states that "[t]he overriding objective of the RAS 
is to achieve effective structural adjustment of farm enterprises in the 
Australian rural industry" (Rural Adjustment Scheme 1993, p9), it goes on to 
describe the operation of the scheme as follows: 
Assistance is provided on a needs basis and is targeted towards 
those farmers whose farm enterprises have the capacity to become 
profitable in the long term but which are experiencing financial 
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problems arising from circumstances beyond their control. (Rural 
Adjustment Scheme 1993, p9 - emphasis added). 
This focus on financial need was reflected in the new Rural Policy Division's 
primary performance indicator in 1991 -92, which was to "[s]upport farm 
level restructuring and encourage improved management by providing 
financial incentives, counselling and other services to farmers in financial 
difficulties" (DPIE 1992, p109 - emphasis added). 
This approach contrasts with the principles inherent in the National Drought 
Policy and RAS 88's replacement, RAS 92, which were heavily focussed 
on self -reliance and risk management. This latter scheme delivered 
support, not on a needs basis, but to "farmers who have prospects of 
sustainable long -term profitability with a view to improving the profitability of 
their farm units" (Rural Adjustment Act 1992, Section 3 (2)(b)). The decision 
on who such farmers were was largely left to the market, with the farmer's 
ability to access further commercial finance being used as a key eligibility 
criterion under the scheme. 
A major exception to this trend occurred with the introduction of the Drought 
Relief Payment in October 1994. As outlined in the previous chapter, by 
later 1994 the drought had become a more political issue and there was 
increased involvement in the policy detail by the Ministerial Office. The 
development of this scheme was driven from the Minister's Office and went 
through Cabinet with the support of the Prime Minister, Paul Keating. 
Although the DRP's introduction marked some change at the political level 
in attitudes towards income support for farmers, at the bureaucratic level 
these issues continued to sit uneasily in an economically focused industry 
Department. Meetings held between the Department and the Minister's 
Office on rural adjustment issues invariably included the Director of ABARE 
which ensured a strong economic flavour to the discussion. There were 
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not, however, equally powerful advocates for alternative approaches 
present at these discussions. 
Cabinet procedures 
A further element which had an impact on the nature of DPIE's responses to 
farm poverty in the 1990s was the procedural requirement that all draft 
Cabinet submissions be agreed with the Departments of Finance, Prime 
Minister and Cabinet and the Treasury prior to lodgment with the Cabinet 
Office. These central agencies, or co- ordinating Departments, therefore 
had an effective power of veto over which submissions were even 
considered by Cabinet. Their agreement to the Budget numbers included 
in the submission was a Cabinet Office requirement. 
In order to obtain Department of Finance agreement to the Farm Household 
Support package, for example, DPIE presented the need for the scheme in 
terms of market failure. A complex table was developed which explained 
how different groups of farmers, from the viable, through the potentially 
viable to the non -viable, obtained necessary carry-on finance in times of 
downturn. The objective of this exercise was to demonstrate the need for 
Government intervention in the form of household support to assist two 
groups. The first group comprised those who were in the process of taking 
advantage of the re- establishment provisions of RAS but needed to feed 
their families while the sale of the farm went through. The second group, 
the argument went, was the victim of market failure. The commercial 
banking system failed to appreciate that these farmers had a viable future in 
farming and the Government therefore needed to step in and provide 
access to loan funds, on commercial terms. There was little scope within 
the debate with the central agencies for an industry Department such as 
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DPIE to argue that there was a low income problem in agriculture that 
warranted a welfare response. 
Conclusion 
The DPIE and its predecessors have been involved in developing policy in 
response to low farm incomes since a separate Department of Primary 
Industry was first established in 1956. This role sat very comfortably within 
the portfolio during the Country Party years until 1972. Under Labor in the 
early 1970s, although the involvement of the IAC increased the focus on the 
economic impact of farm support policies, the predominance of 
Keynesianism meant that the human impact of structural adjustment was 
still regarded as a primary concern of the portfolio. The Fraser years saw 
the re- emergence of "a familiar pattern" of government support for rural 
prices and incomes (Watson 1979, p167) in some industries and the 
Balderstone inquiry set out a policy direction that "was more inclined ... to 
veer in the direction of equity for farmers when faced with conflicts between 
equity and economic efficiency" (Malcolm 1989, p141). The advent of the 
Hawke government saw the rise of economic liberalism across the 
Commonwealth Government and by 1986 this was as clear in the Primary 
Industry portfolio as elsewhere. The small Rural and Provincial Policy Unit 
was concerned with the human dimensions of structural adjustment, 
however, it was not particularly successful in influencing the approaches of 
the economists within the Department. As the emphasis on structural 
adjustment and economic efficiency strengthened, the welfare of farmers 
moved from a central concern of primary industry policy makers to a side 
issue to be dealt with in the context of the broader objective. 
By the end of the 1980s, farm poverty was no longer a key concern of the 
Department but with no other obvious home, it remained part of the 
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responsibility of those developing structural adjustment policy. In the 
mid- 1990s, rural communities issues such as access to 
telecommunications, the shortage of general practitioners in the country 
and the withdrawal of services from rural areas were hived off to the 
Regional Development portfolio established by the new Howard 
Government. The only change of note in relation to farm welfare issues 
followed the 1997 review of RAS, when responsibility for distributing 
re- establishment grants was moved from the State RAS Authorities to 
Centrelink as part of the Farm Family Restart package. Policy responsibility 
remained with DPIE and its successor, Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 
Australia. 
A number of writers have noted that the location of particular areas of 
responsibility within a bureaucracy can be an important consideration, as 
different bodies address issues from different perspectives and against 
different priorities (Dror 1968, p174; Allison 1971, p67; Eyestone 1978, p98; 
Hogwood and Gunn 1984, p172; Colebatch and Larmour 1993, p106). 
Kingdon describes the categorisation of problems as an important part of 
the policy process: 
The first cut at analyzing anything is to place it in its proper category. 
People will see a problem quite differently if it is put into one category 
rather than another. Thus much of the struggle over problem 
definition centers on the categories that will be used and the ways 
they will be used. (Kingdon 1995, p111). 
The persistent categorisation by Australian governments of farm poverty as 
a farm adjustment issue rather than a welfare problem resulted in the 
complex programs outlined above. 
In applying organisational theory in his analysis of the Cuban Missile crisis, 
Allison writes 
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Governmental behavior can ... be understood ... less as deliberate 
choices and more as outputs of large organizations functioning 
according to standard patterns of behavior (Allison 1971, p67). 
He explains that the standard approaches of existing organisations can 
influence policy outcomes: 
The behavior of these organisations - and consequently of the 
government - relevant to any issue in any particular instance is, 
therefore, determined primarily by routines established in these 
organizations prior to that instance. (Allison 1971, p68) 
Standard operating procedures can also explain problems in 
implementation of policies (Art 1973, p477). A good example is provided by 
the implementation of the Farm Household Support Scheme. As it was set 
up as a loan scheme, a mechanism was required to keep track of and 
collect repayments once farmers came off the program. Although the 
Department of Social Security was making the payments it did not have an 
established procedure for tracking or collecting loan repayments so that 
responsibility remained with the DPIE. The decision was made that the role 
be allocated to the Levies Management Unit within the Department as it 
was already collecting levies from primary producers for such purposes as 
research and development and therefore had systems for the collection of 
money. The Unit was very reluctant to become involved in this new activity 
and by early 1995 still had no system in place for either tracking or 
collecting loans, even though by this time farmers were coming off the 
scheme. When the Rural Division was moved to the Headquarters Group in 
1993, the Levies Management Unit remained with the Agriculture and 
Forests Group. This meant that the unit which was supposed to be 
collecting FHS debts and the Division responsible for managing the 
scheme reported to different Deputy Secretaries. Even by 1997 when the 
new Coalition Government decided to forgive all FHS loans, no repayments 
had been collected by the Levies Management Unit. 
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Relying on bureaucratic structures to explain policy does not account for the 
values which particular individuals bring to the job (Art 1973). Although 
conventional bureaucratic politics theory suggests that 'where you stand 
depends on where you sit" (attributed to Don K Price in Allison 1971, p176) 
this does not account for the possibility that individual officers within an 
organisation will have different levels of interest in a particular issue. 
Kingdon raises this issue suggesting that some ideas fail to get very far in 
the policy community because officials find the issue to be "messy, unlikely 
to produce much cost savings, and, most important, not really tied to their 
intellectual preoccupations" (Kingdon 1995, p127). This description could 
easily be applied to the handling of farm poverty within DPIE - to many it 
was an inconvenient side effect of structural adjustment policy that needed 
to be dealt with. 
Unlike other specific interest groups, such as women and migrants, who 
have had separate Offices established to represent their interests across 
portfolios, an Office of Rural Affairs has never been established at 
Commonwealth level. This is in spite of a number of attempts to have such 
a body set up both from within the Department itself, from external groups 
and from government backbenchers (Sorenson and Epps 1993, p280). As 
an "industry" department, DPIE/AFFA is constrained from tackling farm 
income issues in purely welfare terms. This has resulted in the 
development of programs which are presented in terms of addressing 
market failure, such as perceived shortcomings in commercial financial 
markets, and which are linked explicitly to the Government's structural 
adjustment objectives for the farm sector. Over the period under review, the 
Social Security portfolio demonstrated a great deal of reluctance in 
becoming involved in either the development or delivery of welfare support 
to farmers. 
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Given the nature of policy development in Canberra, the location of policy 
responses to farm poverty in the agriculture portfolio also resulted in 
something of a mismatch between the bureaucracy and the interest groups 
which perhaps could have been active in this area. The relationships 
between government departments and interest groups are developed over 
time and tend to be along portfolio lines - for example the key officials with 
whom officers of the Australian Industry Group or the Minerals Council of 
Australia deal on a regular basis are located in the Industry, Science and 
Resources Department, with some contacts with the Environment 
Department on issues such as Greenhouse response policy. As primarily 
an industry portfolio, DPIE was not a target agency for welfare groups and 
there were therefore few established networks through which informal 
consultation on farm welfare policy could be undertaken. 
Within the Department, there has been a series of organisational 
re- arrangements which have moved responsibility for welfare and 
communities issues. The frequency of the changes and the oblique manner 
in which the Annual Reports refer to the welfare of farmers suggest overall 
portfolio discomfort with these issues. DPIE's mission throughout the 1990s 
contained no reference to farm incomes and its Annual Reports make it 
clear, by omission, that farm poverty was not a major portfolio concern. 
However, neither was it a major concern of any other Commonwealth 
Minister or Department. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE INTEREST GROUPS 
The previous chapter outlined DPIE/AFFA's involvement in the 
development of farm income support policy. On balance, the Department 
has not been a particularly effective watchdog for poor farmers partly 
because it has been constrained by its industry development charter from 
seriously considering this welfare issue and also due to a low level of 
Departmental interest in the losers from the structural adjustment process. 
In addition to government agencies, Lindblom also sees an important role 
for interest groups in providing and protecting a diversity of values 
(Lindblom 1959). The various partisans develop expertise in their area of 
specialisation and work to articulate concerns which may be neglected by 
other players to ensure that their values and interests are incorporated in 
the policy development process. This chapter examines the involvement of 
key interest groups in the development of policy in response to inadequate 
farm incomes, focusing on the activities of the major interest groups. These 
are the players with the capacity to influence the policy development 
process. This emphasis on insider groups (Matthews 1997) reflects the 
reality of policy making in Canberra and the limited impact smaller, less well 
known groups have on the policy process. 
Farm Organisations 
National Farmers' Federation 
As the representative of farmers in Canberra, the National Farmers' 
Federation (NFF) is the main national interest group which could be 
expected to be active in support of Commonwealth Government policies in 
the area of farm poverty. The NFF is a relative newcomer to lobbying. 
However, it has made its presence felt and by 1998 was arguably one of the 
most effective and best resourced pressure groups operating in the national 
capital. Kelly reports that, prior to the 1990 rural recession, the NFF ran a 
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national headquarters in Canberra stronger than either the ALP or Liberal 
Secretariats, with a $2.3 million budget and a big policy research staff 
(Kelly 1994, p257). The NFF has a high opinion of its level of influence, 
with President Ian Donges telling an international audience that "we are - 
unofficially - regarded as the most effective lobby group in the country..." 
(Donges 1998a, p12). 
The NFF opened for business in July 1979 and was the result of decades of 
efforts by farm organisations in Australia to establish "one voice" (Connors 
1996) to speak on behalf of farmers to government. Until 1979, farm 
organisations had been splintered along commodity lines, between States 
and along socio- economic lines. A key impetus for the establishment of a 
single body to represent farmers' interests was the creation of the Industries 
Assistance Commission. In order to present well argued and 
comprehensive submissions to the IAC, farming organisations required 
resources and a skilled, professional staff (Connors 1996, p175). Ignoring 
the opportunities offered by the IAC was not an option. The early NFF staff 
had a strong economic focus and this was reflected in the organisation's 
policies. Previous attempts to bring farm organisations together had failed 
- for example, the Australian Primary Producers Union and the Primary 
Producers' Council, both established in 1943, and the Australian Farmers 
Federation which was formed in 1969 (Connors 1996). As well as 
signalling a break with the divisions that had plagued these earlier attempts 
at unity, the birth of the NFF marked a sea change in the economic policies 
pursued by farm representatives. Like the changes in the focus of the DPIE, 
the new approach to economic policy pursued by the NFF left little room for 
consideration of appropriate responses to farm poverty. 
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Origins 
Prior to 1979, there was a plethora of farm organisations in Australia. In 
some major industries, such as wheat, producers were divided, with more 
than one group claiming to represent the industry's interests. Often these 
competing organisations held quite different views on what was best for 
their members as, by the 1930s, a split had occurred among farmers 
between the advocates of a free market and those seeking "orderly 
marketing" (Connors 1996, p18). This distinction was broadly between the 
wealthy "graziers" and the smaller "farmers ", although both groups included 
woolgrowers and eventually, wheatgrowers. Connors describes the 
differences between farmers and graziers as follows: 
They remained divided for almost 90 years as the original battle over 
land ownership gave way to bitter contests over marketing farm 
produce, with farmers demanding government intervention and 
graziers adhering to the free market. The gulf between the two 
groups was widened by differences in wealth, property size, 
education levels and social status. (Connors 1996, p22) 
For many years, these divisions proved a major obstacle to amalgamation 
between the two groups' respective organisations. 
Australian writers generally agree that many of the pre -NFF farmers' 
associations were very narrow in their focus, primarily seeking government 
programs which were aimed at obtaining income security for their members 
(Marshall 1985, p23). Writing in 1980 of the pre -NFF farm organisations in 
NSW, Richmond argued that 
Producer groups perceive policy -making largely in terms of asking 
governments to overcome the unfavourable trading position of the 
farmer, to gain compensation for his [sic] labours and to maintain an 
adequate rural living standard. Groups see their major role as 
presenting proposals that will benefit the rural sector in the 
short-term; long -range planning tends to be neglected in favour of 
tangible rewards. (Richmond 1980, p75) 
Connors makes a very similar observation: 
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Most [pre -1979] Australian farm organisations had a narrow outlook 
and if they at all recognised that issues like interest rates, tariff levels, 
taxation policy and industrial relations affected farming they failed to 
demonstrate it adequately to the Government. They gave the 
impression that their only real aim was to get as much financial 
support out of the Government as possible. (Connors 1996, p108) 
The effectiveness of rural pressure groups was limited by the farmers' 
distrust of academics, professionals, and "experts" in general. As a result, 
farm organisations were often regarded as incompetent by the government 
departments with which they dealt. Richmond describes some of the 
interactions of the United Farmers and Woolgrowers' Association with the 
NSW Department of Agriculture as demonstrating "crass stupidity" 
(Richmond 1980, p87). 
When considering the lack of unity of farm groups and the weakness of their 
voice in public policy prior to 1972, it should be noted that farm issues were 
effectively promoted by the Country Party which had considerable influence 
in a series of coalition governments. As will be discussed in a subsequent 
chapter, the Country Party was very focused on its sectional interests and 
emphasised its role as the farmers' representative. The leader of the 
Country Party from 1958 to 1971, John McEwen saw his Party's role quite 
clearly: 
My altitude is that neither the Australian Country Party nor the 
parliamentary members should decide what is the correct policy for 
primary industry. It has always been the policy of my party that those 
who produce, own and sell a product are the best judges of the way 
in which their property should be treated. It is the function of my party 
to see that the will of those who produce and own the product is 
carried into legislative and administrative effect. (quoted in Connors 
1996, p64) 
Although Connors disputes the accuracy of this statement as a description 
of how policy was actually developed in the McEwen era, it highlights the 
image the Country Party wished to project as the farmers' champion 
(Connors 1996, p64). 
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Structure of the NFF 
The NFF is a federation of State farming organisations. It has no direct 
individual farmer members, however according to the NFF, "by joining a 
State farm organisation, farmers contribute to and support NFF" (National 
Farmers' Federation 2000). The NFF currently comprises the NSW 
Farmers' Association (NSWFA), the Northern Territory Cattlemen's 
Association, the Victorian Farmers' Federation (VFF), the Queensland 
Farmers' Federation (QFF), Tasmanian Farmers' and Graziers' Association, 
Agforce Queensland4, the South Australian Farmers' Federation (SAFF) 
and the Pastoralists' and Graziers' Association of WA (National Farmers' 
Federation 2000). The Western Australian Farmers' Federation has 
recently suspended its membership of the NFF and its commodity councils 
for financial reasons (WAFF 2001) 
The NFF has eight commodity councils which are responsible for national 
commodity specific issues and, like the NFF, do not have direct members. 
The Executive of the Councils are made up of representatives of the State 
farming organisations. From example, the Executive of the Grains Council 
of Australia is made up of a grain grower from each of NSWFA, VFF, SAFF 
and Agforce Queensland. The Tasmanian Farmers' and Graziers' 
Association is an Associate member of the Grains Council. 
As v )ting rights on the NFF Council are related to financial contributions to 
the NFF, this structure has resulted in the impression that the organisation's 
agenda is dominated by the NSW Farmers' Association and the Victorian 
Farmers' Federation, and within these groups by the grazing industry 
(Macfarlane 2000, pers comm). 
4 Agforce Queensland was formed in 1998 by the amalgamation of the Queensland 
Graingrowers Association, the United Graziers Association and the Cattlemen's Union. 
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Economic philosophy 
When the NFF came into being in 1979, its newly elected Executive 
members were predominantly "farmers" and newspaper reports at the time 
suggested that small farmers would hold the power in the new organisation 
(Hodgkinson 1979; The Land 1979a). However, although farmers swept 
into the elected positions, the graziers managed to secure the top 
secretariat positions for their staff, thereby ensuring their economic interests 
were protected. As Connors reports, 
Leading graziers saw greater benefits in pushing their former staff 
into senior positions on the NFF and its commodity councils than in 
demanding leadership posts for themselves. When full time staff 
serve part-time executives there are opportunities for staff to have 
considerable influence. (Connors 1996, p214) 
This certainly proved to be the case, as the NFF very quickly asserted itself 
as a leading advocate of free market economics. In 1981, the NFF released 
a policy paper entitled Farm Focus: the 1980s, which Malcolm describes as 
The opening salvo of what was to prove to be a more rigorous, 
professional and comprehensive approach to the analysis and 
advocacy of policy options than previously had prevailed. (Malcolm 
1989, p140) 
The paper stated clearly that the NEF would be pursuing a free market 
philosophy: 
NFF does not believe that any industry - rural, mining, 
manufacturing, or tertiary - whether highly protected or not - 
should be permanently shielded from the forces of economic change. 
The overall interests of the economy demand that all industries must 
participate in the inevitable adjustment process. (National Farmers' 
Federation 1981, p48) 
As Lawrence writes, the National Farmers' Federation had "become one of 
the most vocal proponents of a deregulated economy and a free enterprise 
agriculture" (Lawrence 1987, p79). The organisation's position on rural 
adjustment was also clear from the outset, 
The farm sector has been particularly exposed to structural 
adjustment because of its predominant export orientation. The aim of 
rural adjustment programs should be to `oil the wheels of change', to 
assist rather than impede market forces. For most farmers, 
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adjustment will cover farm build -up, a new product mix, cost saving 
measures or new technology; for some it will mean leaving 
agriculture. (National Farmers' Federation 1981, p44 - italics in 
original) 
The NFF rejected price and supply controls as mechanisms for stabilising 
farm incomes, expressing a preference for the normal operation of market 
forces with measures such as income equalisation deposits to assist 
individual farmers in managing income instability. 
It should be noted that the economic environment facing the new 
organisation was considerably more complex than that in which its 
predecessor bodies had operated. In the early 1980s the floating of the 
Australian dollar and the deregulation of financial markets exposed 
Australia's export industries to international trade pressures to a degree not 
previously experienced. The emergence of a strong export- oriented 
minerals industry also changed the economic landscape so that agriculture 
was no longer the sole important export sector. In addition, the advent of 
the Industries Assistance Commission in the 1970s shifted the onus on to 
industries seeking government assistance to prove their case. This 
requirement by necessity increased the focus of farmers on the broader 
economics of their industry rather than just appeals for ad hoc responses to 
individual pressures. Although this required the farm lobby to defend its 
industry protection arrangements, the NFF could see the advantages of the 
IAC in its campaign to have manufacturing protection reduced and as such 
expressed it support for the public inquiry processes of the Cor. emission 
(National Farmers' Federation 1981, p22). 
NFF's Deputy Director in the early 1980s, David Trebeck has been 
identified by a number of commentators as the intellectual leader at the NFF 
(Kelly 1994, p45; Connors 1996, p218). Trebeck later became a leading 
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member of the HR Nicholls Society along with the then NFF President and 
grazier Ian McLachlan, described by Connors as a "hard line economic 
rationalist" (Connors 1997, p71). Former Executive Director of the NFF, 
Rick Farley also suggests that in the early years the officers in the NFF 
Secretariat "educated" the Executive about the economic issues which 
were to become their focus (Farley 2000, pers comm). It is therefore not 
surprising that the NFF's policy direction from the outset was focused on 
issues of general economic policy with a strong anti -union flavour - as 
mentioned in Chapter Two this included vocal opposition to the Labor 
Governments' Accord. 
Kelly reports that McLachlan identified the NFF's aims as 
the exposure of all Australian industry to market forces; the creation 
of an internationally competitive economy: a deregulated labour 
market; equality of all interests before the law; and reward for 
initiative and incentive for risk -taking. (Kelly 1994, p254) 
This included opposition to Australia's unique industrial relations arbitration 
system, a position which caused the NFF to fall out with other members of 
the employers' forum, the Confederation of Australian Industry, who were 
not as enthusiastic about challenging the entire system. In its White Paper 
on Economic and Rural Policy released in May 1986, the NFF argued that 
At the heart of many of the problems faced by the Australian 
economy as a whole, and the rural sector and other exporters in 
particular, is our centralised and inflexible system of wage 
determination:- specifically the continuation of indexation based 
wage increases, and the Government's determination to preserve 
that system. (National Farmers' Federation 1986, p1) 
The Paper went on to recommend that "Australia's centralised and inflexible 
wage fixing arrangements should be replaced by a system based on 
common law contracts between employer and employee" (National 
Farmers' Federation 1986, p18). 
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Under McLachlan, the NFF quickly established itself as a leading advocate 
of economic reform, becoming involved in high profile issues such as the 
1985 Mudginberri abattoir dispute, during which the NFF provided 
considerable funding to the abattoir's owner Jay Pendarvis in his civil action 
against the Australian Workers Union (Kelly 1994, p256). It was during this 
dispute that the NFF's "Fighting Fund" swelled to over $10 million (Kelly 
1994, p256), including donations from other employer groups who were 
happy to have the NFF run the anti -union agenda. Coghill sees the NFF's 
role at Mudginberri as part of the "New Right' agenda, describing their 
involvement as follows: 
The NFF was able to turn a dispute at one of Australia's smallest and 
most remote abattoirs into a cause célèbre which reinforced public 
perceptions about the power of unions and their costs to the 
economy, and which, through a string of legal manoeuvres, 
remained in the public eye for month after month consolidating the 
image which it created. (Coghill 1987, p131) 
Kelly is more sanguine about the NFF's interest in industrial relations 
suggesting that "[o]nce the farm sector embraced the cause of low 
protection to assist its competitiveness, it was inevitable that it would also 
address the industrial system" (Kelly 1994, p255). Farmer opposition to 
organised labour was by no means a new phenomenon in Australian 
politics. Connors has observed that, since 1890, 
little has united farmers more than a battle against unionists 
attempting either to stop the supply of produce to market or resisting 
the introduction of more efficient work practices. (Connors 1997, 
p69). 
As the union movement discovered at Mudginberri in the 1980s and or the 
waterfront in the 1990s this was a role the NFF took to with gusto. 
An example of the NFF's strong economic focus is provided by then 
Executive Director Andrew Robb's address to the Australian Institute of 
Political Science in 1986. Asked to speak on the topic "Can farmers cope 
with free market forces ", Robb's response was brief: "Whether or not many 
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of our farmers cope with free market forces is problematical; what is certain 
is that they have no alternative" (Robb 1986, p2). The balance of the 
speech was taken up with criticism of the subsidies provided to farmers by 
the EC and the US, the level of inflation and interest rates in Australia, 
Government debt levels, and industrial relations arrangements. In 
conclusion he reiterated that "[f]armers have no choice but to seek to cope 
with free market forces. There is no sustainable alternative." (Robb 1986, 
p12) His speech was silent on the possibility that there might be farmers 
who would lose out as a result of these forces. 
In light of the sharp contrast between this policy approach and the activities 
of the NFF's predecessor organisations, particularly the "farmer" groups, 
Marshall observed in the early 1980s that "it is doubtful that the attitudes of 
the rank and file members of farm organisations have altered markedly and 
this is a potential weakness of the NFF ". She goes on to point out that 
Canberra -based lobbyists and researchers may believe in the value 
of [economic] reforms; the individual producer, at the mercy of 
seasonal variations and market forces, is far less likely to agree that 
part of his [sic] financial safety -net should be removed in the hope of 
long term benefits. (Marshall 1985, p34) 
Connors made a similar observation in 1996: `To many farmers, the NFF is 
seen as an organisation that has raced well ahead of rank and file thinking 
with its economic rationalist agenda" (Connors 1996, p270). 
However, more th; in twenty years on, the NFF still has one of the highest 
profiles of any pressure group in Canberra and is not showing any 
significant sign of back -pedalling on its economic philosophy. It also still 
appears to be retaining the support of the smaller family farmers for whom 
these policies may not be so ideal. Farley describes as the organisation's 
"greatest achieverient" the NFF's ability to keep within its ranks both the 
free -trade exporters and the producers who are more domestically focused 
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(Farley 2000, pers comm). Gerritsen suggests that this unity has been 
attained through militancy. He argues: 
[The NFF] needs to diffuse tensions between differing commodity 
interests and between export- oriented and domestic market 
producers. Militancy is one, risky method of outflanking the internal 
dissidence. (Gerritsen 1987, p55) 
This tactic is not uncommon among interest groups - Dahl notes that group 
leaders "play down potential cleavages among their own members and 
exaggerate the salience of conflict with outsiders" (Dahl 1982, p44). The 
NFF has done this very effectively. 
Whatever the explanation, from an organisational perspective farmer unity 
has been a major achievement. Writing in the mid- 1960s, Chislett was 
sceptical about calls for unity, arguing that 
The basic limitation to unity of action by all primary producers, is that 
relatively small number of specific matters on which interests are 
really common and deep enough to secure the solid support of the 
whole over a period of time. (Chislett 1967, p123) 
However, large and small farm interests are seen to be represented by the 
NFF, although it is arguable whether this has translated into true 
representation of the entire membership. As Lawrence observes, 
What the NFF appears to have managed to do is to have fused the 
sectional pro -capitalist interests of the more wealthy employer 
farmers with those of the smaller family farmers, those for whom price 
volatility is of paramount concern but whose larger numbers are 
required to lend weight to the leadership's aims. (Lawrence 1987, 
p79) 
In essence, particularly in the 1980s and early part of the 1990s, the NFF 
pursued economic policies which were clearly in the interests of the larger 
and more successful farmers. At the same time, it managed to convince 
smaller farmers that it was also acting in their interests, thereby retaining its 
large membership base. Lawrence suggests that the smaller farmers were 
being misled. In this context he is particularly critical of the NFF's anti -union 
agenda, arguing that 
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Attacks on the union movement are unlikely to put dollars back into 
the pockets of farmers: what they are likely to do is to help those 
larger- than -family- farmers' employing substantial quantities of 
labour, and of course, firms in the agribusiness sector... (Lawrence 
1987, p87) 
A further consideration influencing the level of advocacy on behalf of small 
farmers during the period under review is that many were not members of 
farming organisations and therefore were not affiliated with the NFF (Farley 
2000). Whereas some farm groups, such as the Queensland Graingrowers 
Association considered themselves to represent all grain growers, the NFF 
approach was that it was not their role to pursue polices which would 
predominantly benefit non -members. It has been suggested that those 
farmers who were disadvantaged by the structural adjustment process were 
not seen to be important members of the farming community and therefore 
were not the focus of NFF attention (Macfarlane 2000, pers comm). 
Those industries in which there is a large concentration of small operators 
such as dried fruits and citrus hold very few votes on the NFF Executive 
(Farley 2000, pers comm). As a result, the NFF has tended to focus on 
export- oriented, broadacre agriculture, resulting in an economic agenda 
which does not always suit industries such as pork, chickenmeat or egg 
producers (Ramsay 2000, pers comm). On a range of issues, these smaller 
industries have therefore been left with a choice between working through 
the NFF in an attempt to amend the organisation's policy approach or set up 
as a separate body. Resources aside, there would be considerable 
difficulties in pursuing the latter option as such a grouping would be very 
quickly painted by its competitors as "protectionist" and therefore "irrelevant" 
to the economic debate. 
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It should be noted that the NFF Executive did not adopt its economic policy 
agenda without considerable discussion. In the early years, there were 
philosophical arguments about whether the organisation represented the 
farm sector or individual farmers, and therefore whether its focus should be 
on macro -economic issues such as increasing competition or whether it 
should concentrate on improving returns. According to former NFF 
Executive Director Rick Farley, the organisation's Executive was of the view 
that the NFF represented the sector as a whole and that the best approach 
to addressing low income problems in agriculture was to relieve cost 
pressures (Farley 2000, pers comm). Little consideration was given to 
alternative strategies should this approach fail. The organisation was 
dominated by exporters and it was in their interests to open up the 
economy. As President of the NFF, Ian McLachlan believed that export 
industries should drive the economic agenda and was therefore happy to 
see the farmers take the lead in arguing for free trade, deregulation and free 
rein for market forces. Lawrence describes the NFF's taking a "tough ... line 
in which agriculture effectively loses its right to subsidization in return for 
structural change in manufacturing industry and labour markets" (Lawrence 
1987, p79). Former NFF Executive member, Ian Macfarlane reports that 
views which challenged the prevailing economic approach tended to be 
dismissed as ignorant or ill- informed (Macfarlane 2000, pers comm). 
The NFF clearly sees itself as an economic lobby group and for many years 
was reluctant to become involved in welfare issues - in fact these issues 
were rarely even discussed. Once the economic policy line was set, 
subsequent NFF Presidents continued to pursue the direction mapped out 
by McLachlan, although by the late 1980s the debate within the Executive 
had moved from the need for reform to the issue of the pace of change 
(Farley 2000, pers comm). By the early 1990s the NFF was arguing that 
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protection for agriculture should come down but no faster than for other 
sectors of the economy. This shift is evident in the changing tone used in 
NFF publications. In the 1986 White Paper, the NFF stuck to its economic 
line and recommended an across -the -board approach to economic reform: 
Progressive reduction of high levels of protection to reduce both 
overall rates of assistance and the disparities in assistance 
between industries; 
Introduction of a program of gradual, across -the -board 
reductions in protection; 
The progressive replacement of tariffs and import quotas by 
direct subsidies or bounties to share the burden of assistance 
across the whole community and make the cost of assistance 
more visible and accountable. (National Farmers' Federation 
1986, pp 21 -22) 
Six years later, in its 1992 Annual Report, the first item listed on the NFF's 
work program for that year was "[o]pposition to further reductions in 
assistance to agriculture until assistance to all industries is reduced on a 
"tops down" basis to similar levels" (National Farmers' Federation 1992, 
p6). This is not consistent with "across- the -board" reductions in protection 
and arguably signals a retreat from the 1986 position. 
Writing in the late 1980s, Malcolm suggested that the farmers' position was 
one of "selective economic rationalism" (Malcolm 1989, p149), pointing to 
the fact that "farm organisations staunchly defended the extensive 
regulation which exists in the wheat, dairy, sugar, dried fruit and egg 
industries" (Malcolm 1989, p151) However, over the course of the 1990s 
the majority of these indus ries saw their regulatory regimes dismantled, 
often with the active involvement of the NFF and /or its commodity councils. 
The organisation's rhetoric suggested that there was nothing selective 
about their position: 
The NFF is not seeking subsidies, compensation packages or short 
term palliatives as solutions to the current problems faced by the 
rural sector. Such policies will do little if anything to address the real 
issues. (National Farmers' Federation 1986, p1) 
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Overall, the organisation has been strikingly consistent in its policy 
positions. Its relative silence on farm poverty during the drought of the 
1990s when the issue was getting nightly television news coverage attests 
to the NFF's ability to hold the line. However, the Federation's 1994 Annual 
Report includes a reference to the drought in its "Year in Review" summary 
and it does so in emotive terms. Describing the FarmHand appeal, the NFF 
reports that "(tJhe plight of families unable to put food on the table or to 
afford their children's education touched the hearts of ordinary Australians, 
schools and many businesses" (National Farmers' Federation 1994a, p3). 
However, the NFF's policy position on drought remained focused on 
self -reliance, risk management and competitiveness, with no reference to 
income support: 
NFF advocated a strategy for drought management and recovery 
which encompassed three main components: repayment of debt; 
rebuilding productivity /protection of the resource base of agriculture; 
and establishment of appropriate financial and physical reserves. 
NFF argued that the Commonwealth's response to drought should 
provide support to farmers in all three areas to assist in drought 
recovery and foster greater drought preparedness and self -reliance. 
(National Farmers' Federation 1994a, p18) 
With respect to the Government's two substantial drought response 
packages in 1994, the NFF referred obliquely to the Drought Relief Payment 
in its 1994 Annual Report by mentioning the changes to assets tests 
arrangements (National Farmers' Federation 1994a, p7), however the DRP 
was not mentioned by name in either the 1994 or 1995 Reports. In addition, 
while the NFF claimed credit for lobbying in support of the second 
(December 1994) package which contained longer term measures for 
drought preparation, it did not mention the welfare- focused DRP package 
which was announced in September 1994, even though this package 
involved the substantial sum of nearly a quarter of a billion dollars in 
Commonwealth expenditure. 
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The pro -market position taken by the NFF did not leave much room for it to 
pick up social issues, although it is worth noting that the NSW Farmers 
Association has raised its profile on these issues in the last couple of years 
in response to pressure from members (Wilkes -Bowes 1999, pers comm). 
In 1996 Dr Wendy Craik was appointed as the NFF's Executive Director, 
replacing Rick Farley who had resigned in 1995. Craik made it clear early 
on that social issues and adjustment were important (Macfarlane 2000, pers 
comm) and she demonstrated her interest in health and access to services 
issues. The NFF has also appointed a Director of Rural Affairs and in recent 
years has become more vocal on both physical and social infrastructure 
issues, such as improving telecommunications to rural Australia and the 
number of rural doctors. The NFF was represented on the Special Rural 
Task Force which looked at the impact of assets testing on farm families 
and has made submissions to various government inquiries such as the 
McColl review of the Rural Adjustment Scheme and, more recently the 
review of the Farm Family Restart Scheme. Wendy Craik left the NFF in 
November 2000 and has been replaced by Anna Cronin, former adviser to 
Opposition leader John Hewson in the early 1990s and Chief of Staff to 
Victorian Premier Jeff Kennett until his defeat in 1998. Given her strong 
economic policy background, it will be interesting to see whether Ms Cronin 
continues Dr Craik's work on social issues. 
It is also worth noting that the composition of the NFF's membership has 
shifted away from the dominance by the large, successful market -oriented 
farmers of the mid -1980s and early 1990s. This group has been moving out 
of farm organisations and as a result the NFF's membership comprises a 
higher proportion of the small to middle -sized operations (Craik 2000, pers 
comm; Hooke 2000, pers comm) whose economic interests are not 
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necessarily best served by a strict free market, deregulatory approach. After 
Craik was appointed, the NFF Executive increased its interest in social 
issues such as access to services in rural areas and there was some 
discussion of the need for a welfare safety net equivalent to that available to 
the broader community. However, there was little discussion of farm 
poverty or the appropriate response to the needs of the "losers" from the 
structural adjustment process (Craik 2000, pers comm). 
The NFF's silence on farm poverty has gone largely unremarked in the 
literature on the association's activities. Not surprisingly, Trebeck's analysis 
of the group's work praises its market- focused economic policy direction: 
"[t]he reputation, which the NFF has deservedly won could as easily be lost 
if its future activities were to stray from the policy directions of the past" 
(Trebeck 1990, p142). Halpin and Martin's studies of farmer associations, 
while more critical of the NFF's policies, also do not address the issue of the 
NFF's position on farm poverty (Halpin and Martín 1996; Halpin 1997; 
Halpin and Martín 1999). 
NFF Priorities 
In the period between 1989 and 1998, the NFF ran with a series of "big 
issues" which dominated its agenda, and left little room for welfare issues. 
Former NFF Executive member Ian Macfarlane suggests that this lack of 
interest extended to the whole issue of farm adjustment policy (Macfarlane 
2000, pers comm). In the late 1980s and ';arly 1990s, the organisation was 
an active supporter of the Cairns Group during the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. In the early 1990s, the NFF was also 
involved in the environment agenda with the establishment of the Landcare 
program and on Aboriginal issues in response to the High Court's Mabo5 
decision. In the lead up to the 1993 election, the organisation promoted the 
5 Mabo and others v. Queensland (no. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 F.C. 92/014 
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merits of a Goods and Service Tax, a position which strained its relations 
with the Labor government and tested the organisation's claim to be 
apolitical. Farm poverty was not a priority issue and as noted, even during 
the drought, the NFF's involvement was fairly subdued with respect to the 
income support side of the debate - although then NFF President Donald 
McGauchie was on the Board of the Trust which managed the Farm Hand 
Appeal in 1994. 
As noted, from 1996, after Wendy Craik was appointed to the position of 
Executive Director, the NFF increased its involvement on the question of 
service provision in rural areas. However, the agenda continued to be 
dominated by a series of high profile issues. In 1996 the NFF ran a 
campaign on native title in response to the High Court's Wik decision. In 
1998, the NFF was happy to test the provisions of the new Coalition 
Government's Workplace Relations Act 1996. The legislation contained 
many of the reforms that the organisation had been advocating and the 
conflict between Patrick Stevedoring and the Maritime Union of Australia 
provided a high profile industrial dispute through which the NFF could 
pursue its economic agenda, as Mudginberri had done over a decade 
before. 
Relationship with political parties 
Unlike its predecessor organisations, which had close ties with the then 
Country Party, the NFF's constitution precludes ìt from supporting any 
political party with either cash or services (Connors 1997). The new 
organisation's political independence was evident from the outset when it 
criticised the Fraser Government's 1979 budget through a media release on 
budget night (Connors 1996, p265). However the release received little 
coverage in the print media, with small items focusing on the farmers' 
disappointment that the farm sector had not done very well out of the 
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Budget, and nothing to suggest that the NFF was looking much further in its 
criticisms than its sectional interests (Australian Financial Review 1979; The 
Land 1979b). The organisation later prepared submissions on tariff policies 
in 1981 and in response to the Campbell report on the financial system, 
both of which contained views contrary to those of the National Party 
(Marshall 1985, p33). Connors reports that 
The former National Party leader, Doug Anthony, was not impressed 
by either the NFF staff or the economic direction it had taken. The 
organisation, he believed, was being led by its economists too far 
down the path of free trade and economic deregulation. (Connors 
1996, p219) 
In the mid -80s the relationship between the NFF and the National Party was 
further strained by a speech to the Party's Federal Council by McLachlan. 
Kelly reports part of McLachlan's address as follows: 
Your credibility has been diminished because your policy research 
has been inadequate. You have not provided new directions but 
have relied on the same, tired rhetoric we have all heard a thousand 
times before. (quoted in Kelly 1994, p254) 
McLachlan's public profile was an asset to the NFF and such was his 
popularity among farmers that the NFF constitution was amended to allow 
him to serve a fourth year as President (Connors 1996, p230). McLachlan's 
strong position did not endear him to the Labor Government which was 
described as being in a state of "simmering feud" with the NFF (Hutcheon 
1986). The NFF's relations with Hawke and Keating reached a low point in 
December 1986 when the NFF President was unceremoniously dismissed 
from the Prime Minister's Office after breaking protocol and briefing 
journalists prior to the meeting. McLachlan claimed that he had been "set 
up" by the Government and was quoted as saying "I could hardly imagine 
relations with the Government could be much worse" (Nadler 1986). 
The relationship with Labor was also strained in the lead up to the 1987 
and 1993 elections when, in spite of the organisation's apolitical charter, 
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the NEF campaigned actively. In 1986, the NFF Council decided that it 
would endorse particular candidates in the forthcoming election, however, 
this position was reversed in May 1987 and the organisation instead used 
the campaign to raise particular policy issues (Gruen and Grattan 1993, 
p63). In the 1993 case, the NFF attempted to portray its support for the 
goods and services tax as the promotion of a position long held by the 
organisation - the fact that it was the centrepiece of the Opposition's 
"Fightback" package was purely coincidental. Farley claims that the NFF 
redeemed itself in the eyes of the re- elected Labor government through its 
constructive approach to the development of policy in response to the High 
Court's Mabo decision (Farley 2000, pers comm). 
With the NFF focused on macro -economic issues, representation of the 
needs of poor farmers was largely left to others. The NFF's submissions to 
the key Senate inquiries over the period reflected the low priority given to 
farm poverty. The organisation's submission to the inquiry into rural 
adjustment, rural debt and rural reconstruction contained no reference to 
poverty or income support beyond a recommendation that 
Financial items relating to living costs, future capital requirements 
and repayment of debt, normally excluded from a calculation of 
business profit, be deleted from the criteria for provision of [RAS] 
assistance. (National Farmers' Federation 1994b, p4) 
As has been noted previously, one of the major obstacles to farmers' 
gaining access to social security support is the assets test. The NFF's 
submission to the Senate Inquiry into the impact of assets testing on farm 
families was brief, consisting of two letters, one of two pages and one of just 
over three (Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References 
Committee 1995a). 
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The NFF's constituent bodies spoke out on behalf of their membership from 
time to time. Senate inquiries, for example, provided opportunities for 
groups such as the Queensland Graingrowers Association to put their views 
on appropriate government responses to hardship (Senate Standing 
Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs 1992). Smaller commodity 
councils, such as the Pork Council of Australia, do not have the resources to 
consider welfare issues and tend to rely on other organisations to pursue 
them (Ramsay 2000, pers comm). 
The Commodity Councils 
The NFF's commodity councils are more focused on individual producers 
than the umbrella organisation. In an echo of earlier farm bodies, the 
Grains Council of Australia states, for example, that its "overriding objective" 
is "to maximise net returns to growers" (Grains Council of Australia 2000). 
Like the NFF, the Commodity Councils do not have individual grower 
members, they are comprised of delegates from the relevant sections or 
committees of the State farming organisations. 
During the drought the policy positions of the commodity councils were 
largely consistent with the NFF approach. In evidence to the Senate inquiry 
into rural adjustment, rural debt and rural reconstruction in 1994, then 
Executive Director of the Grains Council, Mitch Hooke stated that: 
The Grains Council's position on rural development and the 
structural adjustment is that the primary onus of responsibility for 
managing extremes of climatic variability a íd commodity price 
volatility rests with the individual grower. (Senate Rural and Regional 
Affairs and Transport References Committee 1994a, p3229) 
NFF Affiliates 
The NFF affiliates are more directly representative of their members. 
Organisations such as the Pork Council are made up of individual producer 
members as well as state organisations. Many of these affiliates represent 
domestically focused industries such as chickenmeat, pigmeat and eggs. In 
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recent years these industries have been very vulnerable to changing 
regulatory regimes and reduced quarantine barriers, thereby placing the 
issue of structural adjustment at the forefront of their organisation's 
concerns. As a result, organisations such as the Pork Council have been 
very active in lobbying government for support for members adversely 
affected, in this case, by greatly increased competition from imports as a 
result of changed quarantine rules. The Pork Council received little 
sympathy from the NFF and was left to run its own campaign in 1998 and 
1999 to obtain a structural adjustment package for its members (Ramsay 
2000, pers comm). During the 1998 election campaign the Pork Council 
ran a marginal seats campaign to draw attention to the plight of the industry, 
in the process alienating members of the Government (Macfarlane 2000, 
pers comm). However, as noted above, the Pork Council lacks the 
resources to pursue broader welfare issues such as farm poverty.6 
The State Farming Organisations 
The State farming organisations, while members of the NFF, do not always 
toe its policy line, nor do they restrict their focus to dealing with state 
governments. These organisations are much closer to their grassroots 
membership and accordingly become very involved in the major issues of 
direct concern to their members. The following provides examples of the 
activities of some of the state farming organisations. 
Queensland Graingrowers Association (QGGA) 
The Queensland Graingrowers Association was active on structural 
adjustment issues and drought relief in the early 1990s, with little support 
for its activities from the NFF (Macfarlane 2000, pers comm). QGGA 
President during the drought, Ian Macfarlane, was in regular contact with 
6 In March 2000, members of the Pork Council voted to form a new industry body comprising 
the PCA, the Pig Research and Development Corporation and The Australian Pork 
Corporation. The new organisation, Australian Pork Limited, responsible for "the delivery of 
policy, R &D and marketing services to Australia's pork industry", commenced operations on 
1 January 2001. (Pork Council of Australia 2000) 
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the Office of the Commonwealth Minister for Primary Industries and Energy 
and also worked closely with the DPIE. The visit to Queensland by Prime 
Minister Keating in September 1994 was organised by the Prime Minister's 
Office in consultation with the QGGA. The NFF's involvement and the 
inclusion of NFF President McGauchie in the official party was the result of 
last minute pressure from NFF Executive Director Rick Farley. According to 
Macfarlane, Farley also intervened to prevent him from attending the Prime 
Minister's Parliament House press conference at which the September 
1994 drought package was announced (Macfarlane 2000, pers comm). 
The QGGA's submissions to various Senate inquiries were generally more 
sympathetic to the plight of farmers in hardship than the NFF (Senate 
Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs 1992, p18). In 
Queensland, in addition to the QGGA, the United Graziers' Association and 
the Cattlemen's Union were also involved to varying degrees in lobbying 
State and Commonwealth governments for support for farmers in financial 
difficulty. 
NSW Farmers' Association 
The NSW Farmers' Association is the largest and best resourced of the 
State farming organisations and along with its Victorian counterpart is seen 
by many to dominate the NFF (Macfarlane 2000, pers comm). The 
Association was involved in some lobbying on welfare issues during the 
drought and a number of delegations from branches of the Association 
were received by the Commonwealth Minister. The NSWFA's submission 
to the Senate Inquiry into rural adjustment, rural debt and rural 
reconstruction dici not include any reference to low incomes however, in 
oral evidence, the Association's Terry Ryan observed that "the rural 
adjustment scheme in terms of welfare provisions does not work" (Senate 
Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee 1994a, 
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p2435). The Association also appeared to recognise implicitly that the 
structural adjustment process was not without cost, suggesting that there 
was a need "to reduce the scope for unnecessary adjustment pressures" 
(NSWFA 1994, p1). 
Victorian Farmers' Federation 
The VFF was not as active on farm welfare issues as its counterpart 
organisations in Queensland and NSW as it was the latter two States which 
were hit badly by the drought of the early 1990s. However, in its written 
submissions the organisation was more explicit in seeking some form of 
income support measure for poor farmers. In its submission to the Senate 
inquiry into rural adjustment, rural debt and rural reconstruction, the VFF 
recommended that 
Amendments should be made to ensure that low income farm 
families are not excluded from social security benefits by 
inappropriate assets tests. (Victorian Farmers' Federation 1994, p6) 
The paper went on to argue that 
The lack of assistance for those farm families in need is appalling. 
There needs to be access to some income support for those 
struggling to stay on their farm. (Victorian Farmers' Federation 1994, 
P9) 
In evidence to the inquiry, the VFF's Geoff Crick stated that 
...we need assistance in times of adversity, as a short term measure, 
and we need adjustment for people who are not going to make the 
grade, or for others to improve so they can make the grade. We think 
there are two clear elements there: assistance and adjustment. 
(Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References 
Committee 1994a, p468) 
Farm Groups as Watchdogs 
In spite of the efforts of the state organisations during the drought, farm 
interest groups were not involved in any systematic lobbying on behalf of 
poor farmers between 1989 and 1998 and as such were not particularly 
effective as watchdogs. As has been explained, there was a plethora of 
reviews and policy revisions throughout the 1990s. Various groups made 
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submissions when the opportunity arose, however, few focused on the 
income support needs of poor farmers. The economic philosophy of the 
NFF focused its attention on broader economic issues and its support for 
structural adjustment in agriculture precluded it from an active role on 
behalf of farmers in poverty. 
Welfare Groups 
Australian Council Of Social Service 
In the absence of effective watchdogs among farm organisations, who else 
is lobbying government on behalf of farmers in poverty? The other obvious 
source of support is the welfare lobby, however, during the period under 
review it did not show a great deal of interest in farm poverty policy. 
The peak welfare organisation in Australia is the Australian Council of 
Social Service (ACOSS). The Council was established in 1956 and now 
comprises 77 full member organisations and 441 associate members 
(ACOSS 1998, p6). ACOSS describes its work as falling into eight policy 
portfolios: 
economic development and tax; 
social security and low incomes; 
employment, education and training; 
community services; 
health; 
housing and urban development; 
law and justice; and 
rural and regional communities. (ACOSS 1998, p7) 
This final policy area appears to be limited to non -farm issues as ACOSS 
has not been involved with farmers and, when contacted by the author, 
suggested that the NFF was the appropriate organisation to speak with on 
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farm poverty (ACOSS 2000, pers comm). The section on Rural and 
Regional Communities in the 1997 -98 ACOSS Annual Report is focused on 
service delivery, infrastructure development, health and employment. 
There is no specific reference to farmers (ACOSS 1998, p16). 
For ACOSS, farmers in poverty have not been a priority due to the 
organisation's limited contact with farm families, the low numbers of poor 
farmers relative to other groups of concern to ACOSS and the difficulty of 
identifying genuine poverty, given the nature of farm businesses (Moore 
1999, pers comm). The asset status of many farmers also distinguishes this 
group from the very poor who are ACOSS's main client group - arguably 
the situation confronting many farmers is a matter of choice where a farmer 
is unprepared to sell the farm and move into alternative activities. The 
typical ACOSS client does not have this option. Finally, it should be noted 
that ACOSS shared the concern of the Department of Social Security that 
welfare support should not underwrite unprofitable businesses (Kingma 
2000, pers comm). 
During the drought, member organisations of ACOSS were active on a 
regional basis, providing services to farm families in need. Some groups 
such as Lifeline became involved in actively lobbying the Commonwealth 
Minister for assistance in their regions. The national body, however, is 
largely autonomous from its members and Marsh suggests that it does not 
become involved in individual or regional issues "but rather targets the 
national debates (employment, housing, education, industry policy and 
microeconomic reform)" (Marsh 1995, p65). Between 1991 and 1994 as 
the drought became established across large areas of Eastern Australia, 
ACOSS printed only one article on farmers in its monthly magazine Impact 
as part of a feature on "Rural Australia" (Lawrence and Share 1993). The 
181 
other two articles in the feature related to young people in rural 
communities and the impact of retrenchments on rural communities. 
An example of activity by ACOSS members is provided by the Society of St 
Vincent de Paul which provides assistance to farmers in difficulty, and in the 
late 1990s, produced a report entitled "In defence of the Bush ", which 
included references to rural poverty and the drought. The report made a 
number of recommendations, including in relation to the assets test for 
farmers seeking the age pension and access to Austudy. However there 
was no reference to low farm incomes or structural adjustment pressures in 
the sector (Society of St Vincent de Paul undated). 
New South Wales Council of Social Service (NCOSS) 
NCOSS, a constituent organisation of ACOSS, established a rural policy 
advisory committee following the rural communities: looking ahead 
Conference which it jointly hosted with the NSW Cabinet Office in June 
1995. Then ACOSS President Robert Fitzgerald addressed the 
Conference on the topic of "Sustainable development and rural structural 
adjustment ", however, his focus was on infrastructure and regional 
development (Fitzgerald 1995). Although it was held during the drought, 
the Conference was largely focused on non -farm issues such as delivery of 
services such as health and telecommunications and building strong 
communities. There was little discussion of the welfare needs of poor 
farmers. 
As has been mentioned earlier, the fact that the Department of Primary 
Industries and Energy did not deal with welfare pressure groups on a 
regular basis limited the ability of officials to initiate contact with them during 
the policy development process. Similarly welfare pressure groups rarely 
contacted policy officers within DPIE to discuss their concerns. Some 
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contact was made through DPIE's involvement on the Special Rural Task 
Force on assets testing and in the Department's participation on a poverty 
task force put together by the NSW government. Briefings with Ministers 
provided some useful anecdotal information about the impact of the drought 
on farm families, however, there were no systematic attempts by welfare 
organisations to become involved in the policy process on an ongoing 
basis. 
Minor Players 
As suggested at the start of this chapter, other smaller interest groups have 
been active on the issue of farm poverty from time to time. During the 
period under review organisations such as the Country Women's 
Association (CWA), the Australian Women in Agriculture, local drought aid 
committees, community organisations and the churches made occasional 
submissions and appeared before Senate inquiries and met with the 
Commonwealth Minister for Primary Industries and Energy. However, their 
capacity to be involved in or influence the policy development process was 
limited and their involvement was sporadic. Although Departmental Officers 
recall their interest during the drought their activities were not of sufficient 
priority to warrant reporting in their own newsletters. For example the 
National Anglican Caring Organisations Network newsletter ACORN 
contains no reference to the drought in 1993, 1994 or 1995 (National 
Anglican Caring Organisations Network 1993 -1995). Although Queensland 
was particularly hard hit by the drought, the Queensland CWA Annual 
Reports for that period give no indication that the organisation had 
undertaken any lobbying or made any contact with government 
(Queensland Country Women's Association 1993 -95). 
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Where submissions were made, they appear to have had little impact on the 
outcome of government policy deliberations. For example, the Australian 
Conference of Leaders of Religious Institutes made a submission to the 
Senate inquiry into rural adjustment, rural debt and rural reconstruction. 
The submission focused on 
the role of the banks in relation to the rural crisis and the rural debt; 
the need for independent negotiation between banks and farmers in 
crisis; and the need to widen the criteria for eligibility for the rural 
adjustment scheme. (Australian Conference of Leaders of Religious 
Institutes 1994, p2605). 
In evidence to the inquiry, Sister St Jude Doyle thanked the Committee for 
the opportunity "to speak on behalf of traumatised rural people" (Australian 
Conference of Leaders of Religious Institutes 1994, p2603) and provided 
the Committee with first hand anecdotal material about the levels of poverty 
and hardship being experienced by farmers. Although the Committee 
appeared to listen with interest and sympathy to the representatives of the 
Australian Conference of Leaders of Religious Institutes, very few if any of 
the Sisters' concerns were reflected in the final report of the inquiry. 
The Minister for Primary Industries and Energy received a number of 
regionally -based delegations during the drought, often concerning eligibility 
criteria for exceptional circumstances declarations. This was particularly 
the case after September 1994 when such declarations provided access to 
the Drought Relief Payment. In November 1994 alone, the Minister met with 
delegations from Wellington, Mudgee and the Hunter Region of New South 
Wales7. These groups provided anecdotal information but were 
insufficiently organised or resourced to have any real impact on the policy 
development process. 
7 The writer was present at these meetings. 
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Conclusion 
Australia's farmers have been very effectively represented in debates over 
economic policy and the NFF has been one of the most vocal proponents of 
economic reform. However, as an organisation which focuses on 
promoting the interests of the farm sector rather than individual farmers, the 
NFF was not active during the period under review in contributing to policy 
development in the area of farm poverty. Some of the NFF's constituent 
organisations have had a higher profile on welfare issues, notably NSW 
and Queensland -based bodies during the drought. Between 1989 and 
1998, welfare organisations were involved in delivering services to farm 
families in need, however, they did not promote the interests of this group in 
a policy sense beyond the occasional delegations to see the Minister by 
small regionally -based service providers. Although these smaller groups 
were very concerned about farm poverty, they were not sufficiently 
integrated into the policy making process to have any great influence over 
the direction of policy development. 
In the period between 1989 and 1998, the interests of Australian farmers in 
poverty were not well represented either by the bureaucracy or by the major 
interest groups that operate in Australia's policy community. The next 
chapter examines whether farmers' political representatives have been any 
more effective at responding to the needs of this group. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: POLITICAL PARTIES 
Between 1989 and 1998 poor farmers were not well served by either the 
major interest groups or the bureaucracy as watchdogs for their interests 
within the policy process. A further possible source of representation within 
Australian government is through the established and new political parties. 
For many years, farmers benefited from the political process which 
delivered a range of support programs to agriculture. The 1974 Green 
Paper describes "[c]ertain characteristics of the farming industries [which] 
give rise to greater government involvement than in other sectors of the 
economy ". These were: 
the "small scale competitive structure of farming "; 
price and production instability and "susceptibility to occasional, 
severe losses "; and 
the greater difficulty faced by farmers in adjusting to changing 
economic circumstances. (Harris et al. 1974, p24). 
Policy responses consisted of "measures for price support and stabilization, 
and policies designed to affect the economic structure of farming and the 
welfare of farmers" (Watson 1979, p159). Until the early 1970s, farmers' 
interests were very effectively served by (predominantly Coalition) 
Governments pursuing this interventionist line towards agriculture in which 
supporting farm incomes held a high priority. Farmers regarded the 
Whitlam Labor government, elected in 1972, as hostile to their interests, 
although a number of policy decisions, such as the 25 per cent reduction in 
tariffs, were welcomed by some farm groups. 
Following both the 1975 and 1977 elections, the Liberal Party had the 
numbers to govern in its own right and although the Coalition was retained, 
there is debate over the influence of the National Country Party within the 
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Fraser Government. Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser was a grazier and seen 
as largely sympathetic to farmers. Between 1983 and 1996 the farming 
community found itself again dealing with a Labor government and this was 
achieved most effectively through the National Farmers' Federation. The 
1996 election delivered the Liberals sufficient seats to govern in their own 
right consequently limiting the National Party's influence in government. It 
was not until the 1998 election and the shift of around one million votes to 
Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party that the concerns of rural Australia 
once again returned to prominence. 
One of the striking features of Australian rural politics is the apparent 
disjuncture between the voting patterns of farmers and the agricultural 
policy approaches taken by the various political parties. The sectionally 
based National Party has retained a high level of support while the Labor 
Party has been largely rejected by rural voters - even though the policy 
positions of these two parties are not vastly different. Malcolm argues that 
the differences in agricultural policies between the Liberal and Labor 
parties at the federal level are strikingly slight, compared with the 
overwhelming difference in allegiance accorded by farmers to these 
alternative governments. (Malcolm 1989, p132) 
More recently, Cockfield has noted that "[d]espite what the parties would 
claim, recent rural policy is characterised more by conformity than change 
associated with a change of government" (Cockfield 1997, p158). 
Nevertheless, farmers' voting patterns have impacted on the ability, and 
inclination, of the various parties to act as watchdogs for poor farmers. In 
addition, as economic liberalism has come to dominate policy making in the 
major parties, scope for adopting innovative approaches which address the 
needs of farmers in poverty has been reduced. 
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The National Party 
History 
The National Party of Australia first entered Australian politics in the early 
1920s as the Country Party of Australia. Set up as a voice for rural 
Australians, the Party grew out of farm interest groups which had been 
established from the mid -nineteenth century. Richmond argues that 
Many country people objected to the Labor Party and its talk of 
socialisation of land; but they also objected to the city domination of 
the larger non -Labor parties. (Richmond 1978, p104) 
The early Country Party therefore set out to establish itself as a third force in 
Australian politics. This position is clearly illustrated by the words of the first 
Country Party leader in the Commonwealth Parliament, W J McWilliams on 
10 March 1920: 
The Country Party is an independent body quite separate from the 
Nationalists and the Labor Party. We occupy our own rooms. We 
have appointed our own leader and other officers. We take no part in 
the deliberations of the Ministerialists or of the Opposition. We intend 
to support measures of which we approve and hold ourselves 
absolutely free to criticize or reject proposals with which we do not 
agree. Having put our hands to the wheel we set the course of our 
voyage. There has been no collusion; we crave no alliance; we 
spurn no support; we have no desire to harass the government, nor 
do we wish to humiliate the opposition. (quoted in Ellis 1963, p53) 
From the outset, the other non -Labor Party at the time, the Nationalists, 
were keen to enter some sort of Coalition arrangement with the Country 
Party. In 1923 the Bruce -Page Government was formed, but only after the 
Country Party leader Earle Page had made it clear that he could not work 
with Prime Minister Hughes, prompting Hughes to step aside in favour of 
Bruce (Ellis 1963, p97). The early coalitions were a long way from more 
recent agreements between the National Party and the Liberals, a 
relationship which has been described as "not a mere coalition but 
coalescence" (Sartori 1976, p188). The National Party was prepared to use 
its position to take on the Liberals when a matter of importance to their 
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constituency was seen to be at stake. Significant disputes arose during the 
1960s and 1970s over the distribution of electoral boundaries, the entry of 
the United Kingdom into the Common Market, the Report of the Committee 
of Economic Enquiry (the Vernon Report), Country Party leader McEwen's 
refusal to accept McMahon as Prime Minister following the death of Harold 
Holt, the revaluation of the Australian dollar and, in Opposition, over who 
was to be Deputy Opposition leader (Richmond 1978; Costar 1995). Once 
involved in coalition governments at the Commonwealth level, the Country 
Party was very effective at exercising policy power quite disproportionate to 
its level of representation (Whitwell 1995). The Country Party, later the 
National Country Party and then the National Party, has secured the key 
portfolios for agriculture whenever the coalition has been in government, 
notably Primary Industries and Trade. During the Menzies years, the 
Country Party Leader John McEwen was a particularly powerful member of 
Cabinet. Costar reports that 
Many contemporaries lamented that Menzies was too indulgent 
towards the Country Party in general and towards McEwen in 
particular. Especially on economic matters, in which Menzies was 
not strong, Liberals complained that he allowed McEwen too free a 
hand. (Costar 1995, p107) 
However, the Country Party and its successors have continued to 
differentiate the Party from the Liberals, ensuring the Party is seen as "part 
of government, but is not identified as government" (Jaensch 1997, p299). 
After its initial reluctance to be tied to another political party, the National 
Party has capitalised on the fact that the Liberal Party and its predecessors 
have so often relied on National Party numbers to form government. As 
Richmond argues 
The Country Party has enjoyed political strength far out of proportion 
to the independent strength of either its support in the electorate or its 
representation in parliament. By maintaining a coalition with the 
Liberal Party, the Country Party has been able to assure a grip upon 
senior government positions and have a deciding vote in policy 
considerations seen to be in its vital interest. (Richmond 1978, p108) 
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In its first half century of operations, the National Party was influential in 
achieving programs for farmers which included a solid component of 
income support. Drought support, rural reconstruction policies, non -means 
tested social security and powerful voices in Coalition Cabinets ensured 
that farmers in financial difficulty were likely to received some form of 
government support. Until the Coalition lost Government in 1972, the Party 
was "unashamedly interventionist" (Jupp 1968, p171) in areas of 
importance to farmers. Jupp describes its beliefs as "subsidies, guaranteed 
prices, producer -controlled marketing schemes, soldier settlement and the 
maintenance of uneconomic railways" adding that these policies were all 
"contrary to the inclinations of the tax -paying business community which 
supports the other non -Labor party" (Jupp 1968, p171). 
As noted, on returning to government in 1975, the National Party found itself 
in the position where the Liberals were able to govern in their own right 
without National Party support. There is some disagreement as to whether 
this greatly reduced National Party power within the Coalition. West argues 
that National Party power waned during this period, as farmers seeking to 
further their interests often dealt through their farm organisations directly 
with Fraser and other senior Liberal Party ministers: 
Given the structure of power within the Fraser ministries, and the 
policy making role of rural producer groups, the real political muscle 
could never lie with the minority National Country Party, however 
`specialist' it might claim to be in promoting rural interests. (West 
1980, p342). 
However, Shamsullah argues strongly that Fraser's empathy with farmers 
strengthened the National Party's position: 
Despite its junior status and the fact that its parliamentary support 
was not even needed by the Liberals between 1976 and 1980 the 
NCP [National Country Party] appeared exceptionally influential 
during the Fraser years. The personal compatibility of the senior 
National Party men, Doug Anthony, Ian Sinclair and Peter Nixon, 
with the pastoralist, Liberal prime minister and his reliance on their 
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advice, were important factors in the National Party's power to curtail 
cutbacks aimed at the rural sector. (Shamsullah 1994, p26) 
Marshall acknowledges this argument but suggests that Fraser's position 
also made the Liberal Party more attractive to rural interests, "a change 
backed by the efforts of Liberal members of the backbench Rural 
Committee, who worked hard to cultivate farm groups and who had by 1978 
formed close links with them" (Marshall 1985, p32). 
From 1983 to 1996, the National Party was in the historically unfamiliar 
position of being in Opposition and its ability to influence rural policy was 
nonexistent. National Party members made speeches in Parliament and 
participated in Committees of Inquiry into rural issues, however, the main 
avenue for farmers attempting to influence government policy was through 
the NFF. 
In 1996 the Coalition was returned to power, however, like 1975 and 1977, 
the Liberal Party had the numbers in the House of Representatives to 
govern in its own right. Nevertheless, National Party Ministers were 
appointed to the key "rural" portfolios of Primary Industries and Energy and 
Trade. If the farming community was anticipating a return to the policy 
approaches of the Country Party of the 1970s, it would have been 
disappointed. Jaensch suggests that the National Party was uncomfortable 
with the type of free market policies pursued by the Hawke and Keating 
Labor Governments and advocated by the Liberal Party. He writes 
Deregulation, privatisation, competition, and an emphasis on the 
market - the kernels of the policies of both major parties today - 
are the antithesis of traditional National Party policies. (Jaensch 
1997, p310) 
However, the National Party generally adopted the policy line put forward 
by the Howard Government (Costar 1997) except for occasional criticisms 
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from outspoken National Party backbenchers such as Ron Boswell, Bob 
Katter and De -Anne Kelly. 
It was a National Party Minister, John Anderson who made it clear to 
industry that he wished to see the end of interest rate subsidies through the 
Rural Adjustment Scheme (Macfarlane 2000, pers comm) and who 
terminated the Scheme which had run in various forms for over sixty years. 
On farm income support, the highly criticised Farm Household Support 
Scheme was replaced by Anderson with the Farm Family Restart Scheme, 
a program which in all its essential features was little different from those 
which had been run since 1989 and, in spite of the Minister's protestations 
to the contrary, remained a loan scheme. National Party control of the 
Primary Industries and Energy portfolio did not see any relaxation of 
eligibility criteria for the exceptional circumstances program and farm 
organisations remained of the view that the scheme was impossible to 
access (Craik 2000, pers comm). Rural and regional Australia gained 
increased attention from the government towards the end of the period 
under review and considerable sums of money were allocated through the 
Natural Heritage Trust, funded from the sale of a third of Telstra. 
As discussed in an earlier chapter, the change of Government in 1996 did 
not bring any notable changes to structural adjustment or farm welfare 
policy. The new schemes which were announced as part of the Agriculture 
- Advancing Australia package in 1997 were only incrementally different 
from their predecessors and remained based on the same economic 
philosophy. They continued to avoid addressing the key issues which were 
denying farmers access to a social welfare safety net. 
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Policies 
National Party policies are not easy to identify beyond the general intention 
that they operate in the interests of rural Australia. Mauldon and Schapper 
wrote in the early 1970s that "[t]raditionally the Country Party has not 
independently formulated and pursued its own national policy" (Mauldon 
and Schapper 1974, p91). This trend appears to have continued. The 
National Party's current (2000) party platform is not distinct from the 
Coalition platform. 
Woodward has argued that "[c]ategorising National Party policy is not an 
easy task since it is a strange blend of conservatism with support for radical 
government intervention in certain economic and social areas" (Woodward 
1985a, p61). Although it is generally agreed that the National Party has 
greatly influenced government policy direction in favour of rural people 
(Mauldon and Schapper 1974, p93; Richmond 1978, p108; Costar and 
Woodward 1985, p1; Woodward 1985a, p63; Sharman 1994, p147), it has 
done so "with piecemeal adjustment to society in favour of its supporting 
interests" (Jupp 1968, p162) rather than with a cohesive policy agenda. 
Costar suggests that the problem is one of identity: 
The [National] Party has ... been unsure of its social and ideological 
base: is it a farmers' party, a rural party, a regional party, a 
conservative party or, in the ... words of .. Tim Fischer, a progressive 
conservative party. (Costar 1994, p130) 
Jaensch has summarised National Party policy as follows: 
The party is totally committed to free enterprise, but is wholeheartedly 
in favour of government intervention in the affairs of rural, and in 
recent years, resource areas. It seems, then, quite ready and happy 
to combine free enterprise with rural socialism. (Jaensch 1997, p298) 
The National Party's Struggle to Survive 
The National Party's demise has been the subject of ongoing discussion 
over the years (Aitkin 1973, p424; Richmond 1978, p132; Malcolm 1989, 
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p134; Jaensch 1997, p293). The Party has recognised that demographic 
and economic trends have eroded its support base and in the mid -1970s 
attempted to broaden its appeal to attract urban voters. This venture, which 
Costar describes as "an unmitigated disaster" for the Party, was rejected by 
Tim Fischer when he became leader in 1990 (Costar 1994, p134). 
The Nationals have continued to deliver to the Coalition an important bloc 
of the rural vote. As noted above, the Nationals have been in Coalition with 
the Liberal Party and its predecessors almost since the Country Party was 
founded, with a few brief separations (such as during the "Joh for Canberra" 
campaign in 1987). This arrangement has endured in spite of distinct 
differences between the two parties. Jaensch argues that 
The Liberal and National parties, in fact, have very little in common. 
First the Liberal Party claims to be a national party, crossing all levels 
and sectors of society, and seeking to win support from all. The 
National Party is sectional and regional in social base, appeal and 
support. It is therefore antagonistic to the very raison d'etre of the 
Liberal Party. 
Second, the ideology, and the policies of the two parties are not just 
different, they are mutually antagonistic. And this became more 
obvious and more important as the Liberal Party took on more of a 
`dry' ideology. (Jaensch 1994, p96) 
Kelly suggests that, after 1993, the Nationals were no longer in the strong 
position they had held vis a vis the Liberals until the 1980s and that the 
party came to accept their "subservience" within the Coalition (Kelly 1994, 
p602). He writes that National Party leader Tim Fischer 
had to carry the Nationals to support tough free market policies, and 
he only achieved this with the traditional argument that the Nationals 
had no future outside the coalition. (Kelly 1994, p602) 
Costar sees the Nationals' policy position somewhat differently. Writing of 
Howard and Fischer, he argues that: 
In terms of economic ideology the two parties' leaders are as one in 
their commitment to the efficacy of the free market and the attendant 
virtues of economic deregulation. The Liberal Party has all but 
excised the social ameliorists from its ranks and the National Party 
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has jettisoned the industry protection policies of John McEwen. 
(Costar 1997, p135) 
Henderson agrees, suggesting in 1995 that "Katter and Boswell aside, 
Liberals and Nationals fit better in a policy sense than perhaps ever before" 
(Henderson 1995, p86). In the latter part of the period under review 
De -Anne Kelly could also be mentioned as a dissenting voice. However, as 
Jupp observed in the mid- 1960s, "[w]ith monotonous regularity the Country 
Party has refused offers of amalgamation" (Jupp 1968, p160) and this 
continues to be the case. 
Mauldon and Schapper wrote in the early 1970s that 
Each of Australia's three major political parties, the Australian Labor 
Party, Liberal Party, and the Country Party has rural policies and 
rural adherents. However, only the Country Party, formed soon after 
World War I, and with origins in farmers' and settlers' associations, 
has as its central interest the benefits of farmers and rural people. 
(Mauldon and Schapper 1974, p91) 
While the National Party's rhetoric continues to present its objectives in 
terms of being the sole true representative of farmers and rural people, in 
recent years that claim has become less convincing. Verrall et al observe 
that "the National Party has by no means a monopoly of the conservative 
rural vote" (Verrall et al. 1985, p9) and they suggest that "National Party 
seats are not typically rural and indeed ... there is no typical National Party 
electorate" (Verrall et al. 1985, p11). Following the 1998 election, Labor 
and the Liberal Party could each claim to hold more rural seats than the 
National Party. In this context it is interesting to note Costar's observation 
that "the National Party once having lost a seat rarely manages to regain it" 
(Costar 1994, p132). 
As a watchdog for poor farmers during the period under review, the 
National Party was arguably ineffective. Between 1989 and 1996 this was 
partly due to its position in Opposition but it also reflected the broad 
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bipartisan agreement discussed earlier about the appropriate direction for 
rural policy. After the 1996 election, the apparent shift in National Party 
policies towards a more free market orientation and its partnership with the 
Liberal Party in government has meant that it has not returned to the focus 
on farm incomes which was a key feature of its policies in earlier coalitions. 
The Liberal Party 
The Liberal Party is the most recently formed of Australia's three major 
political parties, having been founded by Menzies in 1944. During the early 
years, the Party was pragmatic and non -ideological (Sharman 1994, p142), 
aiming to represent the "middle" classes of Australia which did not identify 
with either of the two sectionally based parties, Labor or the Country Party 
(Starr 1978, p25). Jaensch suggests that the Liberal Party's "traditional 
view of itself" is 
that it integrates, represents and serves the interests of all people, 
and all economic interests. It claims to be non -sectional in supports 
or policies, to be beholden to no specific group in society, and to 
represent the `national interest'. (Jaensch 1997, p288) 
A less charitable reading of the Party is provided by Tiver who suggests that 
The collective image of the Liberal Party is one of a rather mindless 
party that supports the interests of business and the rich, and is 
supported by them; that it is clever and pragmatic enough to deceive 
middle class voters; that only pays lip- service to true liberal 
principles; and that is loose and amorphous in organization, yet 
remorselessly efficient at election time. (Tiver 1978, p2) 
Starr suggests that there is "a significant section in the community, drawn 
from all soci.l and economic groupings, that finds political expression 
through the Liberal Party" (Starr 1978, p45). This support base includes 
farmers, particularly the more affluent graziers. 
The Liberal Party's image began to change in the 1980s. Jaensch 
observes that "[t]he Liberal Party, prior to the 1980s, had never been forced 
to declare itself ideologically" (Jaensch 1997, p285). Rather, it had been 
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the "protector of the status quo or pragmatic reformer of the free enterprise 
system" (Kelly 1994, p98). Following the election loss in 1983 and the 
resignation of Malcolm Fraser, a debate emerged within party ranks 
between the so- called "wets" and "dries ". The wets comprised those 
members who held "small I" liberal views which included socially 
progressive attitudes and which did not completely reject the possibility of 
Government intervention in the economy. The dries, by contrast were 
influenced by the neo- classical economic views of Hayek and Friedman, 
placing great faith in the market place as producing the most efficient 
economic outcomes. This latter group also included in its ranks a large 
number of social conservatives, such as John Howard, prompting Liberal 
"wet" and former shadow Minister Chris Puplick to write that the party's "faith 
in the economic `market' is so rarely matched by faith in the personal 
`market'. Some Liberals want to be out of anyone's boardroom but into 
everyone's bedroom..." (Puplick 1994, p6). Jaensch points out that there 
had always been "latent ideological tensions" of this nature within the party 
but there had not previously been an opportunity for them to be aired 
(Jaensch 1997, p283). Over the course of the 1980s the economic "dries" 
within the party began to dominate. After the 1987 election campaign dry 
candidates began to replace leading wets in Liberal preselection contests 
(Jaensch 1994, p172) and by April 1987, the wet influence in shadow 
Cabinet had been "consigned to impotence" on the backbench (Kelly 1994, 
p321.) 
The shift in the focus of the Liberal Party towards a position described by 
Puplick as "a purely economic model of society" (Puplick 1994, p6) 
culminated in Dr John Hewson's leadership and the production of the 
detailed and comprehensive, neo- liberal blueprint for Australia, Fightback!. 
Fightback did not address rural issues in any detail. It suggested some 
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savings that could be made in the primary industries portfolio (Liberal and 
National Parties of Australia 1991, p270) and one of the seven "cameos" 
outlining the impact of the package on families was of "John and Valerie & 
Three Children: Farmers, Central North Queensland ". This example 
explained how changes to the family allowance, the zone rebate and tax 
cuts would make this family better off (Liberal and National Parties of 
Australia 1991, p308). No policies were outlined in the areas of drought, 
income support or rural adjustment. 
Sharman observes that "[a] commitment to a set of economic policies with 
intellectual coherence was new to the Liberal Party ", and that "[w]hatever 
their intrinsic merits, ... [the Fightback] policies cast the Liberals in the 
unfamiliar role of arguing for more substantial change than the ALP" 
(Sharman 1994, p144). Following the loss of the "unlosable" 1993 election, 
the party revised the presentation of its political agenda and proceeded to 
win the 1996 election on the basis of a very general policy platform. 
However, once the Coalition was in Government, it was clear that economic 
liberalism continued to dominate the policy approach. 
As mentioned, the Liberals have consistently attracted support from graziers 
who have been represented in the upper echelons of the party along with 
businessmen and "members of the higher professions such as law, 
architecture or engineering ". It is worth noting that at one stage, six of the 
twelve members of Fraser's Cabinet were graziers, including the Prime 
Minister himself (Tiver 1978, p52). In the current parliament, the Liberal 
Party holds more rural seats that the National Party (Macfarlane 2000). 
Nevertheless the current government has continued the tradition that when 
the Coalition has been in Government, the Primary Industries and Trade 
portfolios have tended to be held by a National Party Minister. Although the 
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Liberal Party has at times had its own Rural Committee, as an advocate on 
farm issues it is very much overshadowed by its smaller partner. National 
Party agitation has contributed to Government moves such as the 
Productivity Commission's inquiry into the impact of the National 
Competition Policy on rural Australia. As far as farm poverty has been 
concerned, the Liberal Party has left what little policy has been developed 
in this area to the responsible, National Party, Minister. 
In 1994, the Coalition released a policy statement "The Things that Matter", 
setting out the goals of the Liberal and National Parties ". The section 
entitled "Helping Farmers" argued that "our farming communities' proud 
heritage has been threatened by the policies of the Labor Government" 
(Liberal and National Parties of Australia 1994, p20). However, the goals 
outlined were little different from the policies being pursued by that 
government. The first goal was to "make farming more competitive and 
profitable" and others referred to the need for income -smoothing 
mechanisms (such as income equalisation deposits) to help farmers 
manage downturns and a recognition that severe drought was an 
exceptional circumstance that warranted government assistance. 
The Australian Labor Party 
Farmers have not looked to the Labor Party to represent their interests and 
indeed it was largely the Labor Party and all that it represented that spurred 
farm interests to organise the first country parties in Australia's parliaments 
(Maddox 1985, p259). This antipathy to the Labor Party does not appear to 
be based on the content of the Party's rural policies. As Warhurst points 
out, "many of the ALP's rural policies comprise a political agenda which is 
shared by the Liberal Party and the NFF if not by the National Party" 
[Warhurst, 1990 #254, p121. From an analysis of census data, Verral et al 
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conclude that the coalition parties "draw support from lower range 
socio- economic electorates which in a metropolitan context might be 
expected to favour the ALP "(Verrall et al. 1985, p11) They conclude though 
that 
The ALP can make little headway against the ideological hegemony 
of `country- mindedness', precisely because it is seen as the electoral 
vehicle of the enemies of `country- mindedness'. ...lt is beyond the 
pale -a party of deviants and outsiders." (Verrall et al. 1985, p21) 
In 1983, the new Labor Primary Industry Minister John Kerin posed the 
question "why don't country people vote Labor", observing that 
The answer does not lie in the rural policies Labor has proposed, 
and when in government implemented; despite ostensible 
differences in their rationale, there has been a striking similarity 
between the policies proposed by the Labor Party and the National 
Country Party. (Kerin 1983, p54) 
As a consequence, Gerritsen writes that in the Hawke government "[tjhere 
was a feeling amongst the Labor party's key strategists that farmers were 
never going to vote Labor and therefore did not justify wooing" (Gerritsen 
1987, p49). 
For most of the first century of Federation, farmers did not need to deal with 
the Labor Party. Having written the Party off as unsympathetic and 
representing all that farmers reject about urban society, rural Australia was 
in the happy position that for many years their interests were served at the 
Commonwealth level by National Party Ministers in Coalition governments. 
The first major shock came wth the election in 1972 of the Whitlam 
government. Maddox writes that "the Whitlam government was the first truly 
urban -orientated [sic] government in Australia's history" and he suggests 
that this generated a "rural backlash" (Maddox 1978, p271). In spite of 
having a "very able and highly regarded Minister for Agriculture in Ken 
Wriedt" (Martin 1990, p159), the government was regarded with great 
suspicion and it reinforced rural prejudices by proceeding with a series of 
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policy decisions which were very unpopular with farmers. These included 
the revaluation of the Australian dollar, reduced funding for wool research 
and promotion, reductions in rural subsidies and concessions and the end 
of the superphosphate bounty (Lucy 1975, p197). Maddox argues that not 
all rural groups were entirely critical: 
Some sections of rural industry were indeed prepared to recognise 
that Labor's administration was quite sound. The cultivation of new 
overseas markets for primary produce, the reserve -price wool 
scheme, the renegotiation of the wheat -stabilisation plan and the 
initiative of the Green Paper reporting on all aspects of rural policy in 
Australia were all received with favour. (Maddox 1978, p271) 
However, the organisation representing graziers, and therefore more 
inclined towards a free trade position, was very negative about the Whitlam 
Government. In his Presidential address to the 1975 Convention of the 
Australian Woolgrowers' and Graziers' Council, Mr EPS Roberts referred to 
the "anti -rural Government in Canberra" and criticised the Government's 
reaction to the high levels of inflation and interest rates and the policy of 
wage indexation. He made no mention of tariff reductions and did not 
suggest that there were any areas in which the Labor Government's rural 
policies were sound (Roberts 1975). 
The real challenge for farmers, however, came after 1983 when the 
National Party was in Opposition for thirteen years and farmers had no 
choice but to deal with the Labor Party if they hoped to achieve any of their 
policy objectives. There is disagreement about the success of the Hawke 
government in working with farmers. Martin argues that 
The Hawke period must be regarded as being one of successful 
management of rural policy in both political and economic terms. Not 
only was the natural antipathy between farmers and a Labor 
government successfully managed, but a substantial degree of 
agreement on policy reform was achieved. (Martin 1990, p176) 
By contrast, Gerritsen suggests that Labor neither understood nor controlled 
the rural policy "agenda" (Gerritsen 1987, p47). He further argues that "the 
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government and the farmers [had] diametrically opposed views as to 
solutions for the crisis" (Gerritsen 1987, p55). This latter position is hard to 
sustain given that the NFF was a leading advocate of market economics, a 
position a long way removed from the pre -NFF farm organisations' 
interventionist tendencies and quite consistent with the "economic 
rationalist approach" (Martin 1990, p160) pursued by John Kerin as Minister 
for Primary Industry in the Hawke government. There is little doubt that the 
relationship between the Labor government and the NFF was strained 
during the presidency of Ian McLachlan. However, these tensions were not 
the result of fundamental disagreements over the direction of rural policy - 
they were related to the NFF's and McLachlan's position on Australia's 
industrial relations system. Hawke and Keating reportedly regarded 
McLachlan as a "political enemy" (Kelly 1994, 257) and the NFF's high 
profile involvement in the Mudginberri dispute was certainly not likely to 
endear the organisation to a Labor government. Once McLachlan had 
departed from the NFF, its relationship with the government settled down. 
Former NFF Executive Director, Rick Farley describes the high profile 
antagonism between Hawke and Keating and McLachlan as "a storm in a 
teacup" (Farley 2000, pers comm). 
Although the NFF approved of the general direction of Labor's rural 
policies, a number of key decisions generated criticism from rank and file 
farmers. The decision to remove drough' from the Natural Disaster Relief 
Arrangements was roundly criticised, with calls for its reinstatement 
continuing for a number of years. In evidence to the Senate Rural and 
Regional Affairs Committee in 1994, United Graziers Association President 
Larry Acton commented that "[i]f a drought like this, which is an exceptional 
circumstance, Is not a natural disaster, I do not know what is" (Senate Rural 
and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee 1994a, p1515). 
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There was also dissatisfaction with the explicit loan nature of the Farm 
Household Support Scheme and, during the worsening drought in 1994, 
the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, Senator Bob Collins came 
under attack over the "lines on maps" which distinguished between those 
farmers eligible for exceptional circumstances drought assistance and 
those who were not. Although at a personal level Collins established a 
good rapport with farmers and their representatives, it was clear that the 
farming community could not forget that it was dealing with a Labor 
government. 
One of the final major policy initiatives of the Labor government which 
continues to generate concern in rural Australia was the commissioning of 
the Hilmer Report into National Competition Policy (Hilmer et al. 1993) and 
the subsequent establishment of the National Competition Council with its 
program of legislative review. Of particular concern to farmers was the 
review of statutory marketing arrangements and, for graingrowers, the 
review of the export monopoly powers (single desk) of the Australian Wheat 
Board. The report found schemes involving production controls, 
compulsory acquisition, price fixing and monopoly marketing arrangements 
to be "grossly inefficient" (Hilmer et al. 1993, p143). The Committee also 
noted that 
notwithstanding some encouraging process, there appears to be a 
substantial agenda of important potential reforms in relation to the 
many regulatory restrictions operating in the agricultural marketing 
area. (Hilmer et al. 1993, p144) 
In the lead up to the 1996 election, the Grains Council of Australia was 
quick to lobby both sides of politics to obtain guarantees that the review of 
the Wheat Board's monopoly powers would be at the end of the program of 
legislative review, not the beginning. A draft report of the review into the 
single desk arrangements was released for public comment in October 
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2000 - interestingly the draft did not include any recommendations (Irving 
et al. 2000). 
Overall, the Labor party could never act as an effective watchdog for poor 
farmers. As Gerritsen writes, the 
Active and partisan hostility amongst the clientele [of rural policy] 
obviously complicates the uncertainty of the policy making process 
for [a] Labor government. ...Labor cannot be allowed to be seen as 
solving agricultural industry problems. (Gerritsen 1987, p54) 
However, it should be noted that in John Kerin and later Bob Collins, the 
Labor Party had Ministers with a real understanding of and genuine interest 
in rural policy. 
Australian Democrats 
The Australian Democrats were founded in 1977 by disaffected Liberal Don 
Chipp. Chipp brought together the remnants of the Australia Party along 
with members of the New Liberal Movement (Warhurst 1997). The 
Democrats have positioned themselves as "a party of the middle ground" 
(Bean 1997, p81) attracting support mostly in urban and metropolitan areas 
(Jaensch 1997, 321). As a "new politics or postmaterialíst party" (Bean 
1997, p81), the Democrats are unlikely to appeal to farmers and therefore to 
be sought out as a political advocate of their concerns. 
However, the Democrats' social justice focus has led Senators to speak on 
behalf of poor farmers in language strikingly similar to that used by the 
National Party. During the debate on the Farm Household Support 
Scheme in 1992 then Deputy Leader of the Democrats, Senator Meg Lees 
questioned the direction of the Government's rural policy arguing that 
RAS 92 and the Farm Household Support Scheme took Australia "further 
along the economic rationalist path in agriculture ". She continued, "[t]he 
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Democrats question whether that is a sensible thing to do -- encouraging In 
economic, social and environmental terms what is really a disaster" (Lees 
1992). Reflecting the Democrat's rejection of big business, their social 
justice focus and their concern about the environment, Senator Lees 
highlighted two different approaches to agricultural policy: 
Two competing visions have emerged of the future of agriculture. 
The first, often referred to as sustainable agriculture, calls for 
economic and social initiatives to protect the environment and family 
farms. This approach emphasises the use of public policy to promote 
economically secure family farms and rural communities; to preserve 
soil, water and biodiversity; and to use farming practices which are 
less chemically and energy intensive - without rejecting technology. 
The opposing view is the free market, free trade or deregulatory 
approach which pursues economic efficiency above all else to 
deliver crops and livestock at the lowest possible prices. Almost all 
social, environmental and health costs are, to use the economic 
jargon, externalised. In other words, they are left out of the price and 
paid for not directly by the buyer but by taxpayers and, in some 
cases, future generations. (Lees 1992) 
The Democrats were critical of the loan nature of the Farm Household 
Support Scheme, rejecting the Government's argument that grants were 
likely to act as subsidies to uneconomic businesses. They saw household 
support payments for farmers as "a basic human right" arguing that "it is 
surely one of the fundamental tenets of social justice that people are 
supported in times of need" (Lees 1992). 
In 1993, Senator Woodley rejected the view of the Democrats as a political 
party which is not interested in rural issues. He wrote 
Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, we take a great 
interest in rural issues and we don't just sit in our city offices thinking 
about them. We do a lot of travelling in country areas, looking at 
matters in our portfolio areas. (Woodley 1993, p10) 
Woodley reported that the Democrats had proposed a number of measures 
to assist rural Australia including debt restructuring, regional development 
planning, re- regulation of the Australian dollar and f nancial markets and 
the selective use of tariffs, tax incentives, value adding and other "positive 
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industry intervention measures" (Woodley 1993, p10). In 1994, Woodley 
expressed his concern that the Government's rural policy approach was to 
"mitigate the effects of rural decline rather than arresting or reversing it". He 
called for 
a political commitment that says that we really do believe in the bush; 
that we do believe in the country areas of Australia, that we do 
believe in rural industry; that we do believe in rural communities; and 
that we are going to make a commitment that will enable them not 
only to survive, but to grow and to make the contribution which we 
know they are capable of making to this great country. (Woodley 
1994). 
The Democrats, while sympathetic to the plight of poor farmers, are 
ineffective in generating policy change when faced with broad agreement 
between the major parties on policy direction. Even when the major parties 
do not agree, the Democrats cannot necessarily get their amendments 
accepted. In an extraordinary example, the Democrats moved an 
amendment in the Committee stage of the Farm Household Support 
Second Reading debar to alter the FHS payments from a loan to a grant. 
Although "it would be the coalition's policy to move towards grants and [it] 
would certainly intend to do that following the next election ", the Opposition 
did not support the amendment on the grounds that it was "sick and tired of 
amending the Government's mistakes in legislation" and also "[tjhe National 
Farmers' Federation was not consulted about these amendments" 
(Tambling 1992). 
Minor Political Parties 
Pauline Hanson's One Nation 
Pauline Hanson rose to prominence with her maiden speech in the House 
of Representatives on 10 September 1996. The new member for Oxley 
delivered "one of the most explosive addresses yet heard in an Australian 
Parliament" (Henderson 1998, p15). She quickly gained media attention as 
well as applause from groups such as the Australian League of Rights 
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(Pasquarelli 1998, p325). Ms Hanson's maiden speech contained no 
reference to rural issues but did include populist economic positions such 
as advocating protection and opposing privatisation of Australian "icons" 
such as Qantas and Telstra (Hanson 1996). 
Ms Hanson later become involved in debate on some rural issues. For 
example, in 1998, Australian pork producers faced considerable pressure 
following the Government's decision to lift quarantine restrictions on the 
importation of pig meat into Australia. Pauline Hanson raised this issue in 
Parliament, using it as an example of the problems of free trade. In 
language which would have appealed to traditional National Party 
supporters, Hanson described the pork industry as "mostly made up of 
family farms and ... perhaps one of the best examples of Australian farming 
as a small business ". She went on to state that "[u]nfortunately the years of 
hard work, personal and financial commitment and dogged determination 
have suffered at the hands of uncaring government policy" (Hanson 1998). 
While Hanson's claim that `rural and regional voters are deserting the 
National Party in droves" (Hanson 1997) was an overstatement, in 1998 
private party polling in then Deputy Leader of the National Party, John 
Anderson's rural NSW seat of Gwydir showed that 49 per cent of voters 
intended to vote for One Nation (Kingston 1999b, p xvii). 
As a watchdog for farmers, the One Nation Party is not particularly effective, 
in fact its intervention on an issue can be counter productive. In the case of 
the pork industry cited above, Pauline Hanson's statements in Parliament 
came at a time when the pork industry's peak body, the Pork Council of 
Australia (PCA) was engaged in negotiations with the Government over 
possible safeguard actions under the World Trade Organisation. The 
involvement of Hanson on the issue ensured that Pauline Hanson, One 
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Nation and the pig industry came to be grouped together. As a result, the 
very real concerns of the industry were marginalised as the politics of 
attacking One Nation became tied up with the rejection of calls for support 
for the pork industry. The PCA's position has since been vindicated by the 
findings of a Productivity Commission inquiry but in 1997 and 1998 the 
plight of the industry was unlikely to be taken up by any other political party 
once it was seen as a One Nation cause (Ramsay 2000, pers comm). 
The League of Rights 
A feature of rural Australia since the 1960s has been the existence of the 
League of Rights, described by Warhurst as the "right -wing fringe of 
Australian politics ... which capitalises on rural discontent and poverty" 
(Warhurst 1990, p121). Although not strictly a political party, in that it seeks 
to subvert rather than participate in the political process, the League of 
Rights has been an important force in rural Australia. The League is an 
extremist, right -wing anti -semitic organisation, described by Campbell as 
"semi- clandestine" (Campbell 1978, p96). From 1967, the organisation 
targeted rural Australia as "the most conducive area of operations" and its 
publications "attempted to exploit and intensify the division between the 
rural area and the cities, and depicted the cities as parasitical upon the 
country areas" (Campbell 1978, p11). The League had an active policy of 
infiltration of farming organisations and community organisations as well as 
political parties, particularly the Country Party. 
The mainstream political parties have given the League of Rights a very 
wide berth with all parties distancing themselves from the organisation and 
its objectives. In 1995 Graeme Campbell, the maverick ALP member for the 
Western Australian seat of Kalgoorlie cause concern in his party over a 
number of issues including his "attendance at meetings of such groupings 
as Australian Against Further Immigration and the League of Rights" 
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(Keating 1995). He was disendorsed by the Party on 1 December 1975. 
Even Pauline Hanson's supporters were keen to disassociate themselves 
from the League (Pasquarelli 1998, p242). Government Ministers are very 
careful to avoid contact with any of the League's front organisations which 
have included over the years the Lilac (Ladies in Line Against Communism) 
League, the Christian Institute for Individual Freedom, the Institute of 
Economic Democracy, the Australian Heritage Society, the Conservative 
Speakers Clubs, the Queensland -based Save our State Organisation 
(Campbell 1978, p90) and, more recently, the Rural Action Movement. 
The League of Rights speaks the language of agrarian fundamentalism 
and appeals to the socially conservative farmers who see big government, 
big business and the city as the root of all evil. Campbell lists "farmers and 
primary producers" as the number one category of "persons who are 
typically attracted to join or are predisposed to support the League of 
Rights" (Campbell 1978, pp93 -94). Although not important as a watchdog 
for poor farmers due to its fringe status within the policy community, the 
League does provide a sympathetic forum for the disaffected rural poor. 
Conclusion 
Watson writes that "Australian rural policies do not have a clear 
party -political character" (Watson 1979, p171) and this can be seen in the 
fact that only incremental changes were made by the incoming Coalition 
government to the rural adjustment and welfare programs in place under 
Labor. Nevertheless, farmers as a group reject the Labor party as 
unsympathetic and lacking in understanding of the farm sector. Watson 
observes that 
The political allegiances of farmers seem to depend more on 
generalized opposition to the urban orientation of the ALP, 
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particularly with respect to social issues and its links with the trade 
unions, than to its agricultural policy per .se. (Watson 1979, p171) 
By contrast, Verrall et al suggest that "[t]he ability of the [National] party to 
attract electoral support is impressive especially given its evident lack of 
success in achieving its major policy objectives. "(Verrall et al. 1985, p18) 
None of Australia's political parties is a particularly effective watchdog for 
farm welfare issues. Farmers' overwhelming antipathy towards the Labor 
Party is not conducive to the development of strong sympathy within that 
party towards rural causes, although it must be noted that probably the most 
generous scheme of the decade under review, the Drought Relief Payment, 
was introduced by a Labor Government. As Lawrence points out, Labor's 
motivation for assistance is one of social equity (Lawrence 1987, p77), or in 
the language of the early 1990s, social justice. As noted, the Democrats 
have also spoken out on farm welfare issues on social justice grounds. 
The "farmers' friend ", the National Party, has continued to promote an 
agrarian ideology, or "countrymindedness" (Craig and Phillips 1983; 
Verrall et al. 1985; Duncan and Epps 1992), while pursuing a strong 
anti- welfare, anti -union position, and the party's coalition partner has 
increasingly adopted economic liberalism as its guiding philosophy over 
the course of the 1980s and 1990s. The Party has also lost its electoral 
strength with the Liberals holding more rural seats in the current Parliament. 
Accordingly, the National Party has not proved particularly effective at 
representing farmers in poverty. It is worth noting that within the ranks of the 
National Party there are a few outspoken members who have criticised the 
Coalition's policy direction, notably Ron Boswell, Bob Katter and De -Anne 
Kelly. However, It is suggested that the role of these backbenchers is as a 
"safety- valve" for discontent within the party. As Eyestone has suggested, 
"[b]eing a maverick is tolerated best, whether in a legislative setting or in 
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administrative circles, when it is seen as harmless (and ineffectual) 
eccentricity" (Eyestone 1978, p37). 
As has been demonstrated earlier, between 1989 and 1998 successive 
governments made only incremental changes to programs intended to 
support farmers in poverty. The major political parties pursued similar 
policy approaches based on improving the productivity of the farm sector 
and providing income support within the context of structural adjustment 
policies. The reluctance of farmers to trade their vote between the major 
parties has undoubtedly reduced the inclination of the parties to give higher 
priority to farm poverty issues. The Democrats have attempted to raise 
social justice issues related to income support but without the support of 
one of the major parties, they are unable to influence policy. As noted 
above, any moves by Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party to act on behalf of 
poor farmers have proved to be counter productive, however since the 1998 
election, support for Ms Hanson has seen the major parties refocus their 
attention on the concerns of rural and regional Australia. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: COUNTRYMINDEDNESS AND ECONOMIC 
LIBERALISM: THE ROLE OF IDEAS AND VALUES IN POLICY 
MAKING 
One of the themes which emerges when examining the policy approaches 
of the Commonwealth public service, the National Farmers' Federation and 
other interest groups, and the political parties in the period under review is 
the strong influence of economic liberalism. As is often the case when a 
powerful ideology has become entrenched within policy circles (Doern and 
Phidd 1983; Hall 1989a; Goldstein and Keohane 1993), the pervasiveness 
of this framework for policy development meant that there was little scope 
for policies to be developed based on alternative assumptions. In the case 
of farm poverty, the policy process resulted in the development of complex 
programs which were inappropriate for tackling the problem at hand. The 
economic approach failed to take account of the non- economic factors 
influencing farmer behaviour and demonstrated a limited capacity to 
incorporate non -economic values into the policy development process. 
In 1970, Henry Schapper wrote: 
At the one and the same time in Australia, there is need for efficient 
farming and there is concern for inadequate income farmers. But 
there is no political or economic mechanism which automatically 
ensures harmony between efficiency and welfare. This can be 
resolved only by government policy. (Schapper 1970, p91) 
In recent years this balance appears to have been resolved in favour of 
economic efficiency. The domination of policy- making by economic logic 
has tended to create an impression that the resulting policies are value free 
and therefore objective. However, this objectivity is an illusion. As will be 
discussed shortly, the economic model informing the version of economics 
which became known in Australia as "economic rationalism" is based on 
particular assumptions about human behaviour and desirable outcomes 
which are not often made explicit (Blandy 1992, p105). Governments have 
been vague about the type of agriculture which will result from these policy 
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approaches, continuing to employ the rhetoric of the family farm while 
pursuing economic policies which are more advantageous to corporate and 
larger- than -family farmers (Lawrence 1987). The ability of government to 
pursue these policies with the agreement of the NFF has been furthered by 
the tendency of farmers to respond to the images and rhetoric of 
self -reliance and the free market, many of which economic liberalism 
shares with agrarianism. 
The three previous chapters of this study have examined the role of key 
policy players and, following Lindblom, their role as watchdogs for poor 
farmers. The policy approaches of the DPIE, the NFF and the major political 
parties have been underpinned by a commitment to economic liberalism. 
Goldstein and Keohane suggest that "policy outcomes can be explained 
only when interests and power are combined with a rich understanding of 
human beliefs" (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, p13). In order to do this, this 
chapter examines the key components of agrarianism and economic 
liberalism and, taking a more normative approach, suggests that the policy 
process needs to take account of all relevant values if effective solutions to 
farm poverty are to be developed. 
In discussing economic policy, it is easy to divert the debate from the main 
point to disagreement over terminology. "Economic rationalism" has often 
been used in Australia in a pejorative manner and, as Freebairn has 
pointed out, the term lacks precision, having never been clearly defined 
(Freebairn 1993, p43). This chapter will therefore only use the term in direct 
quotations. Fred Argy has described the views of the "great bulk of the 
economics profession" as constituting a belief that 
governments should generally interfere as little as possible with price 
relativities, and should expose the economy as much as possible to 
the disciplines of competition: this is because they are of the view 
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that in the long run it will tend to promote a more efficient allocation of 
resources, a better climate for technological and product innovation 
and higher average living standards (Argy 1992, p152). 
This chapter will encompass this set of beliefs in the term "economic 
liberalism ", suggesting a general preference for market solutions to policy 
problems. 
Values and Ideas in the Policy Process 
In his study of the policy development process in the United States, 
Kingdon examines a range of factors which come together as policy. 
Among these are values and ideas. Kingdon suggests that "in our 
preoccupation with power and influence, political scientists sometimes 
neglect the importance of content" ( Kíngdon 1995. p127). He goes on to 
argue that sometimes ideas "turn out to be as important as political 
pressure" (Kingdon 1995, p143). Moore agrees, writing that "ideas matter", 
because "they establish the contexts within which policy debates are 
conducted, organizational activities are rendered coherent and meaningful, 
and people's actions are animated and directed" (Moore 1988, p78). 
Values can influence every stage of the policy development process from 
agenda setting to implementation. As Hogwood and Gunn observe, "what 
policy makers define as problems and how they define them will be deeply 
influenced by the values they bring to the policy- making process" 
( Hogwood and Gunn 1984, p113). Reich writes of being 
struck by how much the initial definition of problems and choices 
influences the subsequent design and execution of public policies. 
The act of raising the salient public questions ... is often the key step, 
because it subsumes the value judgments that declare something to 
be a problem, focuses public attention on the issue, and frames the 
ensuing public debate. (Reich 1988, p5) 
Kingdon concurs, arguing that 
[t]he values one brings to an observation play a substantial role in 
problem definition. A mismatch between the observed conditions 
and one's conception of an ideal state becomes a problem. (Kingdon 
1995, p110) 
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These values are an amalgam of personal views, organisational priorities 
and prevailing economic and social theories. 
Sir Geoffrey Vickers describes the concept of "appreciative systems" which 
he argues are "a set of readinesses to distinguish some aspects of the 
situation rather than others and to classify and value these in this way rather 
than that" (Vickers 1965, p67). He goes on to argue that "these readinesses 
have to be learned; and like all learning, they are necessarily limiting, as 
well as enabling" (Vickers 1965, p68). Within a bureaucracy, these 
appreciative systems are developed in officials as they move through their 
careers or, as Self writes, "Departmental philosophy appears to spread by 
osmosis among participants and to produce a kind of collective personality" 
(Self 1977, p92). 
It is therefore important to review the ideas which directed the policy debate 
during the period under review in order to understand why policies were 
shaped the way they were and how farmers were likely to respond. 
Economic Liberalism - a dominant idea? 
Doern and Phidd argue that there are three levels of normative content in 
public policy: ideologies, dominant ideas or paradigms, and objectives. 
Ideologies are the broad, umbrella sets of beliefs that serve to provide 
political and social identity to their adherents (Doern and Phidd 1983, p51). 
Paradigms provide " a series of principles or assumptions which guide 
action and suggest solutions within a given policy field ", while objectives 
relate to more specific issues within a policy field (Doern and Phidd 1983, 
pp57 -58). 
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During the 1980s and 1990s in Australia, economic liberalism was the 
prime idea or paradigm in the rural policy community. In common with 
many government departments in Canberra, DPIE policy was developed 
within this intellectual framework, as were the policies of the NFF and the 
major political parties. Even the National Party became more comfortable 
with such a policy line, particularly under the leadership of Tim Fischer. 
Head describes the economic approach as follows 
The ideology of `economic rationalism' derives from the a priori 
assumptions of neo- classical economic theory. In particular, it 
assumes that market forces typically unleash growth, innovation and 
efficiency, whereas governmental regulations and expenditures 
typically impede growth, stifle productivity and entrepreneurship, and 
generate inefficiencies in both the private and public sectors. (Head 
1988, p466) 
Whitwell writes that the distinguishing characteristic of the so- called 
economic rationalists was "a basic confidence in the workings of the market 
mechanism" ( Whitwell 1994, p222). Economic liberalism is based on a set 
of assumptions about the operation of the economy - in essence that 
economic agents are utility -maximisers and the market mechanism is the 
most efficient means for allocating scarce resources. 
McTaggart et al define efficiency as follows: 
When economic efficiency has been achieved, production costs 
are as low as possible, and consumers want the combination of 
goods and services that is being produced. Three distinct conditions 
produce economic efficiency. They are: efficient production, efficient 
consumption, and efficient exchange. 
Efficient production is achieved when each firm produces its output at 
the least possible cost. Efficient consumption is achieved when 
everyone buys the goods and services that make them best off, by 
their own evaluations. And efficient exchange is achieved when 
everyone is specializing to earn a living by doing the job that gives 
them the highest possible income. ( McTaggart et al. 1996, p13 ) 
On such a definition it is worth noting, as Etzioni points out, that efficiency is 
a value, just like equity or fairness (Etzioni 1988, p245). With respect to 
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family farming the behaviour that follows from these assumptions would see 
farmers transferring from farming into other forms of economic activity if the 
rate of return elsewhere outstripped the returns to capital in farming. 
In his controversial study of members of the Commonwealth Senior 
Executive Service, Pusey described the impact of "economic rationalism" as 
a "locust strike" sweeping Canberra (Pusey 1991, p1). Described by one 
reviewer as an "intellectual lightning rod" (Bell 1993, p387), the book 
generated much debate over the role of economists in policy development 
(Argy 1992; Blandy 1992; Bell 1993; King and Lloyd 1993; Rees 1994; 
Pemberton 1995). Pusey's book was a polemic against neoclassical 
economics and its practitioners suggesting that economists educated in the 
1960s "have acquired what looks ... like a trained Incapacity to learn from 
all later experience" (Pusey 1991, p6). He later softens his language 
arguing that "there is of course no quarrel with economics per se" but 
qualifies this concession by arguing that his quarrel is 
with an underlying scientism that seems to turn arbitrariness into 
givenness and imperiously asserts its own exclusive evaluative 
criteria for what will, in the wake of `reforms', count as intelligence, 
ability and efficacy within and beyond Canberra. (Pusey 1991, p10) 
Pusey has been criticised for the interpretation he places on his data 
(Blandy 1992) and also for the lack of precision in his "survey methods, data 
analysis and depiction of economic rationalism" (Bell 1993, p392). 
Reviewers have also pointed to ideological biases in his work (Argy 1992; 
Bell 1993). Bell makes the point that "for a book dealing with economic 
rationalism in Canberra, we hear surprisingly little about the role of the 
government or its key ministers" (Bell 1993, p389). Pusey states, without 
much supporting evidence that 
What the ministers want from the new bureaucrats is a full 
partnership in subordinating all policy and management decisions to 
the strategic imperatives of macro- and micro -economic 
management. (Pusey 1991, p193) 
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This interpretation overplays the influence of economics, not allowing for 
the role of politics in the policy process. For example, the Drought Relief 
Payment, discussed in Chapter Four, was driven by the Minister's Office in 
response to political concerns. 
Although Pusey's argument exaggerated the strength of "economic 
rationalism" it nevertheless drew attention to a very real trend in 
government policy making. Woodward describes the history of the Hawke 
and Keating governments as being "characterised by its progressive moves 
down the economic rationalist path" (Woodward 1997, p426), a trend which 
was continued by the Howard Government (Woodward 1997, p432). John 
Kerin, who served as Minister for Primary Industries and Energy under 
Hawke and as Treasurer under Keating, suggests that the economic 
approach of the bureaucracy was shared by Ministers, describing Cabinet 
as "very economically rational" (Kerin 2000, pers comm). 
The influence of economists within the bureaucracy is not a new 
phenomenon. Whitwell argues that the dominance of economics graduates 
within the Australian bureaucracy dates back to the Second World War 
(Whitwell 1986, p9). In Whitwell's analysis, the neoclassical approach of 
which Pusey is so critical began emerging within Treasury as the 1970s 
progressed (Whitwell 1986, p178). Given the influence of Treasury on 
economic policy making in the Commonwealth Government it is not 
surprising that these views came to inform policy processes across a range 
of portfolios. There is little doubt that the economist is in a position of 
strength within the Commonwealth Public Service. Groenewegen and 
McFarlane observe that 
never has the status of economists been as high as in the period 
after 1971, especially as compared with any input into the 
governmental decision- making process by researchers such as 
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anthropologists, political scientists and sociologists. (Groenewegen 
and McFarlane 1990, p205) 
Australia is not unique in this experience. Dror was writing of "an invasion 
of public decision -making by economics" in the mid -sixties (Dror 1967, 
p197). 
The presence of economists within the bureaucracy is perhaps not as 
notable as the strength of a single strand of economics. Hall seeks to 
explain how economic ideas become influential, outlining three 
perspectives on their diffusion: economist -centred, state -centred and 
coalition- centred (Hall 1989b, p8). Of these explanations the 
economist -centred and state -centred views offer some insight into the 
widespread adoption of economic liberalism by policy makers in Australia. 
The economist -centred explanation suggests that the persuasiveness of the 
ideas themselves leads economists to adopt them in their 
recommendations to policy makers. As Whitwell describes (Whitwell 1986), 
economic liberalism was becoming influential among economists well 
before its influence became obvious in government policy. Groenewegen 
and McFarlane write that 
The American version of neoclassical economics which became the 
fount of economic wisdom as part of America's hegemony over the 
Western world began to overwhelm Australia from the 1960s. 
(Groenewegen and McFarlane 1990, p232) 
Ideas do not suddenly catch on, they have often very lengthy gestation 
periods during which a period of "softening up" of the policy community, the 
general public and politicians takes place (Kingdon 1995). Once 
persuaded of the value of an idea, the policy community is more likely to 
promote it. The state -centred approach suggests that "the reception 
accorded new economic ideas will be influenced by the institutional 
configuration of the state and its prior experience with related policies" (Hall 
1989b, p10). In the 1980s the new Labor government was keen to 
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establish its credentials as a sound economic manager. It would have 
been, therefore, particularly receptive to an economic approach which 
came with all the trappings of rationality and technical expertise. This 
willingness on the part of the Executive coincided with the growth of support 
for economic liberalism within the bureaucracy. 
The position of economists within the policy process is strengthened by the 
tendency among officials to defer to "experts ". This was noted by Simon et 
al in their important work Public Administration. Originally published in 
1950, the writers observed that 
great deference is paid to the recommendations of experts, and ... 
these recommendations covertly introduce into administrative 
decisions values of which even the experts are unaware. Further, 
because nonexperts hesitate to contradict experts, experts may inject 
into administrative decisions value preferences of which they 
definitely are conscious. (Simon et al. 1991, p547) 
This deference to the expert has been used to great effect by economists in 
the Australian bureaucracy. Blandy notes that they have skilfully occupied 
the "intellectual and moral 'high ground' in the policy debate. He argues 
that 
The central agency economists have done this superbly and have 
steadily expanded their grip on the periphery of the public service as 
a result. Theirs has been a brilliantly successful campaign. The 
extraordinarily powerful thought [and] consistent ... framework of 
modern economics has overwhelmed the alternative intellectual 
options. (Blandy 1992, p105) 
The position of the expert is strengthened through the use of specialist 
language. Jones argues that one of the features of this "cult of the expert" is 
that dissenter's views "are denied legitimacy because they lack the 
language or the professional standing to have them considered in the 
arenas of respectable exchange of ideas" (Jones 1993, p267). 
Fischer expresses concern about what he describes as the rise of 
"technocorporatism" in which 
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Economic and political guidance becomes more a problem of 
planning and management than an issue for public deliberation and, 
as such, is seen as a job for which only the experts are uniquely 
equipped. (Fischer 1990, p16). 
A related feature of this policy environment has been the trend towards 
politicians offering prescriptions to the community based on economic 
arguments, rather than attempting to persuade the electorate of the merits of 
their policy stands (Walter 1996, p86). In a paper concerned with the use of 
economic rhetoric in presenting a particular world view, Pemberton 
observed that "`the economy' seems now to transcend the operations of 
government having needs and requirements of its own" (Pemberton 1988, 
p192). 
This emphasis on the economic and the widespread adoption of economic 
jargon serves to limit debate on alternative policy options which address 
non -economic priorities. Responsible for developing responses to farm 
poverty, the Department of Primary Industries and Energy drew heavily on 
the research and advice of the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics (ABARE) which provided a solely 
economically- focused analysis of issues - and agricultural economists 
were also operating within the neoclassical framework (Malcolm 1989, 
p148). This, combined with the procedural requirement to obtain 
Department of Finance support for any proposal going to Cabinet, put 
p-essure on those developing farm welfare policy both to justify proposed 
programs in economic terms and to ensure that they were not at odds with 
other policy objectives. This tailoring of policy to suit the dominant 
economic framework is not surprising as policy makers often "frame their 
actions with a view towards what is required to get a policy adopted" (Art 
1973, p471). 
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The outcomes of the policy process can clearly be influenced by a powerful 
belief system of this nature (Vickers 1965; Jenkins -Smith 1988; Sabatier 
1988). As Hogwood and Gunn put it, such organisational "conventional 
wisdom" can render many alternative policy options "almost literally 
'unthinkable "` (Hogwood and Gunn 1984, p172). Minogue argues that 
We know from studies of real organisations that not only may real 
information be screened out if it doesn't accord with established 
beliefs and preferences; but ... competent critical people may also be 
"screened our in favour of incompetent uncritical people..." ( Minogue 
1993, p22) 
Manne describes the difficulty of disputing this level of "expertise ": 
Anyone who might express uncertainty or disagreement with one or 
another of these pieces of certain knowledge or the policies that are 
supposedly derived from them is a dispenser of what is inevitably, if 
not originally, labelled snake oil. To put the mafter simply, the 
defences of economic rationalism ... are undisguisedly arguments 
from authority - no more, no less. We are experts, ergo we know. 
(Manne 1993, p37) 
In Australia in the 1980s and 1990s, the dominance of economics was 
evident beyond the public service, encompassing interest groups wishing to 
influence policy, and a large part of the media. As Atkinson and Coleman 
have pointed out, the possession of technical expertise 
has become crucial to effective participation. For those who have 
such expertise, the exchange of information between state and 
private actors can create privileged relationships from which the 
uninitiated are excluded. (Atkinson and Coleman 1992, p157) 
Thus the already close personal relationships between officers in interest 
groups in Canberra and the bureaucracy have been strengthened by a 
share 1 approach to economic policy. The fact that the Farm Household 
Support Scheme had to be framed by its advocates in the DPIE in terms of 
failure by the commercial banking sector to deliver appropriate farm finance 
highlights the need for players in the policy development process to speak 
the same (economic) language in order to achieve their goals. 
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Agrarianism 
The objective of rural adjustment policies has been to influence farmer 
behaviour in an effort to improve the performance of the farm sector. This 
has included the provision of incentives to farmers who are not making 
adequate incomes in agriculture to move out of the industry, thereby freeing 
up resources for more efficient management or allowing for the 
amalgamation of undersized properties. These incentives have been 
developed within the economic framework described above and reflecting 
the values inherent in that framework. 
However, many family farmers in Australia continue to be influenced to 
varying degrees by the values of agrarianism. Agrarianism has a long 
history. Poets, philosophers and politicians have romanticised rural life for 
centuries creating an image of agriculture as a morally desirable 
undertaking. Montmarquet observes that 
a fundamental premise of much of classical thought - to be found ... 
in Hesiod, in Virgil, in Cato, in Cicero, in Xenophon, and a host of 
lesser writers - is that agriculture is a way of life which promotes 
certain distinctive virtues: justice, honesty, independence, courage 
and a capacity for hard work. (Montmarquet 1989, p26) 
Beus and Dunlap describe a view of agriculture, promoted by Thomas 
Jefferson, as transcending its economic role, with the family farm as "the 
bastion of integrity, morality, common sense, and popular democracy" 
(Beus and Dunlap 1994, p465). These images have been persistent over 
time. 
The seminal modern definition of agrarianism was published by US 
sociologists Flinn and Johnson in 1974, based on their historical analysis of 
events between 1850 and 1969 and on editorials which appeared in a 
range of LS farm journals over the same period. They outlined five "tenets 
of agrarianism" as follows: 
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"farming is the basic occupation on which all other economic pursuits 
depend for raw materials and food' 
"agricultural life is the natural life for man; therefore, being natural, it is 
good, while city life is artificial and evil' 
farming delivers the "complete economic independence of the farmed' 
"the farmer should work hard to demonstrate his virtue, which is made 
possible only though [sic] an orderly society'; and 
"family farms have become indissolubly connected with American 
democracy'. (Flinn and Johnson 1974, pp189 -194 - italics in 
original) 
Although it has been suggested that agrarianism in Australia is a 
home -grown product (Graham 1966, p47), with the exception of the final, 
Jeffersonian feature, Flinn and Johnson's description could just as readily 
describe the "countrymindedness" of Australian farmers. Farmers are 
strikingly suspicious of urban interests and attribute characteristics to the 
farming way of life which are seen as morally superior - such as reward 
from effort, hard work and so on. Don Aitkin's description of Australian 
countrymindedness is set out below. The similarities between this and the 
work of Flinn and Johnson are obvious but Aitkin's features are worth listing 
as they pick up the Australian flavour of this brand of agrarianism - 
recognising the historic importance of agriculture initially as a contributor to 
GDP and later as an export earner, and the place of the bush in Australian 
folklore: 
(i) Australia depends on its primary producers for its high 
standards of living, for only those who produce a physical good add 
to a country's wealth. 
(ii) Therefore all Australians, from city and country alike, should in 
their own interest support policies aimed at improving the position of 
primary industries. 
(iii) Farming and grazing, and rural pursuits generally, are 
virtuous, ennobling and co- operative; they bring out the best in 
people. 
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(iv) In contrast, city life is competitive and nasty, as well as 
parasitical. 
(v) The characteristic Australian is a countryman, and the core 
elements of the national character come from the struggles of country 
people to tame their environment and make it productive. City 
people are much the same the world over. 
(vi) For all these reasons, and others like defence, people should 
be encouraged to settle in the country, not in the city. 
(viii) But power resides in the city, where politics is trapped in a 
sterile debate about classes. There has to be a separate political 
party for country people to articulate the true voice of the nation. 
(Aitkin 1985, p35) 
This ideology has implications for the policy process as Canberra -based 
officials and urban, particularly Labor, politicians are immediately at a 
disadvantage in dealing with rural issues. Their motives are open to 
question, they are not seen as contributing any great value to the Australian 
economy and they represent the antithesis of all that is good and virtuous 
about farming. 
A study by Craig and Phillips of Australian graingrowers showed "the same 
broad attitudes are held by southern Australian cereal farmers as are held 
by North American farmers" (Craig and Phillips 1983, p413). Although little 
other study has been undertaken in Australia on agrarianism (Halpin and 
Martin 1996, p12), there are sufficient similarities between the Australian 
and US experience that the large US literature in this area provides some 
useful insights. 
Agrarianism in Australia and the US has been associated with the family 
farm. Neither country went through the period of feudalism and serfdom 
which characterised early agriculture in Europe, developing rather what 
Montmarquet describes as a "yeoman agriculture" (Montmarquet 1989, 
p86). In the case of Australia, it should be noted that the original shape of 
agriculture in the colonies was dominated by broad scale pastoral holdings 
by wealthy squatters (Craig and Phillips 1983, p412). A series of land 
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reforms were enacted in the 1860s "in the interests of a social ideal of an 
industrious yeomanry" (McMichael 1984, p220), with a view to opening up 
the squatting leaseholds to small farmers. In recent years in Australia there 
has been debate about the future of this model of the family farm and 
concern that there is a trend towards agribusiness and corporate farming 
(Lawrence 1987; Lees 1997). 
Agrarianism is a nebulous concept which allows for its selective use for 
varying ends. It has been described as "multi dimensional and malleable" 
(Halpin and Martin 1996, p21) and "a multifarious concept that defies 
simple definition" (Beus and Dunlap 1994, p462). However, at its core is 
the belief in the "specialness" and moral value of farming as a way of life. A 
number of writers have suggested that agrarianism serves an important role 
for farmers in providing a rationale for enduring the unendurable and 
providing a refuge from the realities of an otherwise humiliating economic 
situation (Flinn and Johnson 1974; Butte' and Flinn 1975, p136; Craig and 
Phillips 1983, p416). Australian writers Share et al argue 
Our knowledge of rural fundamentalist ideologies suggests that 
[farmers] may interpret their misfortune as character building and 
confirmation of how different (and superior) country life is to that of 
the city. (Share et al. 1991) 
A further characteristic of agrarianism is a deep suspicion and distrust of 
urban interests. As Graham describes it, "the city became the antithesis of 
the rural utopia" (Graham 1966, p40). Richmond similarly writes of "ideas of 
deliberate malevolence on the part of urban interests" (Richmond 1978, 
p102), noting that urban interests are "often seen as a conspiracy, 
endeavouring to drain the vitality from the farms and siphon their riches into 
the city" (Richmond 1978, p102). From this perspective, city people are also 
regarded as largely unsympathetic to the plight of the farmer. Marshall 
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argues that "[t]he other side of the belief in the importance of rural industry is 
that its uniqueness and value are not appreciated by city based interests 
who attempt to deny the producer his just reward ". (Marshall 1985, p24) 
The level of response to campaigns such as Farm Hand would suggest that 
urban Australians are more sympathetic to farmers than this implies, 
although some urban writers have reinforced this perception with quite 
hostile interpretations of farm life. In an article provocatively titled "The 
Great Rural Bludge ", Buckley describes agrarianism as follows: 
In GODZONE, these [farmers and graziers] are the people who are 
most convinced that they are the chosen and that if God fails them 
temporarily by sending drought or glutted markets, then the rest of 
the population owes them not merely a living but maintenance of 
their capital assets. (Buckley 1972, p71) 
He goes on to suggest that "the decline of the rural sector represents one of 
the best prospects for Australia's future" (Buckley 1972, p77). 
Verrall et al suggest that the "rural -urban cleavage" is "an essential and key 
notion in understanding Australian politics" (Verrall et al. 1985, p8). The 
Country Party has its roots in this urban -rural divide and as Jaensch has 
argued, "the continued existence of that party ... has played an important 
role in maintaining the cleavage..." ( Jaensch 1997, p308). This divide 
allows for the apparently contradictory position of the National Party and its 
supporters of seeking subsidies and other assistance measures for farmers 
while at the same time condemning urban welfare recipients (Lawrence et 
al. 1992; Stayner 1998). -'his particular view is not unique to Australian 
farmers. Naples identified this perspective in her work in the United States: 
Agrarian ideology extols the virtues of the family farm which 
inadvertently contributes to a contradictory perspective on 
government transfer payments, one that differentiates the role of 
government support to farmers from that to the nonfarming rural poor. 
While most residents interviewed felt that farm subsidies were a 
necessary, albeit unfortunate means towards a vibrant rural 
economy, many did not approve of public assistance to low- income 
nonfarming residents. (Naples 1994, p119) 
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Agrarianism also ensures that urban -based policy makers are treated with 
suspicion, particularly if they do not have a rural background. As noted 
above, city people are not seen as understanding the special nature of rural 
problems. In addition, farmers tend to be distrustful of experts. As Flinn and 
Johnson report 
Within agrarian belief there is pride, a certain nobility, in what man 
accomplishes by the sweat of his brow. There is suspicion about a 
man who makes a living by using his head and not his hands.(Flinn 
and Johnson 1974, p194) 
It is important to understand how the key tenets of the ideology inform 
farmers' behaviour and their responses to government policies. Policy 
makers have been aware of the reluctance of farmers to access support 
through government welfare departments, although ABARE research 
suggests that this aversion to seeking welfare assistance is overstated 
(Garnaut et al. 1997, p51). As noted, farmers and their representatives 
have had a "tendency to stigmatise `welfare' recipients" (Stayner 1998, p4) 
as part of their agrarianism and this is reflected in their approach to seeking 
support when in difficulty. For example, the Senate Standing Committee on 
Rural and Regional Affairs reported: 
Time and again, the Committee was told by members of this 
important section of the Australian community that they do not want 
handouts, they want to be self -reliant but must be given the 
opportunity to prepare for drought. (Senate Standing Committee on 
Rural and Regional Affairs 1992, p vi) 
This approach reflects the fact th<t "[t]he farm -family way of life is believed to 
be tinged by hardship and by costs of isolation, by toil and effort of farm 
operation and development, and by the wrath and perversities of nature" 
(Mauldon and Schapper 1974, p113). 
The apparent inconsistencies of agrarianism can also be illuminated by 
Marxist- oriented scholars who analyse the class position of the small family 
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farmer in advanced capitalist economies. As owners of capital but also 
dependent on their own labour for an income, small family farmers are in a 
"contradictory' class location (Goss et al. 1980, p119; Mooney 1988, p260). 
While Vogeler describes this position as "protoproletariat" - "having 
characteristics of both the capitalists and the proletariat" (Vogeler 1981, 
p281) - most Marxist- oriented writers consider the family farmer to be a 
member of the petty bourgeoisie (Davis 1980; de Janvry 1980; Conway 
1981). Vogeler explains that "[e]ven though family farmers work their own 
land, they are manipulated by agribusiness through its control of 
processing, storage facilities, transportation, and finance capital" ( Vogeler 
1981, p291). In the Australian context, Lawrence has observed that 
the so- called simple commodity producers are, in fact, virtually totally 
reliant upon the upstream agribusiness firms for inputs and have 
become increasingly linked to the downstream firms which purchase 
their output (the farmer's independence therefore being something of 
a myth); ... the integration of family farming in such a manner allows 
for the appropriation of economic surplus by monopoly capital. 
(Lawrence 1987, p132) 
This increasing "proletarianisation" of family farmers has not resulted 
however in a rejection of the conservative political parties in Australia. if 
anything, it has strengthened their anti- labour position (Lawrence 1987, 
p168). In terms of political allegiances, this continued support for the 
coalition has been facilitated by the existence of the National Party. In this, 
the Australian farmer has an advantage over his /her US counterpart in that 
the National Party was established specifically to represent farm interests. 
By contrast, the US farmer's vote is not guaranteed to either side as they 
"cannot find their fundamental interests to be comprehensively included in 
the agenda of either major party" (Mooney 1988, p260). 
Striking the balance 
Between 1989 and 1998 rural policy in Australia was largely guided by the 
principles of economic liberalism. At the same time, many Australian 
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farmers continued to demonstrate an attachment to "countrymindedness ". 
In attempting to influence farmers' behaviour, policy makers often missed 
their mark because the values underpinning these two world views are 
quite different. Where economists measure value in terms of the market, 
seeking to maximise productivity and efficiency, the agrarian philosophy 
emphasises farming as a way of life. Policy makers focusing on economic 
solutions respect and seek out the views of experts while farmers are 
suspicious of expertise. 
One of the roles of policy makers in a democracy is to strike the balance 
between conflicting values (Doern and Phidd 1983, p57). However the 
problem with the contradictions between economic liberalism and 
agrarianism is that the policy makers, rather than mediating between the 
mix of values in the community, are themselves largely captives of one of 
the competing approaches. This limits their capacity to address issues 
creatively and to give full consideration to all factors determining farmer 
behaviour. This leads agricultural economists to "become frustrated by the 
apparently intractable propensity of farmers and others to act in ways 
contrary to those which economic models of human behaviour prescribe for 
them" (Newby 1982, p126). Policy makers define problems within their own 
paradigm - in the case of farm poverty focusing on the pace of structural 
adjustment within farming - and policy responses are developed 
accordingly. As has been outlined in the rase study, these responses have 
been formulated in terms of market -based incentives to influence farmers' 
behaviour. If farmers are guided by a different set of values they are less 
likely to respond as predicted by policy- makers. There is clearly a need for 
all relevant values to be considered in the policy process. 
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A strong attachment to farming as a way of life means that farmers are not 
simply seeking to maximise the returns on their capital investment when 
they engage in the farm enterprise. Vincent refers to the "psychic income" 
obtained through work, suggesting that this is particularly high in farming. 
He argues that 
A disregard for the existence of psychic income in farming by policy 
makers could result in specification of welfare problems which may 
not exist, or an incorrect specification of the magnitude of these 
problems, and the formulation of quite unsuccessful policy measures, 
such as the original rehabilitation and retraining aspect of the rural 
reconstruction scheme. (Vincent 1976, p111) 
The conflict between economics and agrarianism is a good example of 
what Linder describes as the tension between "hard" and "soff' values. He 
explains: 
One of the more insightful maxims of contemporary policy analysis 
holds that "hard values tend to drive out soft ones ". In this context, 
"hard values" are those which are tangible and whose realization 
can be measured with some precision; by and large, they tend to be 
economic or technological and thus translatable into physical units. 
"Soft values ", on the other hand, are predominantly intangible and 
non -instrumental. (Linder 1986, p282) 
The challenge for policy makers is to incorporate consideration of soft 
values into their policy development process, particularly if the measures 
under consideration are intended to influence human behaviour. 
Although Wildaysky suggests that "[n]o -one can do analysis without 
becoming aware that moral considerations are integral to the enterprise" 
(Wildaysky 1979, p12), some critics have suggested that economists 
involved in developing policy in Australia have created an image of their 
discipline as a value -free, scientific endeavour and in so doing attempt to 
discount the views of their opponents as irrational (Rees 1994, p171). In 
describing the economist's role, Michael Keating suggests that 
unlike discussions of other public- policy issues including freedom, 
justice and equality, theories of economic behaviour and their 
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underpinning assumptions do not imply any particular moral values, 
or that people have no other values. (Keating 1993, p59) 
In a defence of economists, Brennan argues that economics 
is concerned with the relation between means and ends rather than 
the appropriateness of those ends. On this reading, economics 
examines the consequences of alternative policies or alternative 
institutional arrangements in the light of policy ends that economics 
itself doesn't specify. (Brennan 1993, p5). 
Sen describes this version of economics as an "engineering" approach 
which is "concerned with primarily logistic issues rather than with ultimate 
ends ": 
The ends are taken as fairly straightforwardly given, and the object of 
the exercise is to find the appropriate means to serve them. Human 
behaviour is typically seen as being based on simple and easily 
characterizable motives. (Sen 1987, p4) 
This position does not recognise the existence of the assumptions about 
human behaviour which underpin the economic model. As Nelson points 
out 
Many economists are uncomfortable with or reject outright the notion 
that at bottom their views also constitute an ideology. Nevertheless, 
any basic way of thinking about social issues rests on fundamental 
assumptions and values that involve some elements of faith. 
Economists have such a way of thinking and in this sense they can 
be said also to have an ideology. (Nelson 1987, p57) 
An economist can be very effective as, to use Charles Schultze's term, a 
"partisan advocate for efficiency" (cited in Nelson 1987, p49). However, as 
Linder argues "in a pluralist society there is seldom an ethical consensus 
sufficient to justify the primacy of economic efficier cy as an allocative norm 
independent of the political process" (Linder 1986, p284). If this is the case, 
the mix of values in public policy needs to be considered as a political issue 
- a theme taken up in the next chapter. The dominance of economic 
liberalism and the absence of an effective voice for the values of 
agrarianism within the policy process will also be considered in assessing 
the normative value of Lindblom's model of "muddling through ". 
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CHAPTER NINE: MUDDLING THROUGH 
Between 1989 and 1998, successive Australian governments introduced a 
series of programs aimed at addressing inadequate incomes among 
farmers. These programs were developed in the context of a powerful 
economic ideology which saw the questions of farm poverty treated, not as 
a welfare issue but as a part of rural structural adjustment policy. The 
frequency of the amendments to the programs, not to mention regular name 
changes, and the complexity of many of them suggests that policy makers 
were struggling to develop a sound, workable and equitable response to 
the needs of poor farmers. It is instructive to ask how the policy process 
itself contributed to the muddle of government policies in this sensitive area 
of rural policy development, This chapter draws on the framework 
developed by Charles Lindblom to reconsider the policy process and in so 
doing raises some issues with the model itself. To this point, this thesis has 
referred to Lindblom's model in an attempt to identify possible flaws in the 
policy process. This model was chosen because of the close 
approximation between Lindblom's description of disjointed incrementalism 
and the way in which rural policy was developed in the period under 
review. Having accepted the descriptive value of "muddling through ", this 
chapter now turns to the normative element of this policy approach. 
Lindblom's model is not simply descriptive. It is also prescriptive, arguing 
that the process outlined results in the best policy outcomes, particularly 
when compared with the utopian and unobtainable synoptic approach to 
policy analysis. Overall, Lindblom's description of the policy process 
remains convincing, however the normative value of the model has been 
questioned (Dror 1964; Dror 1967; Etzioni 1967; Lowi 1979; Burch and 
Wood 1983). 
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The three features of Lindblom's approach which are raised here are the 
ability of the process of partisan mutual adjustment to encompass a broad 
sweep of ideas, the role of watchdogs in the policy process, and the 
interaction between means and ends in policy development. It is argued 
that the strength of economic liberalism in the Australian policy process has 
undermined incrementalism as a means for achieving good policy and as a 
result an alternative approach is needed if community goals for rural 
Australia are to be achieved. Following James Walter (Walter 1996), this 
chapter calls for the reintroduction of politics into rural policy to debate the 
ends of structural adjustment policy and determine clear goals for 
Australian agriculture. 
incrementalism 
While incrementalism is recognised by many writers as the way in which 
real world policy makers undertake their tasks due to resource limitations 
and other constraints, there has been considerable debate over the model's 
normative value. Chief among the criticisms is that the model "offers a 
"scientific" rationalization for inertia and conservatism" (Dror 1968, p145). 
Weiss and Woodhouse summarise the common criticisms of 
incrementalism as: 
1. Insufficiently proactive, goal oriented and ambitious; 
2. Excessively conservative, because increments are small and 
bargaining favours organized elites; 
3. Useful in too limited a range of decision contexts; and 
4. Too hostile to analysis. (Weiss and Woodhouse 1992, p258) 
In their article, Weiss and Woodhouse defend incrementalism against these 
claims but much of their defence rests on suggesting that alternative 
approaches to policy making would fare little better. For example, in 
response to the criticism that incrementalism does not catch "threshold or 
sleeper effects ", the authors write 
234 
The interesting question is whether sleeper effects and other 
unanticipated consequences are more likely to be caught by the 
strategic analysis and serial action that is feasible, or by doomed 
attempts at comprehensiveness. (Weiss and Woodhouse 1992, 
p265) 
Their response to the question of incrementalism's capacity to cope with 
crises is similar (Weiss and Woodhouse 1992, p263). They do not really 
address the value of Lindblom's model as a prescription for good policy 
making, rather they call for a rethink of incrementalism to address what they 
see as the key questions raised by Lindblom: 
How do political participants and policy professionals cope with 
uncertainty? What strategies of decision would allow them to do it 
better? What institutional arrangements actually and potentially are 
available to promote the skilled and fair use of strategic analysis and 
action, including but by no means limited to disjointed 
incrementalism? (Weiss and Woodhouse 1992, p270) 
These are fair questions. However, as Smith and May point out, "quite 
different frameworks may be required for explanatory and normative 
discussions" of the decision making process. Criticisms of synoptic models 
tend to be based on "That is not the way things are ", while critics of 
incrementalism tend to focus on "That is not the way things should be" 
(Smith and May 1993, p205 - italics in original). While the preceding 
chapters have illustrated the value of incrementalism as an explanation of 
the policy process, they have also highlighted that this process does not 
necessarily produce satisfactory outcomes. 
Dror argued that there are "three essential conditions" which must be met 
for incrementalism to produce the best policy outcome. These are: 
(1) the results of present policies must be in the main satisfactory (to 
the policy makers and the social strata on which they depend), so 
that marginal changes are sufficient for achieving an acceptable rate 
of improvements in policy -results; (2) there must be a high degree of 
continuity in the nature of the problems; (3) there must be a high 
degree of continuity in the available means for dealing with 
problems. (Dror 1964, p154 - italics in original) 
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Responses to farm poverty clearly fail the first of these criteria. The large 
number of reviews of government policy in this area over the decade from 
1989 illustrates the dissatisfaction in many quarters with the direction and 
impact of Government programs. While there was certainly continuity in the 
nature of farm poverty, policy responses consistently avoided addressing 
the core issues, arguably satisfying the third of Dror's conditions while 
simultaneously ensuring the failure to meet the first. Kingdon suggests that, 
while incrementalism is useful in explaining the generation of policy 
alternatives, it does not explain agenda change. He argues that "agendas 
exhibit a great deal of nonincremental change" (Kingdon 1995, pp82 -83). 
Farm poverty has tended to be treated as a secondary concern arising from 
structural adjustment policies. The drought of the 1990s moved farm 
poverty on to the public agenda for a short while, with the assistance of the 
Farm Hand appeal, but in general, it has not been a high priority concern of 
Australian govemments. Forester can see problems with both the synoptic 
model and incrementalism as normative approaches to policy development: 
"[w]hile the rational- comprehensive formulation may reach for the sky, the 
boundedly rational and incremental formulations may tie our hands" 
(Forester 1984). While accepting that "we are creatures of limited ability, 
and grand overall optimization is beyond our powers ", Arrow expresses 
concern about the limitations that incrementalism places on policy 
imagination. He sees value in the high standard set by the synoptic ideal, 
arguing that 
the unattainable goal of the well- defined complete decision structure 
provides a better spur for clear and difficult thinking by the social 
scientist then [sic] does a complacent acceptance of our 
imperfections. (Arrow 1964, p587) 
Etzioni rejects both models, proposing an alternative which he describes as 
"less utopian in its assumptions" than rationalistic models of recision 
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making and less "conservative" than incrementalism as proposed by 
Lindblom (Etzioni 1967, p385). In his "Mixed- Scanning" approach, some 
sectors are subjected to detailed examination while others are given a more 
"truncated" review. Etzioni explains his proposal as follows: 
A mixed -scanning strategy would include ... two cameras: a 
broad -angle camera that would cover all parts of the sky but not in 
great detail, and a second one which would zero in on those areas 
revealed by the first camera to require a more in -depth examination. 
(Etzioni 1967, p389). 
This strategy distinguishes between "fundamental" and `incremental" 
decisions although it is not clear how the two can be differentiated (Ham 
and Hill 1993, p91). For example, the decision to remove drought from the 
NDRA in 1989 had the effect in the DPIE portfolio of a fundamental 
decision, in that it initiated a change in the whole philosophy underpinning 
drought support for farmers. Its originating Department, the Department of 
Finance, is more likely to have seen the change as an incremental 
improvement in the operation of an existing scheme. 
Overall, the incremental approach to policy development in the area of farm 
income support resulted in a series of largely unsatisfactory policies which 
were subject to frequent amendment. Incrementalism alone therefore does 
not appear to be a useful normative model for policy design in this area. 
Diversity of Values 
Lindblom suggests that incremental policy development produces beater 
outcomes than attempts at synopsis because of the involvement of a 
multiplicity of decision makers in the process. Through partisan mutual 
adjustment, "intelligent" policy is produced because the process allows for 
the airing of a diversity of views. Lindblom himself points out that "the more 
widely shared a value, interest, or preference, the heavier its weight in 
partisan mutual adjustment" (Lindblom 1965, p242 - italics in original). He 
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also raises the issue of "like- mindedness among government 
administrators" (Lindblom 1959, p88), suggesting that in order to address 
complex problems, administrators will want diversity among their own 
personnel. This diversity would be in terms of policy backgrounds and 
professional or personal values, "so that, even within a single agency, 
decision -making can be fragmented and parts of the agency can serve as 
watchdogs for other parts" (Lindblom 1959). In spite of its flaws, Pusey's 
research did highlight the lack of such diversity and the strength of the 
economics profession within public service agencies in Australia. The 
relative weight given to economics in the policy process was not news to 
anyone who had worked in policy development in the public service over 
the course of the 1980s and 1990s. 
When considering responses to farm poverty during the period under 
review, such diversity was virtually non -existent in policy circles in Australia. 
As has been outlined above, the policy debate was driven almost 
exclusively by economic liberalism and there were few dissenting voices. 
As Painter has pointed out, in Australia "[m]arket liberalism is now more or 
less embedded within élite political and bureaucratic circles ". He argues 
that "[clore features of Australia's institutional arrangements seriously 
truncate and limit the potential for an influential, constructive and critical 
public debate on policy issues" (Painter 1996, p297). Without that debate, 
the policy process fails to deliver the diversity of views required by 
Lindblom's model. In later work with Woodhouse, Lindblom recognised this 
shortcoming in the pluralist approach, arguing that "[t]here rarely is enough 
diversity in democratic political systems as presently set up, and some 




In their recent defence of Lindblom's model, Weiss and Woodhouse 
addressed the issue of unequal representation in the policy process. They 
agreed that 
there is something of a rigged competition in which business and 
other well- organized interests win disproportionately, a serious 
deficiency in contemporary process that Lindblom along with many 
other scholars in the 1950s and 1960s under -estimated or 
underreported. (Weiss and Woodhouse 1992, p262) 
Within rural policy, farm representatives may be seen to "win 
disproportionately" when it comes to deregulation and policy changes 
which benefit the more successful farmer. As has been discussed, the 
interests of the tail of the industry are not so well represented. 
Weiss and Woodhouse do not see this representational imbalance as a 
failing of incrementalism. They argue 
it is not clear what bearing this has on disjointed incrementalism, for 
these would be obstacles to marshalling political resources behind 
any change- oriented strategy. Hence, it is the socio- political power 
structure that favours organized elites, not incrementalism or any 
other decision strategy. (Weiss and Woodhouse 1992, p262) 
The problem with this point is that it acknowledges the strength of 
Lindblom's analysis - the descriptive power of incrementalism - but does 
not address the element of his work which probably has generated the most 
debate - incrementalism as a normative model of decision making. 
Simply arguing that any decision strategy would face the problem does not 
justify accepting Lindblom's model as the ideal approach. 
As has been illustrated, in the period under review there were no clear, 
vocal groups representing the interests of farmers in poverty. Within 
government, the Department of Primary Industries and Energy rather 
reluctantly handled issues of farm poverty as part of its structural adjustment 
programs aimed at developing a more competitive and sustainable farm 
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sector. As has been discussed, the policy framework within which officials 
were operating was not conducive to considering welfare issues other than 
in the context of the broader portfolio objective. The Social Security 
portfolio was unwilling or unable to make the adjustments to its generalist 
approach required to respond to the needs of a relatively small group of 
self -employed farmers who were often income -poor but asset -rich. The 
watchdogs that Lindblom would expect to exist within government agencies 
were largely hamstrung by other portfolio objectives and of limited 
effectiveness in representing poor farmers. Beyond DPIE there was little 
interest either from the Department of Social Security or the central 
agencies. 
Among interest groups, the story is little better. While farmers are very 
effectively represented by the National Farmers' Federation (NFF) on a 
wide range of policy issues from trade to the environment, the organisation 
has not been active on farm welfare issues. Speeches by senior officials 
and office- bearers within the NFF focus very heavily on trade liberalisation, 
industrial relations reform and tax reform. The few references there are to 
social issues are limited to access to Austudy support for farm children to 
obtain a tertiary education and improved service delivery, such as 
increased numbers of general practitioners (for example Craik 1998; 
Donges 1998b). Poverty and the issue of income support are not 
mentioned. In response to pressure from members, the NSW Farmers' 
Association has raised its profile in this area in recent years and the NFF 
has moved some way. It is interesting to note that, although the assets test 
is a key obstacle to farmers' obtaining standard social security support, the 
literature on the introduction of the assets test in the early 1980s contains 
no reference to any lobbying activity by farm groups on this issue (eg Marsh 
1985). As Dahl notes, "[o]rganizations...are not merely relay stations that 
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receive and send signals from their members about their interests. 
Organizations amplify the signals and generate new ones" (Dahl 1982, 
p44). Not all members' interests are picked up by their representative 
organisations. 
Smaller rural community representatives, such as the Isolated Children's 
Parents Association and church groups were active during the drought. 
However, in general, these groups are not established members of the 
Canberra policy community and therefore are not plugged into the policy 
making process on a regular basis or during the crucial development 
phase. Welfare groups such as the Australian Council of Social Service 
(ACOSS) have also only very recently moved to look at rural issues. The 
NSW Council of Social Service now has a Rural Policy Advisory Group but 
the Council is not a high profile player on farm poverty. In the period under 
review, ACOSS did no significant lobbying on farm poverty (ACOSS 2000) 
although some of its constituent organisations, such as Lifeline, made 
representations to the Commonwealth Minister. 
The political parties also gave little attention to issues of farm poverty. The 
Labor government responded generously in financial terms when the 
drought put the issue on the agenda in the early 1990s but the ALP is an 
improbable advocate for poor farmers. Its union connections and urban 
focus make it anathema to farmers, particularly those with strong agrarian 
tendencies. As has been demonstrated, the policies introduced by the 
Coalition government were only incrementally different from Labor 
government policies and the strong influence of economic liberalism within 
the Liberal Party will ensure that the emphasis on structural adjustment in 
agriculture will continue. 
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In the area of farm poverty, therefore, there were no effective watchdogs - 
either within the bureaucracy, among the interest groups or within the 
political parties. In his later work, Lindblom has acknowledged the 
limitations of partisan mutual adjustment in achieving both multiplicity of 
views and an effective system of policy watchdogs. A more serious criticism 
of his model as a normative guide to policy making relates to Lindblom's 
treatment of means and ends. 
Means -ends 
Lindblom's model of the policy process rejects the rational- comprehensive 
requirement that ends be determined and then the best means for 
achieving these objectives selected. Lindblom's position is that means and 
ends do not need to be distinct and that, in fact, the two are determined 
concurrently (Lindblom 1959, p83). In theory, this approach has its appeal 
and Lindblom provides examples of issues on which different parties agree 
to the same policy outcomes for different reasons. However, what this 
model does not address is that the policy means selected can imply 
particular ends and in the absence of a debate over these ends can result 
in policy outcomes which may not be desirable. Although a focus on policy 
means can avoid "unnecessary controversy" over policy objectives 
(Lindblom 1959, 84), it also gives considerable power to those who 
determine the policy means. in Lindblom's model, this problem is avoided 
by the participation of watchdogs in the system representing a diversity of 
values. 
As has been outlined in the preceding chapters, over recent decades the 
key policy players on rural policy in Australia have been driven by 
economic liberalism. This common world view, which is focused on means 
rather than ends, has deprived the Australian policy process of the ability to 
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encompass a comprehensive range of values - for example, no partisan 
has been promoting the values inherent in agrarianism. Brennan makes 
the point that economics is not intended to determine policy objectives 
(Brennan 1993, p5). Economics provides the tools to determine the most 
efficient means for attaining particular goals. The problem with policy 
development in Canberra in recent years is that this distinction appears to 
have been lost. Policy makers have focused on economic factors to the 
exclusion of the ends of the policy process (Walter 1996). As Etzioni has 
pointed out, "No be efficient may be only as good as the goals that are 
efficiently implemented. We cannot escape judging goals..." and 
"rationality is not an ultimate value; it is desirable to act efficiently - but only 
in pursuit of worthy ends" (Etzioni 1988, pp138 -139). 
Lindblom himself was wary of relying purely on economics: 
Only in relatively restricted areas does economic theory achieve 
sufficient precision to go far in resolving policy questions: its 
helpfulness in policy- making is always so limited that it requires 
supplementation through comparative analysis. (Lindblom 1959, 
p87) 
Over twenty years later, he voiced much more explicit concerns about the 
role of the market, characterising it as a "prison" which crippled popular 
control of the policy agenda through its capacity to punish decisions 
unfavourable to business by reducing investment and increasing 
unemployment. Lindblom argued that as a consequence of this mechanism 
We have come not to think of human need and aspiration but of the 
market system as the fixed element in the light of which we think 
about policy. We find it difficult to think about the market as the 
variable. (Lindblom 1982) 
So what does this tendency mean for rural policy in general and farm 
poverty in particular? As Geoffrey Lawrence argues in Capitalism and the 
Countryside, the economic policies which have been pursued by Australian 
governments, both Coalition and ALP, in recent years, and endorsed by the 
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National Farmers' Federation, have been directed at supporting and 
encouraging corporate and larger- than -family farming enterprises. 
Lawrence argues that "[c]urrent policies will lead to greater control by 
agribusiness and the erosion of family farming" (Lawrence 1987, p261). He 
suggests that 
The liberal economic paradigm defines the problems of agriculture in 
a particular way - one consistent with the assumptions and world 
view embedded within that paradigm. The solutions formed as a 
logical outcome of the paradigm are failing to address many of the 
major problems confronting family farmers. (Lawrence 1987, p307) 
Prior to Federation, Australian colonial governments took a series of 
decisions to replace extensive, capitalist agriculture in the form of squatting 
with more intensive settlement of the land. Driven by images of rearing "a 
staunch and honest race of independent yeomen" (Williams 1975, p74), 
closer settlement policies were followed by the ill -fated soldier settlement 
schemes. Writing in 1975, Williams points out that 
The years from 1920 to the late 1960s have been spent in attempts to 
perpetuate and justify that heavy and powerful legacy from the past, 
that more people are needed on the land in Australia rather than 
less. (Williams 1975, p99) 
The structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and 1990s have effectively 
reversed this trend. This may be the solution to developing an agricultural 
industry in Australia which can compete in increasingly competitive 
international markets. However it is of great concern that such a 
fundamental shift in direction has occurred with little or no public debate 
and with the acquiescence of the interest groups and political parties which 
purport to represent the interests of Australia's family farmers. 
This shift has occurred incrementally with all partisans involved in the 
process basically agreeing with the policies being pursued - in essence 
the policies have been developed through a process of "muddling through ". 
The result of these policies has been greater economic efficiency in 
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agriculture. However as argued above, efficiency alone cannot be a final 
policy objective. In early work with Dahl, Lindblom distinguished between 
"prime" and `instrumental" goals: 
A prime goal when attained is a direct source of satisfaction in itself; 
an instrumental goal, as the name implies, has value only because it 
facilitates the attainment of one or more prime goals. (Dahl and 
Lindblom 1953, p26) 
Efficiency, competition, and structural adjustment are all instrumental goals 
and economics provides policy makers with the tools for achieving them. 
However, in order to pursue the correct instrumental goals, society's prime 
goals need to be debated. As Walter observes, "the greatest problem is that 
once we abandon politics for economics, we abandon the capacity to 
imagine new solutions" (Walter 1996, p52). The problem with pursuing 
economic liberalism in the absence of politics as Walter describes it is that 
liberal economics is not a value -free scientific discipline. As Emy and 
Hughes have observed: 
The more the language and calculations of economic rationality 
predominate in official policy circles, the more one may wonder 
about the type of 'rational society' which is being favoured or created. 
This is not to say that economic rationalism is inherently bad, nor to 
deny its evident applicability in a time of rising economic scarcity. 
The problem, as with the economic theory of the market itself, is that 
there is a good deal more to it than meets the eye. It is a particular 
type of thinking which focuses on means -end relationships, where 
the ends are either assumed or are limited to those which seem 
`obvious' to those with, primarily, economic training. (Emy and 
Hughes 1991, p570) 
With respect to rural adjustment policies, it is suggested that the ends are 
not obvious to many farmers and those in the broader community with an 
interest in rural Australia. In the absence of a political debate over the 
future shape of agriculture, the future foreseen by Geoffrey Lawrence of 
corporate farming dominated by agribusiness may be coming, ready or not. 
The agrarianism which is still apparent among many farmers is not 
consistent with the ideal of the rational economic agent who is driven by the 
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profit motive and who will move between economic activities in response to 
market signals. The result is that in many cases farmers place much higher 
value on the non -economic elements of their lifestyle and will tolerate often 
considerable hardship to remain in farming. The importance of sentiment in 
understanding farmers' motivations to continue farming under adverse 
conditions is completely missed by a strand of theory which attempts to treat 
people as rational, utility- maximising players and fails to account for their 
"irrational" qualities. 
Conclusion 
Lindblom's concept of the policy making process as a kind of inspired 
"muddling through" has attracted debate and discussion for nearly half a 
century. The case study outlined in this thesis once again confirms the 
accuracy of his model as a description of how policy is made in the real 
world. From 1989 to 1998, policy makers grappled with farm poverty and 
developed a series of responses each differing only at the margin from the 
program before. 
However, Lindblom not only presented his model as a description of how 
policy is really made, he also argued that this approach "will be superior to 
any other decision- making method available for complex problems in many 
circumstances, certainly superior to a futile attempt at superhuman 
comprehensiveness" (Lindblom 1959, p88). Lindblom argues that "big 
step" policies are likely to fail as "too many conflicting interests pull them 
apart" (Lindblom 1979, p521). With Braybrooke, he went so far as to argue 
that "[p]olitical democracy is often greatly endangered by nonincremental 
change, which it can accommodate only in certain limited circumstances" 
(Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963, p73). 
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This case study exposes three key problems with Lindblom's approach as a 
prescriptive model. Firstly, although this criticism is not new, it needs to be 
pointed out that the system of watchdogs does not necessarily result in 
effective representation of all interests. As has been shown, there were no 
effective watchdogs in the system interested in pursuing the interests of 
poor farmers independent of the prevailing economic paradigm - for 
example there were no voices for the non -economic characteristics of 
farming. Secondly, the expectation that a "multiplicity of views" will be 
present within the process of partisan mutual adjustment does not allow for 
the presence of a dominant idea of the type of economic liberalism. As 
Lindbiom himself observed: 
In a society in which most people believe that the whole and final 
truth has not yet been discovered there is such a thing as too much 
political agreement, too much conformity of preference, interest or 
value.... (Lindblom 1965, p287) 
However, his model assumes that diversity of views will exist. Finally, in a 
policy environment dominated by economics, Lindblom's suggestion 
essentially that the process will look after the policy means and the ends 
will then make themselves known (Lindblom 1958, p308) leaves no room 
for politics in giving voice to community values and objectives. 
The case study suggests that as the expertise available comes from an 
increasingly limited range of disciplines, or is dominated by one particular 
approach, Government policies can be inappropriate and /or ineffectual. 
Policies directed at encouraging farm adjustment, including exit, focused on 
the provision of economic incentives to farm families. This approach flies in 
the face of sociological evidence that it is the non -economic attributes of 
farm life, such as the perceived moral values of life on the land, which keep 
many families in the industry in spite of economic hardship. Wildaysky 
suggested that "[t]here must be a better way to delimit the domain of 
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applicability so that economics ... is not turned into politics or .... becomes a 
substitute for it' (Wildaysky 1979, p180). In analysing the shortcomings in 
Government responses to farm poverty, consideration of the dominant idea 
needs to be accompanied by an examination of "non -rational" motivators 
such as emotion or sentiment. One of the key problems with the policies 
which have been developed to encourage marginal farmers to exit 
agriculture has been the inappropriateness of the incentives offered. In 
summary, farmers see these issues differently. 
Agrarianism remains very strong in rural Australia. This perception that life 
on the land is wholesome, pure, moral and inherently superior to life in the 
city has been accompanied by a self -image of the rugged, self -reliant 
individual, a factor which has often inhibited those in need from seeking 
welfare support. The following provides an example of the special virtues 
farmers attribute to themselves and their way of life. In a letter to the Editor 
of The Land during the drought of the early 1990s, Mr Angus McNeil wrote: 
Farmers, unlike many other Australians, do not like having to accept 
handouts and would prefer to stand on their own feet, drought or no 
drought. (McNeil 1994) 
The almost belligerent anti -urban tone is an example of a philosophy of 
agrarianism which includes a perception that "city life is both artificial and 
evil" (Flinn and Johnson 1974, p190). The values encompassed by 
agrarianism have not been protected or promoted in the policy 
development process in Australia. 
Lindblom described incrementalism's appeal as follows: 
Its hold on the citizens of the most stable democracies is attributable 
to many factors, among which I mention three: (a) widespread 
consensus on fundamental values, (b) frequent widespread 
agreement on the general direction and character of social changes, 
(c) relatively greater confidence in the predictability of consequences 
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of incremental as against drastic social change. (Lindblom 1958, 
p301). 
It is arguable that these conditions did not hold in Australia at the end of the 
20`h century. Towards the end of the period under review, Pauline 
Hanson's One Nation Party shook the major political parties in Australia. 
Although the NFF maintains that the majority of Ms Hanson's electoral 
success has come from non -farm rural people (Craik 1998), it appears that 
struggling family farmers have been among her supporters (Kingston 
1999a, pers comm). This is not surprising as much of Ms Hanson's rhetoric 
was pitched at the emotional level. 
The rise of Pauline Hanson and ongoing debates within the National Party 
about issues such as competition policy and the privatisation of Telstra 
suggest that there is not widespread agreement on the direction of social 
change. It is hard to determine whether agreement exists on fundamental 
values as these have been squeezed out of the policy debate in recent 
years by the almost exclusive focus on economics. The recent trend in 
voting in rural and regional areas may force political parties to reassess 
their purely economic approach to policy and respond to the views and 
frustrations that Ms Hanson appeared to unleash. 
Lindblom does not reject "big picture" policy debate. While acknowledging 
that incremental analysis "encourages us all to think small, timidly, 
conservatively about social change ", he argues 
the corrective is not the suppression or neglect of incremental 
analysis, which remains necessary and useful ... but the 
supplementation of incremental analysis by broad -ranging, often 
highly speculative, and sometimes utopian thinking about directions 
and possible features [sici, near and far in time. (Lindblom 1979, 
p522) 
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This is important. However, as Adams notes, although "Lindblom points out 
that long -run considerations need not be omitted" from the policy process `it 
is a point that he gives little attention to" (Adams 1979, p548). 
Etzioni's call for the employment of a more encompassing 
"socio- economics" as a basis for policy development may be another useful 
starting point (Etzioni 1988). He argues for a recognition of the complexity 
of social issues: 
Typically, we deal with a complex and changing world and need to 
apply more than one set of specialized variables; decision makers as 
a rule need to deal with all the relevant factors that account for a 
significant portion of the variance, as well as with the result of their 
interactions, disregarding the disciplinary compartments to which 
variables that characterize the phenomenon belong. Otherwise, the 
variables ignored will come to haunt the actors, as is the case when 
the psychic implications, or the social, cultural, and political 
prerequisites of economic policy are ignored. (Etzioni 1988, p124). 
As an alternative to "muddling through ", policy makers may need to invest 
some time in what Dror has characterised as "metapolicymaking" (Dror 
1968) - debating how they go about their tasks. If an effective response to 
farm poverty is to be developed, policy must not be treated as a technocratic 
exercise which excludes intangibles such as community values and 
aspirations. 
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CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION 
Farm poverty is a difficult issue for policy- makers. It is hard to measure and 
it raises a number of important questions about policy objectives, including 
equity and efficiency. Low incomes among farmers are brought about by 
several factors. The cause can be structural, relating to inadequate 
resources or changing market conditions, or temporary, resulting from 
sudden drops in commodity prices, or from the impact of natural 
phenomena such as droughts or floods. 
The first question which confronts the policy maker is whether government 
assistance should be provided at all. In the case of structural poverty, it can 
be argued that the economically rational course of action for poor farmers is 
to leave farming and invest their capital in an activity that produces higher 
returns. Where poverty is temporary, farmers could be called on to manage 
the risk of low income years - after all a variable climate and unreliable 
commodity markets are not unusual. The situation is not so clear cut, 
however. In the case of structural poverty, many of the conditions leading to 
farmers having inadequate incomes were the result of government policies 
in the first place. The soldier settlement schemes created undersized farms 
which are now struggling to be viable. Similarly "get big or get ouf' policies 
combined with high interest rates have resulted in many farmers coping 
with very high debt levels. Attempts to improve farmers' risk management 
skills require a series of good seasons in which the farm can generate 
sufficient income to accumulate the reserves required to cope with flood or 
drought. In the case of prolonged drought, many well prepared farmers can 
still find themselves in difficulty. 
Aside from the specific issues related to farming as an occupation, there are 
questions of equity. Many farmers endure low incomes because they value 
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the non -economic features of living and working on the land. Whether the 
community should support this choice by providing income support in the 
lean years raises questions of equity with other occupational groups, such 
as artists, who also may not be able to make an economic living in their 
chosen profession. Because of the close relationship between the farm 
business and farm family, consideration also needs to be give to the 
potential for welfare support to operate as a subsidy for an otherwise 
unviable business. 
As this thesis is being finalised in early 2001, poor farmers in Australia can 
apply to the Department of Family and Community Services for assistance 
through the Commonwealth Government's Farm Help program. This 
program provides re- establishment grants for farmers who choose to leave 
the industry and household support payments for a limited time while 
farmers in difficulty contemplate their futures on the land. Retraining 
support for farmers who take re- establishment grants is also available. If 
they are in an area declared to be experiencing exceptional circumstances 
they may be eligible for an exceptional circumstances relief payment. 
These options are remarkably similar to those facing a poor farmer in 1994 
or, but for the exceptional circumstances relief payment, 1989. Although 
payments in 2001 are administered Centrelink, policy development remains 
with the agriculture portfolio. 
The Policy Development Process 
Farm poverty is hard to define and measure as it is difficult to separate the 
farm family's household expenses from those of the business, and to 
account for the perquisites of farming, making comparison with wage and 
salary earners problematic. However, there is enough anecdotal evidence 
to suggest that there are farmers in Australia who are truly poor and to 
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whom the standard social security safety net is inaccessible. The question 
for policy makers is how these families should be helped. 
The answer provided consistently over the past several decades has been 
to assist those with a long term future in farming to improve their 
productivity; and for those who are not viable, to provide an incentive for 
them to sell up and leave the land. This apparently simple answer is 
complicated in years of drought when the question of some form of disaster 
assistance is added to the picture. On the basis of this policy prescription, 
the appropriate government portfolio to handle farm poverty is agriculture. 
However, like any organisation, the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Forestry Australia, and its predecessor DPIE, have value structures 
appropriate to their core business which, to use Herbert Simon's term, 
bound the area of rationality within which policy options are considered. 
Policy alternatives across the Australian government in the 1980s and 
1990s were bounded by the principles of economic liberalism. In the case 
of farm poverty, this meant that it was regarded as an economic problem 
related to industry adjustment and not a welfare issue to be considered in 
social justice terms. Within this economic framework, policy makers sought 
solutions which provided market incentives to poor farmers to take the 
decision to leave farming if the return on their capital was insufficient to 
provide the farm family with a reasonable income. 
Between 1989 and 1998 a series of programs was introduced in an attempt 
to achieve this policy outcome. As has been demonstrated, policy has 
developed incrementally, with policy makers looking to improve on existing 
schemes rather than tackling the problem synoptically. This incremental 
process was partly the result of limited time and staff resources and also the 
desire to ensure that the transition between schemes was smooth. 
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Innovative suggestions such as Synapse Consulting's Option C for 
providing income support were not given serious consideration because 
staff resources were tied up on other projects. The social security portfolio 
showed little interest in the issue, leaving responsibility with a Department 
whose primary focus was industry development and the economic health of 
agriculture. 
Charles Lindblom has argued that incremental policy development is 
preferable to any attempt at pursuing complete rationality in decision 
making. His model of policy development sees strategic disjointed 
incrementalism delivering superior policy outcomes because omissions are 
deliberate rather than accidental. To ensure that the outcomes are as 
comprehensive as possible, players in the policy process take on the role of 
watchdogs within the system, looking out for and protecting the values of 
different groups within society. The various partisans participating in the 
process bring a diversity of views to the policy debate and the test of good 
policy is that all players agree to the policy means, although they are not 
necessarily pursuing the same ends. 
This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that poor farmers in Australia 
have not been well served by the policy process. Although the various 
programs have been developed incrementally, there have been no 
watchdogs effectively acting for this group of farmers. The National 
Farmers' Federation has been focused on the agricultural industry rather 
than the individuals within it and has generally supported the direction of 
government structural adjustment policy. The social welfare groups have 
shown no interest in the plight of poor farmers. At a bureaucratic level, the 
agriculture Department's primary focus, like the NFF's, has been on 
agriculture as an industry. Finally, at the political level, farmers' voting 
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patterns have tended to ensure that Labor governments have had difficulty 
in acting on their behalf and, as a junior partner in the coalition, the 
National Party's once strong influence in the area of farmers' incomes has 
faded in recent years. 
The biggest obstacle to a more comprehensive consideration of farm 
poverty has been the dominance of a particular economic paradigm. There 
has been little scope within the public debate in Australia for alternatives to 
economic liberalism to be heard. The idea has been dominant in all 
sections of the policy community. There are several problems with the 
strength of this world view. In spite of the triumphalism of Francis Fukuyama 
(Fukuyama 1992) and to a certain extent Paul Kelly (Kelly 1994), it seems 
improbable that one economic theory can hold the solutions to the myriad 
complex problems that face human society. Like any other ideology, 
economic liberalism is based on a value system - in this case a highly 
individualistic, materialistic interpretation of human behaviour. However, it 
has created, largely successfully, an image for itself as politically neutral, 
instrumental and value -free. 
By setting the parameters for policy development, economic liberalism has 
constrained policy makers from considering alternative values. As has 
been outlined, many family farmers do not respond "rationally" to market 
signals. Their reasons for remaining in farming are not related to return on 
capital but to intangibles such as quality of life, attachment to the land and, 
in many cases, family history - factors which are not captured in the 
economic model. Policy makers who fail to consider these issues when 
constructing incentives intended to influence farmers' behaviour are setting 
themselves up for failure. 
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At a broader level, the issue of means and ends in policy development 
requires greater attention. Acceptance of economic liberalism as value free 
has created a false sense of security - a perception that governments 
simply manage the economy and that there is no need for ideology or even 
politics as they are not making value judgments. The path set out by 
economic liberalism is likely to lead agriculture to increased domination by 
agribusiness and larger -than- family farms. Whether this is where the 
farming community, or indeed the broader Australian community wants to 
go has not been the subject of much debate. The impact of this trend on the 
viability of rural communities and on the environment has not been 
discussed with any vigour. Economics is a useful tool for identifying the 
most efficient means for arriving at particular ends - however, it should not 
be allowed also to determine those means by default. 
Improving the Policy Process 
The pure rational- comprehensive model of policy making has largely been 
discredited by theorists on the basis that policy makers have neither the 
time, the resources nor the cognitive capacity to make decisions with a high 
degree of rationality. Charles Lindblom abandons the model completely 
and suggests that strategic policy making is the solution with a multiplicity of 
players bringing diverse views to the process thereby ensuring important 
values are represented. 
The present study highlights some limitations to this approach, the most 
important of which is that the Lindblom model does not require the 
separation of means from ends. While the two are not always distinct and, 
as Simon points out are often part of a chain in which the ends of one 
portion of the hierarchy can provide the means for achieving a higher goal, 
there is clearly a need for policy to have some sense of direction. The 
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setting of values for a community is a political activity. It cannot be achieved 
by applying an economic model, unless the community is in agreement that 
efficiency should be the overriding consideration to the exclusion of equity, 
justice or any other value. 
Farmers in Australia face particular challenges. They have been 
experiencing declining terms of trade for decades and increasing, often 
subsidy- based, international competition. In addition, they are subject to a 
highly variable climate with drought of some magnitude a common 
occurrence in many parts of the country. This thesis has not addressed 
issues of salinity and land degradation which are also putting pressure on 
both the land resource itself and on land management practices. In spite of 
these hardships, life on the land is valued by many farmers as a rewarding 
career choice and one which they would like to pass on to their children. 
The question for policy makers becomes to what extent an individual's 
lifestyle choice should be supported by the community. If the land is 
providing insufficient returns to avoid poverty, is there a moral obligation on 
taxpayers to provide income support or should farmers be encouraged to 
behave more rationally and give up their farms if they cannot make ends 
meet? If they do not respond to economic incentives, is it acceptable to let 
them "choose" poverty for themselves and their children? These questions 
can only be answered in light of community values - values that are not 
necessarily captured in the economic model. 
The Way Forward 
So, what are the options for Australian agriculture? Geoffrey Lawrence and 
others have argued persuasively that the policy path we are pursuing is 
leading us to a future of corporate, or at the very least larger- than -family 
farming. Is this where we wish to be heading? What are the implications of 
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this type of agriculture for rural and regional communities and for 
environmental sustainability? If we are happy with this outcome, there may 
be few changes needed to rural policy settings. 
Would we prefer an alternative future? The preservation of family farming 
as we have known it is likely to come with a price tag - in the face of 
declining terms of trade the smaller family farm will continue to face the 
probability of periods of inadequate income. If the community wishes to 
preserve this type of farming, are we prepared to set up some form of 
income support scheme for the bad years to ensure that Australian farm 
families are not living in poverty? These questions are beyond the scope of 
this thesis, however, It is argued that they need to be answered within the 
political arena. We need to recognise that we live in a society and not 
simply an economy and we must ensure that our policy debates take 
account of a diversity of value systems and perspectives. 
Pusey has written that 
Almost everything that happens in Canberra today is premised ... on 
the assumption that there is a hierarchical order of reality and 
causation that gives primacy to the economic system, and a second 
place to politics and the political system, and a third place to a 
residual view of society that is seen as some kind of stubbornly 
resisting sludge that variously inhibits and obstructs "the economy ". 
(Pusey 1990) 
This may be an overdrawn portrait of the policy process but it contains a 
degree of accuracy which is of concern, As this thesis has attempted to 
show, in the area of farm poverty this framework has resulted in complex 
and continually amended policies that have failed to deliver. As noted 
above, the 2000 review of the Farm Family Restart Scheme concluded that 
79 per cent of farmers who took re- establishment grants would have left 
farming anyway and the vast majority o those receiving income support 
would not be induced to leave farming by the existence of such a grant. 
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Nevertheless, the Government extended the scheme in the 2000 -2001 
Budget. 
The policy process has failed to encompass non -economic values in the 
consideration of farm poverty. Policy -makers have continued to muddle 
through, framing farm poverty as an adjustment issue and attempting to 
squeeze farmer behaviour into an ill- fitting economic model. Until all 
relevant values are considered in the policy process, and consideration is 
given to the ends as well as the means of achieving these values, a 
sensible response to farm poverty in Australia will remain elusive. 
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